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The objective of this thesis is to examine the use of evaluative language in texts that in 
one way or another defend vivisection. The primary material consists of 33 letters to the 
editor published in The Times between 1875 and 1884. The aim is to find out what and 
who are evaluated when vivisection is defended, and what type of evaluations are utilised. 
Furthermore, changes in the evaluative language between the letters published before and 
after the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876 are looked into, in order to find out whether the Act 
had influence on people´s attitudes concerning animal experimentation and thus the 
evaluative language used in the letters. 
 To investigate the evaluative language in the letters, appraisal theory (Martin and 
White 2005), a lexis-oriented classification system for analysing evaluations, is used. The 
framework is divided into three subtypes of Appraisal, but in this thesis, the focus is on 
Attitude, which deals with the actual feelings and opinions conveyed in texts. Attitude is 
further divided into Judgement, Appreciation and Affect, along with their subcategories. 
Besides the Attitude subtypes, the evaluations in the letters are categorised according to 
their target, valence and explicitness. The data are analysed both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. 
 Summarising the most relevant changes in the evaluative language and connecting 
them to vivisection itself, it can be concluded that there is a clear shift between the periods 
under examination in how the practice is seen and what aspects are highlighted: In the 
former letters, different types of animals, their use and their suffering are discussed 
relatively frequently, but patients, their suffering and diseases causing that suffering are 
hardly mentioned. In the latter letters, in turn, animals are rarely mentioned, but patients 
and diseases are discussed rather frequently. What is more, the utility of animal 
experimentation is raised substantially more frequently after the Act. It seems that before 
the Act, animals and their suffering are still considered worth discussing, but after it, 
people and their potential suffering replace animals in the discussion. In the same time, 
the role of the utility of vivisection, i.e. its potential for helping potentially suffering 
people, becomes increasingly important in people’s minds. Therefore, the findings 
indicate that the Act did influence people’s attitudes. Further, the findings support the 
idea that, instead of protecting animals, the Act protected vivisection by legitimising it 
and thus helping it become the standard method in biomedical research. 
 
Keywords: animal experiment, appraisal theory, Cruelty to Animals Act 1876, Late 
Modern English, letter to the editor, vivisection 
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The 19th century was highly significant to the development of animal1 protection and 
related legislation. The UK was the leading country in taking the first concrete steps 
towards better treatment of animals, both in terms of animal welfare charity and animal 
welfare legislation. For example, the world’s first animal welfare organization, the Royal 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) was founded in 1824 and was 
followed by several organisations focusing on different types of animal welfare issues. 
As for legislation, in 1822, the Cruel Treatment of Cattle Act 1822, the first significant 
piece of animal protection legislation in the world, was passed. It was expanded by the 
Cruelty to Animals Act 1835, and 14 years later, both Acts were replaced by the Cruelty 
to Animals Act 1849. 
The century was of great importance to regulating animal experimentation as well. 
In 1875, the world’s first anti-vivisection organization, the National Anti-Vivisection 
Society (NAVS) was established, the total abolition of vivisection as its prime objective. 
At the time, vivisection was understood to mean surgery or other painful operation 
conducted on a living, sentient animal2. The practice had been in use already in Ancient 
Greece and since then had formed a more or less systematic part of scientific research in 
some societies, but during the 17th and 18th century, animal experiments became a more 
widespread and regular part of medical and physiological investigation. In the 19th 
century, all types of scientific exploration increased dramatically both in Britain and 
elsewhere, and also medical research developed substantially, which resulted in a 
considerable increase in the use of experimental animals. 
In July 1875, due to growing opposition to vivisection, the Royal Commission on 
Vivisection was set up by the government, and it ended up recommending that legislation 
be enacted to control the practice.  In August 1876, the world’s first legislation to regulate 
animal experimentation, An Act to amend the Law relating to Cruelty to Animals Act 1876 
(henceforth referred to as Cruelty to Animals Act 1876) was passed—and remained in 
force for the next 110 years. As Hamilton states, “[t]he nineteenth-century vivisection 
                                                          
1 I use the term animal in this thesis—although it is not an ideal term to refer to non-human animals—
because that is the term used in the primary material.  
2 Today the term sometimes has a broader meaning. For example, according to New England Anti-
Vivisection Society’s website, vivisection refers to “using animals in ways that cause distress and/or death 
in attempts to test the safety of drugs and biological products or of finding treatments, prevention, or cures 
for human diseases”. Furthermore, nowadays the term is mainly used by the opponents of the practice, 
while defenders prefer terms such as animal experimentation, animal research and in vivo testing. 
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controversy in England is a distinctive shaping moment in the history of animal welfare 
and the changing relations between humans and animals” (2004, xiv). 
In this thesis, the focus is in particular on the abovementioned vivisection 
controversy in England, concentrating on a ten-year period around the effective date of 
the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876. Since both the country and the decades are of such 
significance to the development of laboratory animal protection around the world, it is 
important to understand how the topic was dealt with at the time, e.g. what aspects were 
raised, what sort of arguments were used and what type of language was utilised. For the 
purpose of this study, the latter question is the one under examination; more precisely, 
the aim is to examine the use of evaluative language in letters to the editor in The Times 
that in one way or another defend vivisection. Further, I will look into possible differences 
in the use of evaluative language between the letters published before and after the 
Cruelty to Animals Act 1876 came into effect.  
To analyse the use of evaluative language in the letters, I will use appraisal theory 
(Martin and White 2005), and I will also make some suggestions concerning the theory. 
This particular framework was chosen for the purpose because it provides a lexis-
oriented, discourse-based, detailed and multi-layered classification system for analysing 
evaluations. The material contains a considerable amount of explicitly evaluative lexis, 
which is why I find this type of lexis-oriented perspective particularly fruitful. Moreover, 
the theory takes into account the wider contexts—textual and social—in which 
individuals evaluations occur, the importance of which increases even further when 
analysing implicit evaluations, which compose the majority of my data. Finally, a less 
detailed framework might not do justice to the diverse and colourful language used in the 
material. 
The 19th century vivisection debate, the rise of the anti-vivisection movement and 
the significance of the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876 have been dealt with extensively in 
previous research (e.g. French 1975), but I have not been able to find any linguistic study 
concerning these topics. As for appraisal theory, it has been used in a dissertation that 
examines emotion-based strategies in modern anti-vivisection and pro-research 
mobilisation (Grivas 2008) and also in an article studying the portrayal of murderers and 
their victims in late 19th century newspapers (Nevala 2016), but, as far as I know, it has 
not been applied to 19th century letters to the editor of any topic nor to other historical 
texts opposing or defending vivisection. 
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In a nutshell, the theory is about linguistic resources of various types that speakers 
and writers use both to express evaluations of people, objects and processes—i.e. 
targets—and to engage themselves to the ideas presented in their texts (Martin and White 
2001, 1). The theory is divided into three subtypes of appraisal—Attitude, Engagement 
and Graduation—but in this thesis, the main focus will be on Attitude and its subsystems 
Judgement, Appreciation and Affect. Both qualitative and quantitative analysis will be 
conducted in order to gain better understanding of the language and possible differences 
between the time periods under examination. For annotating the letters and running 
statistical analyses, I will use UAM CorpusTool, a text annotation software that has an 
editable Appraisal scheme. The research questions I will be seeking answers to are as 
follows:  
 
1) What and who are the targets of evaluation when vivisection is defended? 
2) What types of evaluation are used when vivisection is defended? 
3) How does the use of evaluative language change after the Cruelty to Animals 
Act 1876 is passed? 
 
To answer the third research question, which naturally concerns the two other 
questions as well, it is important to consider the possible effects of the Cruelty to Animals 
Act 1876 on the attitudes towards vivisection and the people involved. Before the Act was 
passed, the practice of vivisection was quite a wild west, allowing anybody to do 
practically anything to animals in the name of science. At the time the Act was under 
negotiation, I would say there were roughly speaking three groups of people with different 
objectives with regard to vivisection and the new legislation: those who demanded the 
total abolition of vivisection, those who wanted the practice to be regulated and those 
who were of the opinion that the matter should be left to vivisectionists’ discretion (e.g. 
French). Those that were advocates of animal welfare, naturally hoped for a legislation 
that would protect animals. However, it seems that besides affording protection to certain 
animals in certain situations, above all it afforded protection to vivisection by 
institutionalising and legitimising the practice. As Hamilton states, “[c]ontrol and 
regulation of [vivisection] was fundamental to experimental science’s rising professional 
legitimacy and expert status” (2013, n.p.). Apparently under cover of that legitimacy and 
expert status, by 1883, The Association for the Advancement of Medicine by Research 




involved in the daily administration of the Cruelty to Animals Act, reviewing 
license applications, the certification of physiologists and their experiments, and 
passing along their recommendations to the home secretary. Under this 
arrangement, licenses increased one-hundred fold in a twenty-year 
period. (Hamilton 2013, n.p.) 
 
Furthermore, while the number of animal experiments towards the end of the century 
could still be counted in thousands (e.g. 7500 in 1896) (French 1975, 173), these figures 
were just an overture to the further development of animal use in experimental research; 
in 2019, there were 3.4 million scientific procedures conducted on living animals in Great 
Britain alone (Home Office 2019). 
 People’s awareness of vivisection was still relatively limited in the beginning of 
the 1800s3, but towards the end of the century, vivisection was not only commonly 
known, but also widely objected (Bates 2017, 14). As Bates describes, 
 
 [d]uring the nineteenth century, the anti-cruelty lobby went from being 
 largely unaware of vivisection to passionately opposing it, largely due to a 
 few high-profile incidents. By the century’s end, anti-vivisection had become 
 a humanitarian cause celebre, a mainstream issue with great public support 
 and many societies dedicated to it. (2017, 14) 
 
In fact, people actively opposing vivisection were always more numerous in Britain than 
those supporting it, and in the 19th century, anti-vivisectionists collected more signatures 
for anti-vivisection petitions than anybody for any other cause at the time (ibid.). Despite 
the popularity of the anti-vivisection cause, animal experimentation became increasingly 
common towards the end of the century—as mentioned above—and increased 
exponentially in the 1900s (Rowan and Lowen 2001). As Bates states,  
 
 since the nineteenth century, [animal] experimentation has become the gold 
 standard of academic medicine, shaping not only its approach to solving 
 problems, but also the moral conduct and education of doctors. (Bates, 2017, 13) 
  
 Considering the above-mentioned development, it does not seem that far-fetched 
that maybe in the end the new legislation has been even counter-productive to animals 
themselves. This is also a question Svärd raises, referring to two opposing points of view 
                                                          
3 Apparently even Richard Martin, a passionate campaigner against cruelty to animals and the initiator of 
the Cruel Treatment of Cattle Act 1822, was not aware of the practice starting to gain a foothold in Britain—
I assume they would have included experimental animals in the bill if they had realised what was going on, 
and where it was leading. 
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with regard to the historical function of animal welfarism (welfarism here refers to the 
view that ethical use of animals can be achieved by regulating the use; see e.g. Marino 
2016). According to Svärd, in the abolitionists’ view, “the gains made under the welfarist 
regime have largely been illusory” and its main function “has been to cover over the ugly 
realities of animal exploitation and lull the public into accepting ever-multiplied 
atrocities” (2018, 8). Without taking up any particular stand in the matter, I do believe the 
viewpoint is worth considering; it is possible that the Act, instead of protecting animals, 
helped vivisection become, by legitimising it, the established and generally accepted 
practice it still is today. 
The reason why this is interesting from a philological point of view and with regard to 
this thesis is that this type of changes unavoidably influence people’s attitudes and, most 
importantly, the ways they talk and write about the matters in question. As for the question 
of the Act’s influence on the development of animal protection in the long run, the 
changing attitudes might also, for their part, shed some light to that. Naturally, I do not 
expect to find a comprehensive explanation for why animal experimentation has 
developed the way it has from my analysis, but I do aim to find out whether there is 
something in the evaluative language in the letters that might indicate that cruelty to 
Animals Act 1876 really influenced people´s attitudes in a way that would from then on 
make them see animal experimentation in a different light—light that would be rather 
unfavourable to animals. 
I assume there is a change in the use of evaluative language after the Cruelty to 
Animals Act 1876 is passed, and I have some hypotheses about their nature. One 
possibility is that the legitimacy afforded by the new Act made the defenders of 
vivisection more confident and therefore more arrogant and aggressive. In the use of 
evaluative language, this might be manifested e.g. in the increased use of both (explicit) 
negative Judgements targeted at anti-vivisectionists and (explicit) positive Judgements at 
vivisectionists. Alternatively, increased confidence might have made them feel less need 
to convince their audience and hence use fewer (explicit) positive Appreciations targeted 
at vivisection and fewer (explicit) positive Judgements at vivisectionists. Next, I will 
present the outline of this thesis. 
Section 2 concerns the development of vivisection in the 19th century, and in 
section 3, appraisal theory will be presented. In section 4, I will introduce the primary 
material of this thesis, in section 5, the analysis will be dealt with, and in section 6, the 
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findings will be presented. Finally, sections 7 and 8 are for the discussion and the 
conclusion, respectively.  
  
2 Vivisection ‒ From a feared continental practice to a 
regulated scientific method 
This section will deal with the history of vivisection in the 19th century, more particularly 
how medicine developed in Europe, what kind of consequences the change had for 
vivisection, the characteristics ascribed to pro-vivisectionists and anti-vivisectionists of 
the time, and the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876. 
 
2.1 Vivisection as the key to the progress of Science 
Medicine was going through fundamental changes in Europe during the first half of the 
19th century (Franco 2013, chap. 5). This could be seen in concrete changes in medical 
practice—new hospitals were built, new methods and instruments were invented, and 
doctors were trained in universities—but also in a more profound shift in how the function 
of the body was understood: 
 
 There was also a growing acknowledgement by the medical community that 
 most medical practice, up to that period, was based on unproven traditions  and     
 beliefs and that most therapies were not only ineffective but often worsened the 
 patient’s condition. As a result, medical practice increasingly began to focus more 
 on understanding pathology and disease progression, pursuing more accurate 
 diagnosis and prognosis. (ibid.) 
 
As expected, moving from basically faith-based healing to more scientific medical 
practices would also change people’s attitudes towards those practicing them and those 
producing the knowledge. As Franco states, “[t]his paradigm shift would help give more 
credit and recognition to medical doctors and scientists, who, at that time, were often 
viewed with disdain and suspicion by the general public” (ibid.). 
 The change was also happening in experimental science, “[change] that would 
ultimately provide the consistent basic science on which twentieth-century modern 
medicine would set its foundations” (Franco 2013, chap. 5). In France, for example, the 
Académie Royale de Médecine was founded in 1820, and as Franco describes its 
significance for the development of medicine, it was “a thriving academic environment 
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where science—and physiology, chemistry, and pharmacy, in particular—would finally 
be incorporated into medicine”. They continue by describing the development as follows: 
 
  The acknowledgment of the great knowledge gap in physiology and 
 pathology, and the openness to positivist views on scientific knowledge, led 
 to the definitive abandonment of the quasi-esoteric and, up to that time, 
 dominant vitalistic4 theories in physiology […] This led to a generalization of 
 the understanding of all bodily processes as an expression of physical and 
 chemical factors, (Franco 2013, chap. 5) 
 
The new understanding of bodily functions, in turn, “led to a greater relevance given to 
animal experiments for answering scientific questions” (ibid.), and, according to Franco, 
“[a]t the Académie, animal experiments were being increasingly prompted by existing 
clinical problems, and carried out with the ultimate goal of developing new therapeutic 
approaches to tackle these issues (ibid.). 
 Two French physiologists were of a particular significance for experimental 
physiology of the time, François Magendie—“the father of experimental physiology” 
(e.g. Stahnisch 2009)—and their disciple Claude Bernard (Franco 2013, chap. 5). As 
Franco states, 
 
 Bernard’s experimental epistemology, unlike his tutor’s more exploratory 
 approach, advocated that only properly controlled and rigorously conducted 
 animal experiments could provide reliable information on physiology and 
 pathology of medical relevance, setting the landmark of experimental 
 medicine. (ibid.) 
 
However, Magendie and Bernard did not achieve renown only for their contributions to 
science, but both became notorious for their extremely cruel experiments (ibid.).  
 The same type of development was taking place in the Prussian/German 
physiology circles (Franco 2013, chap. 5), and both the researchers there and e.g. earlier-
mentioned Magendie and Bernard had a fundamental influence on the spread of animal 
experimentation around the Western world: 
 
 Thousands of students flocked to attend medical schools in Germanic 
 universities (and French institutes, although to a lesser extent) […] This, in 
 turn, would lead to an unprecedented rise in animal research-based  advancement 
                                                          
4 According to these theories, “a vital principle, the ‘soul’, was the main source of living functions in 
organisms, rather than biochemical reactions” (Franco 2013, chap. 5). 
8 
 
 in biological and medical knowledge in the late nineteenth  century—with                 
 important consequences for public health and quality of life. (ibid.) 
 
 While Continental researchers were establishing the vivisectional practices—and 
“had few qualms about animal experimentation” (French 1975, 39)—their counterparts 
in Britain were not—at least not unanimously—very keen on joining them (ibid.; Franco, 
2013 chap. 5). However, in the 1870s, due to e.g. the publication of Handbook for the 
Physiological Laboratory (1873) by John Burdon-Sanderson, the relevance of vivisection 
became increasingly recognised also in the British medical circles (Franco 2013, chap. 
5). 
 
2.2 Characteristics of pro-vivisectionists and anti-vivisectionists 
The debate on animal experimentation has naturally changed over time. Whereas today’s 
debate focuses primarily on animal rights and the utility of the practice, in the 19th century 
the arguments were not only different, but also more numerous. As far as I can tell, 
previous studies on vivisection controversy have mainly focused on the anti-vivisection 
movement and anti-vivisectionists’ motives, whereas pro-vivisectionists’ perspective has 
not been studied in such depth. However, since pro-vivisectionists’—like anybody 
else’s—reasoning have originated and developed in a more or less constant dialogue with 
others, considering the anti-vivisectionist viewpoint as well can help understand how pro-
vivisectionists’ attitudes and arguments were formed. In this subsection, I will briefly 
discuss the most relevant arguments in the 19th century vivisection controversy, 
emphasising those that have most relevance with regard to my own study. 
 According to Bates, the 19th century debate concerned, rather than the utility of 
vivisection, the character of the experimenter (2017, 7); more specifically, people were 
worried about the possible consequences it might have for themselves if doctors and 
scientists engaged in such a cruel practice (Bates 2017, 18‒19). As Bates continues, 
paraphrasing Boddice (20085), “the suffering experienced by animals and their rights or 
interests were of lesser importance than the effects of vivisection on the experimenter and 
on society” (Bates 2017, 20). In fact, according to Bates, “the ethical arguments that 
sustained [anti-vivisection movement] from its beginning and throughout its heyday” 
(2017, 4) can be summarised into two major concerns:  
                                                          
5 Boddice, Rob. 2008. A History of Attitudes and Behaviours toward Animals in Eighteenth- and 





 that it is socially irresponsible to permit cruelty, that Christianity, and other 
 faiths, require animals to be treated as more than means to an end, and that 
 a balanced, holistic approach to medicine must draw on emotional and 
 spiritual insights as well as on the results of experiment. (ibid.) 
 
The anthropocentric perspective of the anti-vivisectionists at the time becomes clear also 
from the reasons why Animals’ friend Society was against vivisection. In 1833, they listed 
five objections to the practice, all related to humans, directly or indirectly (Bates 2017, 
197). As Hamilton notes, 
 
 [a]t a time when the opponents of vivisection concern themselves almost 
 exclusively with the rights and interests of animals […] it is salutary to recall 
 that the radical Animals’ Friend Society’s five objections to vivisection did not 
 mention animals at all: according to them, [vivisection] was a moral failing, 
 created public animosity against scientists, fostered cruelty towards humans, 
 diverted charity away from human causes, and offended God. On these 
 principals was built an anti-cruelty movement unequalled anywhere in the 
 world.  (ibid.) 
 
The main theme of the opposition seems to have been the cruelness and immorality of 
vivisection, and, as expected, many people found vivisectionists cruel and unempathetic 
(e.g. French 1975, 20, 22). These qualities were considered particularly problematic in 
those practising vivisection—doctors and scientists; they were judged according to 
different norms than those abusing other types of non-human animals, e.g. farm animals 
(Bates 2017, 14). Different standards were applied to them  
 
 partly because those responsible were linked with the healing and academic 
 professions, whose morality was supposed to be beyond reproach, and also 
 because it had implications beyond animal welfare: for the way society made 
 ethical choices, for how science should be conducted, and for how humans 
 saw themselves in relation to the rest of creation. (ibid.) 
 
Medical doctors in particular were expected to be compassionate, and many of them were 
worried about losing people’s trust if they were connected to vivisection:  
 
 [w]hen the Continental fashion for vivisection first touched Britain in the 
 1820s, many doctors chose to distance themselves from it for the sake of their 
 reputation, and the few who did undertake it felt the need to defend a 




In fact, in the mid-century, “when vivisection was introduced into British laboratories and 
medical schools […], much of the opposition to it came from doctors” (Bates 2013, 1). 
 A single incident that probably contributed substantially to doctors’ fears—and 
other people’s as well—was Magendie’s public dissection of a dog in England in 1824, 
when anaesthetics were not yet available (for details on the experimentation, see e.g. 
Tubbs et al. 2008). As Franco notes, paraphrasing other researchers, “[d]espite the broad 
recognition of [Magendie’s] contributions to science by most peers, he was also amongst 
the most infamous of his time for the disdain he held for his experimental subjects” (2013, 
chap. 5). According to Franco, however, Magendie—or their disciple Bernard—did not 
see themselves the same way as their critics; quite the contrary, they considered 
themselves as humanists (ibid.). As Franco continues,  
 
 their view that animals did not deserve the same moral consideration as 
 humans made them condemn experiments in humans without previous work 
 on animals, the general principle on which the use of animal models in 
 biomedical science is still grounded. (ibid.) 
 
Cruel or not, Magendie’s notorious experiments had very long-lasting effects: even in the 
report of the first Royal Commission on Vivisection from 1876, Magendie’s experiments 
are referred to as a proof of vivisectors’ cruelness and thus a need for a vivisection 
legislation. In fact, the need for a new legislation had been recognised already in 1824, 
when Magendie had visited London and Martin’s Act had been proven powerless against 
Magendie’s experiments (Bates 2013, 17). However, there was another outcome of the 
outcry, which has relevance to the current study as well: from then on, pro-vivisectionists 
were aware of how important it was to highlight the utility of vivisection. As Bates argues,  
 
 [t]he need to show they were compliant with anti-cruelty law inclined future 
 experimenters to favour utilitarian arguments, because anticipated benefits to 
 human health  provided a clear, rational justification for their work. (2013, 
 17) 
 
 There was also another reason for British doctors to object to vivisection, besides 
saving their reputation as compassionate healers: as Bates notes, they “resented the 
introduction of novel, Continental experimental methods that challenged their tradition 





 [t]aking advantage of the rising antivivisection trend, British anatomists 
 explored the (undoubted) gruesomeness of Magendie’s experiments, along 
 with some nationalistic partisanship and xenophobic feelings against France, 
 in their defense of anatomical observation as the primary method for 
 advancing physiology, to the detriment of experiment through vivisection. 
 (2013, chap. 5) 
 
 While medical doctors were trying to convince people of their humaneness and 
competence, scientists engaging in vivisection underlined the importance of one’s 
objectivity, which, in turn, required strong self-restraint (Bates 2017, 6‒7). In Bates’ 
view, vivisectors “thought they were doing something that needed to be done, and many 
genuinely disliked doing it” (ibid.). While anti-vivisectionists found them “cold, heartless 
and indifferent”, [vivisectors considered themselves] cool, objective and scientific 
instead” (ibid.). As Bates notes, “the culture of masculinity was strong in medicine and 
[…] many members of this quintessentially caring profession were driven to regard 
sentimentality as a weakness of character” (2017, 7). As for the pain inflicted to the 
experimental animals, it was “though regrettable [but] a necessary element in the 
experimental method and the medical benefits to humans that might ensue from 
experimentation” (Hamilton 2013, chap. “Pain and Anesthetics”). As Bates summarises, 
“[v]ivisectionists […] defended themselves with utilitarian arguments […] and also tried 
to show that their motives were virtuous” (Bates 2017, 23). While vivisectors saw 
themselves as objective scientists and generous humanists, they accused anti-
vivisectionists of being “soft, sentimental, and womanish, [and] of valuing other animals 
above their own species and hampering life-saving research because they were too weak 
to stomach the necessary experiments” (Bates 2017, 7). 
 The fact that vivisectors were able to supress their emotions obviously did not 
mean that they did not have them or that they were not concerned about the subject. As 
Boddice describes, 
 
 British medical scientists in the 1870s and 1880s were […] acutely aware of 
 the reflexive problems of causing pain. At worst, it might adversely affect  their 
 own ‘nerve’, and prevent them from following through their inquiries to the fullest 
 extent. The infliction of pain on an animal, where unnecessary, might betray a 
 callousness that could affect society at large. (2012, 6) 
 
Despite various views on non-human animals’ ability to suffer (Boddice 2012, 3‒6), 
generally speaking, physiologists of the time were of the opinion that “vivisection without 
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anaesthetic was difficult because animal suffering was, however mitigated, real” 
(Boddice 2012, 6). Considering the potential benefits, however, it was worthwhile (ibid.). 
 By the late 19th century, animal experimentation had become the leading method 
for developing medical treatments (Bates 2017, 4), which naturally changed the public’s 
attitudes towards vivisectors as well: 
 
 though [vivisectors] were disliked and sometimes feared by the public, they 
 were also admired for their fortitude and commitment to the pursuit of 
 science. If medical progress required experiments on animals, then the 
 scientist’s cool indifference to vivisecting them signified dedication and self-
 mastery rather than callousness or cruelty. (Bates 2017, 4‒5) 
 
What is more, attitudes towards anti-vivisectionists were becoming increasingly negative: 
by the early 1900s, “to be pro-vivisection was to be for science, progress, and the relief 
of human suffering, while anti-vivisectionists were enemies of science, whose 
sentimentality and squeamishness were obstacles to be overcome” (Bates 2017, 5).  
  
2.3 Cruelty to Animals Act 1876  
As discussed above, the anti-vivisection movement was becoming increasingly strong 
and influential towards the last fourth of the 19th century (French 1975, 55). However, it 
had become clear that without new legislation, there was little anti-vivisectionists could 
do to change the way non-human animals were treated in the name of science (Hamilton, 
2013, chap. “Demonstration and Expertise”). Already in the 1820s, after Magendie had 
performed their notorious experiments, “Martin’s Act”, which concerned wanton and 
cruel acts against cattle, had been put to test and proved to be ineffectual in controlling 
vivisection:  
 
 [the] law was powerless to stop it because scientific experiments were 
 performed in a deliberate, calculated manner and not ‘wantonly’, and so could 
 not, by definition, be cruel under the law. (Bates 2017, 17) 
 
In the Cruelty to Animals Act 1835, also dogs and cats were included, but it still only 
concerned wanton and cruel acts. From the Cruelty to Animals Act 1849, which replaced 
the previous Acts, the wantonness had been left out, but the acts would still have to be 
done cruelly in order for them to be seen as illegal. This naturally made it practically 
impossible to do anything to “scientific experimentations” with the current legislation. 
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 However, anti-vivisectionists were not the only ones to publicly promote the 
regulation of vivisection: for example, in 1870, a committee for formulating guidelines 
for animal experimentation was formed by the General Committee of the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science (French, 1975, 45). According to French, 
“[t]he physiologists knew they were treating a subject of considerable sensitivity, but they 
still trusted that the statement of careful guidelines and the avowal of good intentions 
might suffice” (1975, 46). In Hamilton’s view, “[a]nimal pain appears here to have been 
a kind of originating concern” (2017, chap. “Pain and Anesthetics”), which can be seen 
in the proposed regulations: 
 
 first, to use anesthesia whenever possible; second, teaching demonstrations 
 involving live animals were either to be painless or must use anaesthesia; third, 
 painful research experiments were to be performed solely by skilled people using 
 proper instruments and laboratory facilities; and, fourth, veterinary education was 
 not to use vivisection to improve manual dexterity. (ibid.) 
 
As can be seen from the regulations, pro-vivisectionists were aware that people were 
concerned about the pain inflicted to experimental animals—and that it was important to 
convince the public of vivisectors being able to regulate the practice themselves 
(Hamilton, 2017, chap. “Pain and Anesthetics”). In Franco’s view, on the other hand, 
formulating the recommendations just meant that “British physiologists had set 
themselves guidelines for responsible research” (Franco, 2013, chap. 5). Radford seems 
to be conforming to French and Hamilton’s thoughts:  
  
 the scientific community, fearful that the legality of vivisection would fall  to be 
 determined by magistrates, as a result of their interpretation of the anti-
 cruelty legislation, were moving towards the view that legislation specifically 
 permitting the practice might be required. (2001, 68) 
 
 Due to the increasing pressure from both the anti-vivisection movement and 
vivisectionists themselves, in 1875, a Royal Commission to inquire into the practice of 
vivisection was constituted (Bates, 2017, 26; Germain, Chiapperino and Testa 2017, 77). 
The Commission’s report was completed in the beginning of the following year, and it 
recommended that a legislation to regulate vivisection be enacted (Franco 2013, chap. 5). 
Later that year, 15 August 1876, An Act to amend the Law relating to Cruelty to Animals 
1876 was passed (ibid.).   
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 The Act consists of 22 clauses6: the first one presents the short title of the Act, and 
the five following ones concern regulations of painful experiments; clauses 7‒12 have to 
do with the administration of law, e.g. registration of places for experimentation, licenses 
to perform experiments, etc.; the next 9 clauses, clauses 13‒21, concern legal proceedings 
resulting from offending against the Act; and clause 22 concerns the delimitation of the 
target group: “[t]his Act shall not apply to invertebrate animals” (39 & 40 Vict. c. 77, 3). 
What is to be noted is that neither does the Act concern non-human animals that are killed 
before the experimentation nor those used in experimentations that are expected not to 
cause pain. As it reads in the Act,  
 
 [w]hereas it is expedient to amend the law relating to cruelty to Animals by 
 extending it to the cases of animals which for medical, physiological, or other 
 scientific purposes are subjected when alive to experiments calculated to inflict 
 pain. (ibid.) 
 
The Act does not contain any references to other type of animal experiments but those 
expected to cause pain.  
 The basic idea of the Act is summed up in the second clause: “A person shall not 
perform on a living animal any experiment calculated to give pain, except subject to the 
restrictions imposed by this Act” (39 & 40 Vict. c. 77, 3). In clause three, there are six 
subclauses7 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 77, 3‒4): 
 
(1.) The experiment must be performed with a view to the advancement by 
new discovery of physiological knowledge which will be useful for saving 
or prolonging life or alleviating suffering. 
 
(2.) The experiment must be performed by a person holding such license […] 
as in this Act mentioned […] 
 
(3.) The animal must during the whole of the experiment be under the 
influence of some anӕsthetic of sufficient power to prevent the animal 
feeling pain. 
 
(4.) The animal must, if the pain is likely to continue after the effect of the 
anӕsthetic has ceased, or if any serious injury has been inflicted on the 
animal, be killed before it recovers from the influence of the anӕsthetic 
[…] 
 
                                                          
6 Nowadays sections  
7 Nowadays subsections 
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(5.) The experiment shall not be performed as an illustration of lectures in 
medical schools, hospitals, colleges, or elsewhere. 
 
(6.) The experiment shall not be performed for the purpose of attaining manual 
skill. 
 
After these subclauses, there are additional four subclauses supplementing them (39 & 40 
Vict. c. 77, 4‒5): 
 
(1.) Experiments may be performed […] by a person giving illustrations of 
lectures in medical schools, hospitals, or colleges, or elsewhere [in  case] 
the proposed experiments are absolutely necessary […] 
 
(2.) Experiments may be performed without anӕsthetics [in case] 
 insensibility cannot be produced without necessarily frustrating the 
 object of such experiments […] 
(3.) Experiments may be performed without [the animal being] killed 
 before it recovers from the influence of the anӕsthetic [in case] the so 
 killing the animal would necessarily frustrate the object of the 
 experiment […] 
(4.) Experiments may be performed not directly for the advancement by 
 new discovery of physiological knowledge, or of knowledge which 
 will be useful for saving or prolonging life or alleviating suffering, but 
 for the purpose of testing a particular former discovery alleged to  have 
 been made for the advancement of such knowledge as last  aforesaid [or 
 in case] such testing is absolutely necessary for the  effectual 
 advancement of such knowledge. 
 
Further, clause 4 prohibits the use of curare as an anӕsthetic (39 & 40 Vict. c. 77, 5). 
Clause 5 concerns the use of cats, dogs, horses, asses and mules (ibid.): 
 
 5. [A]n experiment calculated to give pain shall not be performed  
  without anӕsthetics on a dog or cat [unless otherwise] the object of  
  the experiment will be necessarily frustrated […] [A]n experiment  
  calculated to give pain shall not be performed on any horse, ass, or  
  mule [unless otherwise] the object of the experiment will be  
  necessarily frustrated. 
 
In clause 6, any exhibition to the general public of painful experiments is prohibited (39 
& 40 Vict. c. 77, 5). 
 It seems that the Act did very little to protect animals from exploitation and abuse. 
As Bates describes the Act, it was “permissive rather that regulatory” (2017, 27), and 
according to Germain, Chiapperino and Testa, it “proved very soft on scientists” (2017, 
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77). Considering the indeed permissive contents of the Act, one cannot help wondering 
about its true objective. 
 
3 Appraisal theory 
Appraisal theory has its origins in systemic functional linguistics, a function-focused 
theory of language, mainly developed by M. A. K. Halliday (see e.g. Halliday and 
Matthiessen 2013 for more information on SFL). In this thesis, however, appraisal theory 
is treated as an independent framework. As Bednarek notes, “[e]ven though appraisal 
theory works within systemic functional linguistics (SFL), it can also be adopted in a 
more theory-neutral way to the analysis of language” (2008, 12). Consequently, SFL will 
not be introduced further, and no prior knowledge of SFL is required from the reader.   
 As mentioned earlier, appraisal theory deals with language of evaluation. More 
particularly, it has to do with linguistic resources that are used, on one hand, to express 
evaluations and, on the other hand, the evaluator’s commitment to these evaluations 
(White 2015b, chap. 1). The theory is divided into three subtypes of appraisal—Attitude, 
Engagement and Graduation, and as White describes, the subtypes deal with, 
respectively, “those meanings by which texts convey positive or negative assessments, 
[those] by which the intensity or directness of such attitudinal utterances is strengthened 
or weakened and [those] by which speakers/writers engage dialogistically with prior 
speakers or with potential respondents to the current proposition” (ibid.). However, 
considering the scope of my research and the complexity of each subtype alone, I will 
focus on Attitude, i.e. the actual opinions and feelings conveyed.   
In this section, I will describe appraisal theory, using The Appraisal Website 
(White 2015a) and The Language of Evaluation: Appraisal in English (2005) as the 
starting point, but bringing up other researchers’ viewpoints as well. The Appraisal 
Website was initially published in 2001 and has been extended over the past decades, and 
the book is the first comprehensive account of the theory, written by James R. Martin and 
Peter R. R. White, who—together with other colleagues—developed the theory in the 
1990s and 2000s (White 2015a). However, like is the case with all seminal works, the 
ideas presented in the book have later been developed and also challenged. As White 
described almost two decades ago, and Wei et al. more recently, the theory seems to be 




[A]ppraisal theory is very much an on-going research project - many problems are 
still to be solved and many lexicogrammatical and semantic issues have yet to be 
addressed. There are numerous registers and discourse domains to which the 
theory has not yet been applied. (White 2015a) 
 
Appraisal Theory is an effective framework for analyzing attitudes expressed and 
interpersonal meanings in various types of discourse such as literary works, news, 
legal, scientific and academic discourse. There are still some arguments about the 
theory itself and future studies are recommended to focus on the identification and 
classification of appraisal resources. (Wei et al. 2015, 1)    
 
In my view, both quotations are still relevant today, and in this thesis, I will try—maybe 
not to solve, but to discuss—at least some of those problems and arguments related to the 
framework. Some of the issues are mainly discussed in the theory section, as they do not 
have a significant role in my analysis, but most of them are clearly visible in the analysis 
section as well.  
                     
3.1 Attitude 
Attitude is concerned with “[v]alues by which speakers pass judgements and associate 
emotional responses with participants and processes” (White 2015a). In other words, it 
deals with how people express—through their or somebody else’s thoughts or feelings—
evaluations of different kinds of targets. The theory is further divided into Judgement 
(evaluation of human behaviour), Appreciation (evaluation of objects and processes) and 
Affect (emotional response), each with several subtypes (ibid.). The three subsystems, 
along with their subtypes, will be dealt with in their own subsections below. Furthermore, 
I will discuss a couple of points that concern the valence (polarity in Martin and White 




Judgement deals with attitudes towards people’s character and behaviour—attitudes 
based on society’s shared values, expectations and institutionalised norms (Martin and 
White 2005, 52; White 2015a), like in the following example: 
 
 (1) He corruptly agreed to accept money from those bidding for the 




Depending on what type of consequences result from violating the social norms, Martin 
and White divide judgements into those of social sanction and those of social esteem 
(White 2015a). Those of social sanction have to do with morality and legality and 
“involve an assertion that some set of rules or regulations, more or less explicitly codified 
by the culture, are at issue” (ibid.), and often, violations of these rules or regulations are 
seen as sins or crimes, depending on the context (ibid.). Violations of norms related to 
social esteem, in turn, do not cause moral or legal consequences but rather result in less 
appreciation of the judged individual by the community members; “negative values of 
social esteem will be seen as dysfunctional or inappropriate or to be discouraged” (ibid.).  
Judgement of Social sanction is further divided into two subcategories, Veracity 
and Propriety, and that of Social esteem into Capacity, Tenacity and Normality (Martin 
and White 2005, 52–53). Simply put, Veracity concerns people’s truthfulness, Propriety 
their ethics, Capacity their capability, Tenacity their determination and dependability and 
Normality their specialness (ibid.). As one can notice, the first four categories are fairly 
self-explanatory, but the fifth one, Normality, might require some clarification; as far as 
I understand it, Normality can be described as follows: when one is seen as e.g. “natural”, 
“familiar” or “predictable”, they are considered “normal enough”, while when seen as 
e.g. “lucky”, “avant garde” or “celebrated”, they are considered “unnormal enough”, i.e. 
“special enough” (Examples of possible realisations od Appreciation taken from Martin 
and White 2005, 53). Therefore, both being normal and unnormal can be considered 
positive or negative. What is more, a point that is not explicitly mentioned in Martin and 
White (2005) but I find important with respect to distinguishing between the Judgement 
categories is related to the essential difference between Normality and the rest of the 
categories: In my view, Normality values are related to how people are seen in 
comparison to other people, hence the term ‘normality’, while other Judgement values 
are actual qualities ascribed to the targets. In fact, often ascribing other Judgement values 
to somebody makes us see them as normal or unnormal. For example, if you are insane 
enough, you are probably considered odd; if you are reckless, deceitful or unfair, you are 
also unpredictable; if you are educated, you are most likely to be considered lucky; and 
if you are very successful, it is likely you are celebrated as well. 
Illustrative realisations for each subcategory of Judgement are listed in tables 1 
and 2 below (examples taken from Martin and White 2005, 53). Although all of them are 
adjectives, it is important to keep in mind that Judgement can be conveyed by various 
types of realisations, not just adjectives, which naturally applies to all Attitude subtypes. 
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However, since the purpose of the tables is to illustrate what types of values each 
subcategory of Judgement covers, I find it sensible to focus on the actual features 
connected to the judged individual, not the way the judging is done (whether it is done 
using noun, verb, adjective, invoked evaluation, etc.). Furthermore, like this the lists are 
as uniform as possible and thus easy to follow. It is to be noted that the adjectives in the 
right column are not supposed to be the negative counterparts of the ones in the middle, 
but the aim is to provide the reader with a concise list of words that represent the 
categories comprehensively enough for the time being. 
 

















Tenacity Brave, careful, resolute Impatient, unreliable, 
stubborn 








                                                          
8 Martin and White (2015, 53, table 2.7) list discrete and tactful under Veracity, apparently considering 
them “positive dishonesty”, as in “dishonest enough to be tactful”. However, I see them better suiting either 
Capacity, as in “skilful or clever enough to act according to the situation in question” or Propriety, as in 
“kind or polite enough to behave discreetly”. 
9 Martin and White (ibid.) list also blunt and blabbermouth under Veracity, apparently considering them as 
“negative honesty”, as in “too honest to be tactful”. However, I see them better suiting either Capacity, as 
in “too stupid or socially incompetent to act according to the situation in question” or Propriety, as in “too 
insensitive or discourteous to behave discreetly”. 
10 Martin and White (ibid.) list unsung under positive Normality, but, the definition of the word being “not 
noticed or praised for doing hard work, being brave, or achieving results” (CD, s.v. “unsung,” adj.), I would 
rather say it is either a negative value of Normality or a positive value of Capacity or Tenacity; “Not 
noticed or praised” means roughly the same as obscure, and doing hard work or achieving results is usually 
connected with people’s capability, and being brave with their determination and dependability. 
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However, it is important to bear in mind—when choosing the right Appraisal 
categories for different lexical items—that not always can this be done as 
straightforwardly as the tables above might suggest; as Martin and White note, the 
meaning of a lexical item can vary from context to context—and might even change from 
negative to positive, and vice versa (cf. slow person vs. slow food), and consequently 
“[the word list] should not be treated as a dictionary of the value of judgement which can 
be mechanically applied in a text analysis” (Martin and White 2005, 52). The importance 
of understanding the context in which evaluative language is used will be dealt with in 
more detail later in this thesis. 
 
3.1.2 Appreciation 
While Judgement deals with evaluations made of a person’s character and their behaviour, 
Appreciation primarily concerns evaluating inanimate things, or as White puts it, products 
and processes; these can be e.g. natural or manufactured objects, texts, policies, 
performances and natural phenomena (White, 2015a; Martin and White 2005, 36, 56), 
like in the following examples: 
 
 (2) a beautiful sunset (White 2015a) 
 (3) an ugly scar (ibid.) 
 
However, evaluations of Appreciation can also be made of humans when they are 
“viewed more as entities than as participants who behave” (White 2015a), like below: 
 
 (4) Sophie's little suit makes her look […] curvily sexy (White 2015a;  
  underlining omitted) 
 
Appreciation covers values related to both aesthetics [as in sensori-emotional values, not 
just beauty] and social valuation and is further divided into three subcategories, Reaction, 
Composition and Valuation (White 2015a). 
The subcategories of Appreciation are fairly self-explanatory: reaction has to do 
with the reactions things arouse in us, Composition with how well things are formed and 
Valuation with whether things are worthwhile or not (White 2015a). According to Martin 
and White, the latter category, Valuation, is “especially sensitive to field since the value 




of things depends so much on our institutional focus” (2005, 57). This is illustrated by 
comparing values associated with a certain artist’s music—pure, hardcore and vintage—
and those associated with academic work—penetrating, significant and profound (ibid.). 
Reaction is further divided into Impact and Quality and Composition into Balance 
and Complexity, the whole system therefore being comprised of five types of 
Appreciation (Martin and White 2005, 56). Impact has to do with whether and how things 
catch one’s attention, while Quality focuses on whether things are likeable or not; Balance 
encompasses the values related to the coherence of things and Complexity those related 
to, well, how complex things are.  (ibid.). In the case of Complexity, a similar point is to 
be noted as was with Normality in section 4.1.1; as I understand it, Complexity can be 
described as follows: when something is seen as e.g. “detailed” or “precise”, it is 
considered “complex enough”, while when seen as e.g. “simple” or “elegant”, it is 
considered “uncomplex enough”. Furthermore, if something is “lucid” or “clear”, it could 
be described as “perfectly complex”, i.e. “of not too much nor too little complexity” 
(example evaluative items taken from Martin and White 2005, 56). Therefore, both being 
complex and uncomplex can be considered positive or negative. 
A point that is not explicitly discussed in Martin and White (2005) but in my view 
is a rather important one is the essential difference between Reaction and the rest of the 
Appreciation categories: while values of Composition and Valuation are more directly 
attached to the targets themselves, values of Reaction reveal how we feel about the 
targets: “did it grab me?” or “did I like it”, as Martin and White put it (2005, 56). In fact, 
often ascribing values of Composition and Valuation to something probably leads us to 
connect values of Reaction to that something as well. For example, a harmonious or 
detailed piece of art is often considered beautiful or arresting, and a penetrating or creative 
analysis is likely to be seen as a good and fascinating one (example values from table 2.8 
in Martin and White, 2005, 56). 
Illustrative realisations for each subcategory of Appreciation are listed in table 3 
below (examples taken from Martin and White 2005, 56).  
 



























In the next subsection, the final subsystem of Attitude—Affect—is presented. 
After discussing briefly what Affect is about in general terms, I will move on to presenting 
its five subcategories, most of which is also divided into lower-level categories, like was 
the case with Judgement and Appreciation in the previous sections. However, while the 
categorisation of Judgement and Appreciation was fully based on Martin and White’s 
ideas, that of Affect is a combination of their categories and those of Bednarek’s (2008). 
 
3.1.3 Affect 
Affect is about making evaluations by connecting emotions to different sorts of targets—
be they people, products or processes (White 2015a). While Judgement and Appreciation 
have in common that they both are oriented towards the Appraised object, Affect in turn 
is more focused on the one that is doing the evaluation (White 2015a). In practice this 
means that in Judgement and Appreciation, evaluative items describe the targets of 
Appraisal, but in Affect, they describe the Appraiser’s emotions that are triggered by the 
targets, like in the following example: 
 
 (5) I like chocolate (White 2015a) 
 
 Accordingly, the experiencer of these emotions, in this case I, is called Emoter, and what 
or who causes the emotion, in this case chocolate, is Trigger (Martin and White 2005, 
46). However in this thesis, I will refer to the former as Emoter, but to the latter I will 
refer to as both Trigger and Target. 
 Martin and White divide Affect into three subsystems according to what type of 
emotions they cover. They describe these subsystems, Happiness, Satisfaction and 




The un/happiness variable covers emotions concerned with ‘affairs of the heart’ – 
sadness, hate, happiness and love; the in/security variable covers emotions 
concerned with ecosocial well-being – anxiety, fear, confidence and trust; the 
dis/satisfaction variable covers emotions concerned with telos (the pursuit of 
goals) – ennui, displeasure, curiosity, respect. (2005, 49) 
 
Each of the three subsystems is further divided into two more specific categories—
Happiness into Cheer and Affection, with their negative counterparts Misery and 
Antipathy; Satisfaction into Interest and Pleasure, and their negative counterparts Ennui 
and Displeasure; and Security into Confidence and Trust, with their negative counterparts 
Disquiet and Surprise (Martin and White 2005, 49–51). 
To put it rather simply, the difference between the subcategories of Happiness is 
that while Affection and Antipathy cover the feelings of un/happiness that are directed at 
somebody, Cheer and Misery, in turn, have more to do with the mood of the Emoter 
(Martin and White 2005, 49). As to the subcategories of Satisfaction, Interest and Ennui 
are related to how excited one feels about something, and Pleasure and Displeasure to 
whether one is satisfied or not (Martin and White 2005, 51). Confidence deals with how 
confident one feels, while Disquiet is rather related to whether one feels anxious or not; 
finally, Trust deals with how much one trusts someone or something to happen and 
Surprise with whether they are surprised or not (Martin and White 2005, 50). 
Martin and White categorise feelings also on the grounds of whether they “involve 
intention (rather that reaction), with respect to a stimulus that is irrealis (rather that realis)” 
(2005, 48; parentheses as in the original). As they note, “[g]rammatically this distinction 
is constructed as the opposition between desiderative and emotive mental processes (I’d 
like to vs I like it)” (ibid.; parenthesis as in the original). To further illustrate the difference 
between realis Affect and irrealis Affect—and between realis and irrealis stimuli—they 
give the following two sentences to compare (ibid.; emphases as in the original):  
 
(6) the captain disliked leaving (realis) 
(7) the captain feared leaving (irrealis) 
 
As I understand it, in the first example, the captain does not like something they have 
already experienced or are experiencing at that moment, while in the second example, 
they are afraid of doing something that is still to come, regardless of whether they have 
experienced it or not. 
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Martin and White categorise feelings of irrealis Affect under Inclination and its 
subcategories Desire and Fear (2005, 48). However, what is important to note is that they 
do not seem to view Inclination as a fourth subsystem of Affect, along with the 
abovementioned Happiness, Satisfaction and Security, but as one of the six factors by 
which Affect can be classified; other five factors have to do with how the feelings are 
graded, whether they are positive or negative or directed or undirected, whether they are 
realised as mental disposition terms or behavioural surge terms—and to which emotion-
related subsystem of Affect they belong to (Happiness, Satisfaction or Security) (2005, 
46–49).  
For the most part, Bednarek’s categorisation complies with that of Martin and 
White’s, but there are, however, some dissimilarities concerning Security and Inclination. 
As one may have already noticed, the positive subcategories of Happiness and 
Satisfaction—Cheer, Affection, Interest and Pleasure—clearly correspond to the negative 
ones—Misery, Antipathy, Ennui and Displeasure—but the Security subcategories do not 
seem to work quite the same way. As Bednarek notes, this is especially the case with 
Trust and Surprise (2008, 160). To make the categorisation more coherent, Bednarek 
suggests “setting up the system of in/security […] with the positive and negative 
categories ‘mirroring’ each other” (ibid.) and proposes the following: 
 
Compared to the old system, confidence becomes subsumed under the more 
general (technical) term of quiet, having to do with emotional calm, as it were, as 
realized for example by lexical items such as comforted, reassured, confident, 
solace. Trust is now opposed to its opposite emotional response, distrust, rather 
than surprise, which falls out of the system […] In fact, I propose to set up surprise 
as a separate type of affect, and to treat it on its own terms (2008, 161; parenthesis 
as in the original) 
 
The reason for not including Surprise in the Security category is the following: 
 
Apart from this new classification resulting in a more ‘logical’ structural 
organization of the in/security sub-category, it is based on the belief that surprise 
is not culturally construed as negative – which would be the implication if surprise 
were included as the ‘negative’ part of in/security. (ibid.) 
 
Therefore, the modified system of Security consists of the subcategories Quiet vs Disquiet 
and Trust vs Distrust, and Surprise is no longer a negative subcategory of Security but a 




As for the differences between Martin and White’s views on Inclination and those 
of Bednarek’s, Bednarek views it “as indicating a certain kind of emotion in the same 
way as un/happiness, in/security and dis/satisfaction” (2008, 165)—although “different 
from the other types of Affect in not allowing a realis trigger” (2008, 106)—and thus 
considers it a subcategory of Affect (ibid.). However, as Bednarek notes,  
  
if we compare in/security and dis/inclination there seems to be some possibility 
for overlap between disinclination: fear and insecurity: disquiet, with both relating 
to emotions of anxiety or fear (2008, 165) 
 
Consequently, Bednarek proposes Inclination to be  
 
re-construed not in terms of a positive (desire) or negative (fear) emotion, but 
rather with respect to polarity, referring to desire (volition) and non-desire (non-
volition). (ibid; parentheses as in the original) 
 
In other words, to decrease the overlap between Insecurity and Disinclination, feelings of 
fear belong exclusively to Insecurity, and Dis/Inclination concerns solely the question of 
wanting or not wanting something. 
 In summary, the modified Affect system consist of Happiness, Satisfaction, 
Security, Inclination and Surprise. Possible realisations for each subcategory of Affect 
are listed in table 4 below (examples taken from Martin and White 2005, 48–51 and 
Bednarek 2008, 173–175). The names of the Affect categories and their subcategories are 
from Bednarek (2008, 169).  
 
Table 4 Possible realisations for the subcategories of Affect 
Happiness Cheer: 
Happy, amused, cheery 
Affection: 
Love, cherish, devotion 
Unhappiness Misery: 
Agony, sad, painful 
Antipathy: 
Resent, hate, horrified 
Satisfaction Interest: 
Involved, curious, excited 
Pleasure: 




Anger, discontent, furious 
Security Quiet: 



















3.1.4 Valence of appraisal 
An essential aspect related to Attitude is whether values ascribed to the targets are positive 
or negative. With respect to Affect, Martin and White consider valence as one of the six 
factors by which Affect can be classified (2005, 46). They base the division on the 
following idea: 
 
 Are the feelings popularly construed by the culture as positive (good vibes 
 that are enjoyable to experience) or negative ones (bad vibes that are better 
 avoided)? We are not concerned here with the value that a particular 
 uncommon sense psychological framework might place on one or another 
 emotion (cf. ‘It’s probably productive that you’re feeling sad because it’s a 
 sign that …’). (ibid.; parentheses as in the original) 
 
As for the valence of Judgement and Appreciation, Martin and White add that, similarly 
to Affect, “we can recognise positive and negative evaluations ‒ traits we admire 
alongside those we criticise” (2005, 52) and “properties we value alongside those we do 
not” (2005, 56), respectively. In other words, generally speaking, the Attitude subtypes 
can be categorised as positive or negative. However, there are some exceptions.  
 Two exceptions I will discuss here are Bednarek’s Affect categories Surprise and 
Dis/inclination. The former is considered to include values that are neutral with respect 
to valence; unlike other emotions, “[s]urprise […] is conjoined much more equally with 
both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ emotion terms” (2008, 163), which “seems to support the 
assumption that surprise is not clearly construed culturally as a negative (or positive) 
emotion” (2008, 164; parenthesis as in the original). In addition to Surprise, Bednarek 
considers Inclination “not culturally construed as positive or negative” (2008, 171). In the 




 This classification of  dis/inclination in terms of polarity rather that 
 positive/negative cultural construal takes into account the fact that neither desire 
 nor non-desire seem to be unequivocally construed culturally as positive or 
 negative. And the evaluation implied by desire and non-desire terms may also 
 depend on the  context: if I desire something that you do not think I deserve, or if 
 I desire something that you think is bad […], your evaluation of me is presumably 
 negative [and vice versa]. (Bednarek, 2008, 166) 
 
 As to Surprise, I find Bednarek’s view perfectly reasonable. However, while I 
understand Bednarek’s motivation to modify the Inclination category—and consider the 
modified system more justified than that of Martin and White’s, as discussed in 3.1.3—I 
do not see why Inclination could not be seen as positive or negative the same way as 
Happiness, Security and Satisfaction; in my view, e.g. wanting something indicates a 
positive evaluation of the wanted target the same way as loving or admiring something, 
and similarly, not wanting something indicates a negative evaluation of the target. The 
major difference between Inclination and the three above-mentioned Affect categories is 
that the more specific emotion—the one construed culturally as positive or negative—
behind the wanting or not wanting is not stated; for example, we do not know whether it 
is sadness, fear or anger what makes Mary refuse to go to school, we only know that they 
do not want to go there. But that is enough for us to know who the Emoter is, whether 
they feel positive or negative about the target and that the target is ‘going to school’. 
Simply put, I would say that the difference between Inclination and the three above-
mentioned Affect categories is more related to what type of a mental process is going on 
than to whether the evaluation is positive or negative. As for the challenge mentioned 
concerning implied evaluation in the quotation, as far as I understand, it applies to other 
Affect categories as well: if I like/trust/am interested in something you think is bad, you 
will probably evaluate me negatively. 
 Another point to be noted is that Martin and White make a distinction between 
‘negative feelings’ (e.g. sad) and ‘grammatically negated positive feelings (e.g. not 
happy) (2005, 73). ‘Morphologically negated feelings’ (e.g. unhappy), in turn, should be 
coded as ‘negative feelings’, the same way as sad above (ibid.). This distinction will be 
taken into consideration also in this thesis. Next, let us move on to discussing how to 





3.1.5 Distinguishing between Judgement and Appreciation ‒ Whether to 
prioritise target or lexis, form or meaning? 
In examples (1), (2), (3) and (5) in the previous subsections, the appraisals were 
straightforwardly of Judgement (He corruptly agreed to accept), Appreciation (a 
beautiful sunset, an ugly scar) and Affect (I like chocolate). As Bednarek notes,  
 
 in cases where appreciating lexis is used to appreciate things/situations, 
 where affective lexis is used to attribute emotional responses to Emoters, and 
 where judging lexis is used to judge people and their behaviour, the APPRAISAL is 
 simply and straightforwardly analysable as APPRECIATION, AFFECT and 
 JUDGEMENT. (2009, 182) 
 
What is more, the targets fit unambiguously the descriptions of targets of Judgement, 
Appreciation and Affect, respectively: he refers to a person, sunset to a natural 
phenomenon, scar to a tissue formation with aesthetic consequences, and like to an 
affective mental process. However, as one can expect, this is not always the case. In this 
subsection, I will discuss some issues concerning how to distinguish between Judgement 
and Appreciation and what aspects can be taken into consideration when deciding on the 
category. The researchers whose ideas I will be presenting are Martin and White (2005), 
White (2015a), Bednarek (2006 and 2009) and Thompson (2014).   
 According to Martin and White, one way to distinguish between Judgement, 
Appreciation and Affect is to place the adjectives that are used to make evaluations in 
certain grammatical frames: for example, one can test whether an evaluation is of 
Judgement with the frame “It was Judgement of person to do that”; to see if an evaluation 
is one of Appreciation, in turn, one can use e.g. the frame “Person considers something 
appreciation”; further, for recognising Affect, the frame “person feels affect about 
something” might prove useful (2005, 58‒59).  In my view, however, there are at least 
two major reasons why this kind of a strategy can only work in limited cases: first, very 
often evaluations are made by other means than using adjectives or words derived from 
them (e.g. I like chocolate above), which is of course something Martin and White 
themselves have discussed as well (e.g. 2005, 46). Second, since the context can influence 
so considerably the interpretation of the evaluative items under consideration, it is often 
impossible to categorise them solely based on their denotative meanings. The influence 
of context on the meaning is also something that has naturally been discussed by Martin 
and White (e.g. 2005, 52). 
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 An illustrative example of a case where the context changes the meaning of an 
evaluative item and thus the Appraisal category it belongs to, resulting in the 
distinguishing frames not working ideally, is beautiful. At first sight, the word seems to 
be fitting perfectly the Appreciation frame: Person considers something beautiful, and 
also Martin and White use the word in the example sentences for the frame: I consider it 
beautiful and They see it as beautiful (2005, 59). However, it can just as well be used in 
the Judgement frame above, as in It was beautiful of person to do that. The effects of this 
type of unconventional usage naturally differ from those of the more common one, but 
nevertheless, it is perfectly possible. Given that beautiful can also be used to evaluate 
humans when they are seen as entities, instead of behavers, it is possible to use this 
particular adjective both to Appreciate things and to Judge or Appreciate people. 
 Despite having discussed the considerable role of the context and the multiple 
means of making evaluations, Martin and White do not mention them explicitly when 
discussing the distinguishing frames. They do note, however, that in certain situations, 
this type of frames do not work ideally, namely with so called “borderline categories” 
(2005, 67). According to Martin and White, 
 
 [w]here nominal groups construe a conscious participant in an institutional 
 role or name a complex process as a thing then virtually the same attitudinal 
 lexis can be used either to judge or appreciate […] (although not always with 
 exactly the same meaning). (Martin and White 2005, 60; emphases and 
 parenthesis as in the original)  
 
What is to be noted is that the lexis they refer to is lexis which is primarily seen as either 
Appreciating or Judging, but which in practice can function as either, like in the following 
examples: 
 
 (8) He proved a balanced player ‒ It was a balanced innings    
  (Appreciation:Balance) (ibid.) 
 
 (9) He was an honest player (Judgement:Veracity) ‒ It was an honest innings  
  (ibid.) 
 
In my view, however, irrespective of possible borderline categories, using this type of 
frames for distinguishing between the Attitude subtypes seems rather laborious and, 
above all, unreliable. Naturally, they can be helpful in automatic annotation (see e.g. 
Bednarek 2006: Bednarek 2009), but when the wider context is available to the analyst, I 
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do not see how the use of frames could facilitate or improve the analysis. Next, let us 
consider other factors and suggestions discussed in previous research concerning the the 
topic of this subsection. As one might expect, researchers lay emphasis on different 
aspects when analysing evaluations—for example on target over lexis, or on form over 
meaning.  
 One challenge concerning the distinction between Judgement and Appreciation is 
how to define the target of evaluation. Martin and White’s definition for a target of 
Appreciation is fairly broad: according to them, targets of Appreciation are “’things’, 
especially things we make and performances we give but also including natural 
phenomena […] whether concrete or abstract, material or semiotic” (2005, 56, 59). This 
naturally means that it might not always be clear from the target whether an evaluation is 
one of Appreciation or one of Judgement. As White describes, 
 
 [t]he instances of APPRECIATION which can, perhaps, be most easily  distinguished 
 from JUDGEMENT values are those involving aesthetic evaluation of physical 
 objects or material circumstances/state of affairs - for example, `a beautiful 
 sunset', `an ugly scar', `a striking vista', `the sleek lines of the E-type Jaguar', `the 
 squat, constricted form of the Morris Minor'. Such assessments clearly do not 
 reference human behaviour, at least not directly. They don't involve assessments 
 of right and wrong or correct and incorrect. (2015a; emphases as in the original) 
 
However, very often targets are different from those listed in the quotation, and the more 
closely they are associated with human behaviour, the more difficult it naturally becomes 
to distinguish Appreciation from Judgement. For illustration, let us look at the examples 
below from Martin and White (2005, 59; emphases as in the original; underlinings 
omitted; parentheses added). The phrases describe virtually the same phenomenon—
somebody hitting a great innings—but utilise different means to indicate evaluation. In 
the examples, the same value—skilfulness—is ascribed to the player or to their innings. 
What is to be noted here is that the only difference between (10) and (11) is that the value 
in the former is realised as an attributive adjective and in the latter as a manner adverb; in 
both, the person’s capacity as a player is evaluated. The terms behaviour and process used 
in the parentheses are from Martin and White (2005, 59‒60): 
 
 (10) He’s a skilful player (person’s behaviour) 
 (11) He played skilfully (person’s behaviour) 




In Martin and White’s view, the evaluations in (10) and (11) are targeted at a person’s 
behaviour and therefore are of Judgement, whereas in (12), the evaluation is targeted at a 
process, i.e. the innings performed by the player, and thus is one of Appreciation (ibid.). 
However, as Martin and White note, “positive and negative valuations of something 
imply positive and negative judgements of the capacity of someone to create or perform” 
(2005, 58; emphasis as in the original). 
 Bednarek, in turn, suggests that Attitude subcategories can be classified either 
“according to the type of lexis used” or “according to the entity that is evaluated” (2009, 
167). That is to say, “precedence can either be given to the lexis itself: is ‘appreciating’ 
lexis or ‘judging’ lexis or ‘affect’ lexis used? or to its context: is a thing/situation 
appreciated or a person/behaviour judged?” (ibid.). In practice this would mean—if one 
“rule” or the other were strictly followed—that examples (10), (11) and (12) above could 
be analysed in either of the following ways: If precedence were given to the lexis—in this 
case Judging lexis—all the clauses would be coded as Judgement. In case precedence 
were given to the context [or target more like] instead, the interpretation would be the 
same as Martin and White’s above: examples (10) and (11) would be coded as Judgement 
and example (12) as Appreciation, according to the entities being evaluated, namely 
‘player’ and ‘innings’, respectively. However, distinguishing between Judging and 
Appreciating lexis is not always simple—as illustrated with beautiful above—which 
might make the first option, i.e. prioritising the lexis, rather challenging in certain cases. 
 Bednarek considers it often easier to distinguish between Affect and the other two 
subcategories of Attitude than between Judgement and Appreciation (2009, 173). 
According to them, 
 
 [w]hile in some cases it may be easy to categorise lexis as making an appeal 
 to moral/ethical standards (judging lexis, e.g. honest, truthful, intelligent, 
 clever) or as making an appeal to aesthetic standards (appreciating lexis, e.g. 
 beautiful, ugly, elegant, irregular), in other cases this is much more difficult. 
 (ibid.; emphases and parentheses as in the original) 
 
In Bednarek’s view, e.g. important, genuine, expected, possible and necessary, and their 
negative counterparts, are words that cannot straightforwardly be considered good or bad, 
or deriving from any ethical or aesthetic standard (ibid.). However, while I understand 
that this type of words might be a considerable challenge in distinguishing between 
Judgement and Appreciation in automatic annotation—which is what Bednarek (e.g. 
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2006 and 2009) is developing in their research—I believe the situation is quite different 
when the analyst close reads the material and is able to analyse the words in a wider 
context.  
 Another set of words Bednarek discusses is good, bad and great:  
 
 [v]ery general evaluative adjectives such as good, bad, great while clearly 
 inscribing positive/negative evaluation are also difficult to classify in terms 
 of a specific evaluative (aesthetic or ethical) standard: rather, it seems to me 
 that these adjectives are semantically ‘underspecified’ as far as a precise 
 dimension of evaluation is concerned. (2009, 174; emphases and parentheses 
 as in the original) 
 
Since Bednarek approaches the question again from the automatic annotation perspective, 
I, as a manual annotator, see the challenge slightly differently: as long as the analyst is 
familiar with the broader context of, let us say, bad researcher, I do not see any possibility 
of them not being able to distinguish between Judgement and Appreciation, considering 
that the Target is known, and that it is compatible with the value ascribed to it. However, 
as far as this type of words are concerned, it indeed seems likely that classifying them in 
terms of any more specific ethical or aesthetic standard proves to be very difficult, even 
impossible, despite the context being available; for example, in many contexts, the above-
mentioned bad researcher might be seen as Judgement:Propriety just as well as 
Judgement:Capacity, unless it is made clear that it is specifically the researcher’s ethics 
that are assessed instead of their skills, or vice versa. However, as far as I understand from 
their article, Bednarek is not referring by “a specific evaluative (aesthetic or ethical) 
standard” (ibid.) to the subcategories of Judgement and Appreciation but the 
subcategories of Attitude.  
 Also Bednarek notes, however, that sometimes it is useful to take both the aspects 
of Appraisal, i.e. the lexis and the context/target into consideration. As they acknowledge, 
 
 [o]ne argument against my claim above that it is often difficult to distinguish 
 APPRECIATION from JUDGEMENT lexis might be that it is simply necessary to 
 look at the context, i.e. the appraised entity (or attitudinal target) in order to 
 decide whether APPRECIATION or JUDGEMENT is concerned. (2009, 180; 
 parenthesis and emphases as in the original) 
 
Based on this principal, as Bednarek continues, an important man would be analysed as 
Judgement:Capacity and an important issue as Appreciation:Valuation (ibid.), in the 
same way as examples (10/11) and (12) from Martin and White above (player/innings). 
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What is important to note here, however, is that, despite the apparent similarity between 
the two strategies, the underlying ideas behind them are different: Martin and White 
clearly prioritise the target and choose the Attitude subcategory according to that—and 
recognise that along with every explicit evaluation of a person or their behaviour there 
comes an implicit evaluation of their accomplishments, and vice versa (2005, 67); 
Bednarek, in turn, is more disposed to prioritise the lexis: referring to the coding of an 
important issue above, they state that “this is no longer purely a classification of 
APPRAISAL dependent on attitudinal lexis, but rather a classification of APPRAISAL 
dependent on the attitudinal target” (2009, 180) and suggest another type of classification 
for this type of cases: 
 
 I would instead suggest classifying the second example [an important issue] 
 as judging lexis which is used to appreciate. That is, what we need for 
 APPRAISAL analysis is a classification of attitudinal lexis in terms of 
 evaluative standards which are inscribed in this lexis, which constitutes our 
 first starting point for the analysis of ATTITUDE. (ibid; parenthesis added; 
 emphases as in the original) 
  
Bednarek’s preliminary classification of attitudinal lexis, drawing on earlier frameworks 
developed by e.g. Francis (1995) and Lemke (1998), consists of emotion lexis and opinion 
lexis; opinion (more or less) corresponds to Judgement and Appreciation in Martin and 
White (2005). Opinion lexis is divided into opinion types good/bad, 
important/unimportant, genuine/fake, expected/unexpected, possible/not possible and 
necessary/not necessary (Bednarek 2009, 181); all of them—except for good/bad—are 
based on the evaluative items discussed above that Bednarek considers “not easily 
classified […] as deriving from aesthetic or ethical standards or even necessarily as good-
bad” (2009, 173). Opinion type good/bad is further divided into three subcategories, 
namely aesthetics (e.g. beautiful), ethics (e.g. honest) and general (e.g. good) (Bednarek 
2009, 181), the latter consisting of the type of adjectives discussed above that Bednarek 
considers ‘underspecified’ (2009, 174). What is to be noted is that Bednarek’s 
classification is based on the framework (presented in Bednarek 2006, 41‒44) they 
developed while working on their doctoral thesis, the primary material of which was a 
corpus of “hard news” in British newspapers (2006, 5). What is more, as Bednarek 
themself notes, their framework is both theory-driven and text-driven, the latter meaning 
that “it derives from the actual analysis of naturally occurring data which guided the 
establishment of the framework” (2006, 37). Considering the material and the emphasis 
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given to it when developing the framework, it seems rather likely that not all the opinion 
types are necessarily the same useful or relevant in other types of studies. In other words, 
even if the evaluative items themselves are relevant, there may not be need for separate 
categories for them, but it might be more sensible to include them in the subtypes of 
Attitude suggested by Martin and White (2005).  
 According to Thompson, in turn, “there are a number of areas where the 
boundaries [between Judgement and Appreciation] are blurred. This happens when there 
appears to be a mismatch of some kind between the Target and the AV [ascribed value]” 
(2014, 57). This can occur for example when a person is evaluated using lexis associated 
with Appreciation, or when a product is evaluated using lexis associated with Judgement 
(Thompson 2014, 57‒58; cf. Bednarek’s appreciating and judging lexis). The following 
examples from Thompson (2014, 57; emphases added; parentheses as in the original) deal 
with a similar situation as the examples (10), (11) and (12) from Martin and White above, 
concerning who/what is targeted, a player or an innings: 
 
 (13) an intelligent film director (people’s characteristics) 
 (14) his intelligent direction of the film (people’s actions) 
 (15) an intelligent film (the outcome of people’s actions) 
 
As one can notice, Thompson’s example (13) is practically identical to (10) from Martin 
and White above (He’s a skilful player): in both, a person is evaluated, and the lexis is 
typically associated with judging humans, not objects; as Thompson states, “[t]he first of 
these is unproblematically a judgement of the person” (2014, 59‒57). Example (15), in 
turn, is slightly more complex: “the evaluative term actually indicates the intellectual 
qualities of the person who directed the film; and yet the wording attributes this quality 
to the product” (Thompson 2014, 58). As for example (14), the target is a nominalisation 
of the verb direct, which naturally directs the interpretation even more towards the 
filmmaker’s doings, and therefore their capacity as a director. As Thompson states, 
 
 when behaviour is nominalised it moves into a grey area between action and 
 product; and, although the grammatical structure takes it towards product (a 
 ‘thing’ rather that a person) and therefore APPRECIATION, the evaluative terms 




At first glance, example (15) seems fairly identical to (12) from Martin and White; in 
both, the target of evaluation (film/innings) is something somebody has accomplished, a 
result of that somebody’s capacity. However, the targets differ from each other in that 
while a film is a concrete, semiotic outcome of a filmmaker’s actions, an innings is more 
of a process a player performs during a game. In a way, a film is more straightforwardly 
a ‘thing’ or an ‘object’ and thus fits more conveniently the description of a target of 
Appreciation than an innings; an innings is more of a peripheral member of the category, 
associated more likely with the actions performed by the player. As for the targets in 
examples (12) and (14), they are also very similar to one another on the one hand but 
differ from each other on the other: in my view, they both, innings and direction of the 
film, can be seen as describing the complex process (Martin and White’s term above) in 
question, but direction—a nominalisation of the verb direct—refers more directly to the 
actual doings of the person in question, i.e. their actions (Thompson’s term above).  
 In Thompson´s view, it is possible to treat this type of evaluations, in which 
“behaviour is nominalised [and] it moves into a grey area between action and product” , 
in two ways: either as Judgements, regardless of the form, and prioritising the meaning, 
or as Appreciation, according to its target, which is a nominalisation, i.e. a non-human 
entity (2014, 58). Thompson prefers the latter approach, i.e. “relying on the formal nature 
of the Target” (ibid.), which allows for “the distinction between conscious and non-
conscious entities” (ibid.). According to them, 
 
 [t]his kind of constraint on at least the initial categorization seems essential if an 
 examination of APPRAISAL in a text is to retain as much of a footing in replicable 
 linguistic analysis as possible, rather than being a subjective commentary on one 
 person’s reading of the text. There is also the fundamental point that the 
 speaker/writer could, in principle, have chosen the wording of the paraphrase but 
 did not […] While meaning certainly must be taken into account at some point, 
 the analysis should therefore start from what was said rather than what might have 
 been meant. (Thompson 2014, 58‒59; emphasis added)  
 
3.2 Implicit Appraisal and the cumulative nature of evaluation 
In all the examples so far, evaluation is expressed explicitly, i.e. using overtly attitudinal 
lexis. However, evaluation is not always communicated directly but can also be conveyed 
implicitly. This applies to both Judgement, Appreciation and Affect, and the means of 
implying evaluation are varied. In this section, several of them will be presented. 
However, before moving on to the actual means of implicit evaluation, let us look at an 
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important aspect concerning implicit Appraisal, namely the cumulative—or prosodic—
nature of evaluative meaning. 
 Martin and White call this cumulativeness of evaluation ‘prosody’, drawing on 
Halliday’s (1979, 66‒67) thoughts on the cumulative nature of interpersonal meaning: 
“this type of realisation [is] ‘prosodic’, since the meaning is distributed like a prosody 
throughout a continuous stretch of discourse” (Martin and White 2005, 19). As Martin 
and White describe it, emphasising the influence of explicit evaluations on the 
interpretation of the rest of the text: 
 
the prosodic nature of the realisation of interpersonal meaning such as attitude 
means that inscriptions tend to colour more of a text than their local grammatical 
environment circumscribes. The inscriptions act as sign-posts, in other words, 
telling us how to read the ideational selections that surround them. (2005, 63)  
 
In Hood’s synthesis of several researchers’ ways to describe the phenomenon, the 
potential of interpersonal meanings to “colour” a text accumulatively is emphasised:  
“[p]rosodies of interpersonal meaning are variously described as the spread, sprawl, 
smear or diffusion of interpersonal meanings that accumulate, reinforce, or resonate with 
each other to construct an evaluative ‘key’ over an extended segment of text” (2010, 141). 
Hunston starts with a similar idea, i.e. describing the cumulative nature of evaluation, but 
in the latter part of the quotation, they highlight the fact that sometimes stretches of text 
become evaluative only when explicit evaluations guide the reader towards an evaluative 
interpretation or the text is evaluatively coloured by other textual evidence: 
 
 [E]valuative meanings tend to cluster together. In a book review, for 
 example, the assessment of the book could be said to be the accumulation of all 
 the different things said about it. Where evaluation is highly implicit, however, it 
 could be said that it is only the accumulation of evaluation that makes it 
 noticeable […] [I]t is  possible that some evaluation in some texts remains only 
 potential until it is actualised by the introduction of a more explicit statement or 
 by the sheer accumulation of evidence. (2011, 16‒17; emphasis added) 
  
 Martin and White introduce “three types of prosodic realisation [which are] useful 
for interpreting the ways in which appraisal operates as an ongoing cumulative motif” 
(2005, 19): saturation, intensification and domination (2005, 19‒20). In brief, in 
saturation, “the prosody manifests where it can” (2005, 19), like in the example (16), 




 (16) I suppose he might possibly have mightn’t he. (Martin and White,  
  2005, 20; emphasis as in the original) 
  
However, saturation is not restricted to any particular type of lexical or grammatical 
choices. Another example of the phenomenon illustrates how a text can be saturated with 
Appraisal by the use of expletives: 
 
 (17) Fucken Hell man, who the hell told you I liked doing this kind of shit. 
  (Martin and White, 2005, 24; emphasis as in the original) 
 
What is to be noted here is that Martin and White suggest we “treat expletives […] as 
outbursts of evaluation which are underspecified as far as type of attitude is concerned” 
(2005, 69; emphasis as in the original).  
 Intensification, in turn, has to do with amplifying the impact of evaluations 
conveyed in texts, e.g. by repetition (Martin and White, 2005, 20), like in the following 
example: 
 
 (18) It’s a dirty rotten stinking lousy bloody low filthy two-faced lie. 
  (ibid.; emphasis as in the original) 
 
As one can notice, example (18) is somewhat similar to (16) and (17) above in that they 
all contain several semantically similar items in a relatively small space. The essential 
difference, in turn, is that when saturation is at stake, the prosody really manifests 
everywhere it can, like in (16) and (17) above: in every clause, insert and tag, in different 
clause elements and in words belonging to different word classes (slightly differently 
described in Martin and White 2005, 19‒20); intensification has a much more limited 
scope. As to domination, as far as I understand, it is related to situating the evaluative 
material—explicit or implicit—in certain places in text, places where it has the largest 
potential to influence the reader (Martin, 2004, 330; Martin and White, 2005, 20‒24).  
 As the reader might have already noticed, especially saturation and intensification 
resemble Graduation; indeed, they both are very similar to one of the modes of 
Intensification—repetition. While this type of Graduation can be created simply by 
repeating a certain lexical item, it can also be done by listing items that “are closely related 
semantically” (Martin and White, 2005, 144). An example Martin and White give of this 




 (19) [i]n fact it was probably the most immature, irresponsible, disgraceful  
  and misleading address ever given by a British Prime Minister. (ibid.) 
 
To be very precise, I would in fact say that examples (16), (17) and (18) exemplify 
Intensification more accurately than (19) from Martin and White, which contains 
semantically rather different adjectives. What is more, example (16) could also be an 
example of Engagement, more particularly of entertain, as it very emphatically 
“entertains or invokes […] dialogistic alternatives” (Martin and White, 2005, 98; 
emphasis as in the original). However, despite this overlap between different aspects of 
Appraisal, both saturation, intensification and domination certainly have an important 
role in guiding readers’ interpretations of texts. In this thesis, these three phenomena and 
their realisations are treated as prosodic, and are thus considered falling under its scope.  
 So far, the discussion has mainly focussed on prosody and some of the ways the 
discourse can guide the reader to interpret stretches of text evaluatively—also those that 
do not contain anything explicitly evaluative. However, I would say that the three ways 
of prosodic realisation mentioned above, saturation, intensification and domination, are 
mainly related to how lexical items, words, clauses, sentences, etc., are situated in the 
discourse. Explicit evaluations acting as sign-posts, in turn, has to do with their role in 
how ideational meanings are interpreted; next, we will move on to the ways implicit 
evaluations can actually be made. 
 Martin and White describe the basic idea of implicit—or Invoked—evaluation in 
the following way: “[t]he general point […] is that the selection of ideational meanings 
is enough to invoke evaluation, even in the absence of attitudinal lexis that tells us directly 
how to feel” (2005, 62). They further specify three strategies for Invoking evaluation, 
namely Affording, Flagging and Provoking (2005, 63‒68), the first one being about 
making the most implicit evaluations, and the last one referring to the most explicit ones. 
According to Martin and White, Affording is in question when a stretch of text does not 
contain any attitudinal lexis and the meaning of it as such is purely ideational (2005, 62). 
What they do not mention explicitly but is inferable from the text is that these “ideational 
tokens” or “invocations” (Martin and White, 2005, 75) do not contain any other textual 
clues either that would inform the reader about an evaluation being made (Martin and 
White, e.g. 64‒67). Consequently, the explicit evaluations elsewhere in the text and the 
cumulative nature of evaluative meaning play an important role in how ideational tokens 
are interpreted, i.e. whether they are seen as evaluative or not (Martin and White, 2005, 
63). As Martin and White describe this role in connection with one of their text samples, 
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“[i]nscribed attitude […] launches and subsequently reinforces a prosody which directs 
readers in their evaluation of non-attitudinal ideational material under its scope” (2005, 
64).  
 Flagging, in turn, is in question when there is a textual clue that indicates there 
might be something more to the meaning than the purely ideational one (Martin and 
White, 2005, 65‒67). The first strategy Martin and White suggest for Flagging evaluation 
is using “non-core vocabulary that has in some sense lexicalised a circumstance of manner 
by infusing it into the core meaning of a word” (2005, 65). For example, instead of using 
the verb run when describing somebody’s movements, it is possible to use gallop, which 
“implicates a judgement of a person running this way” (ibid.). Simple intensification 
functions in a similar way: instead of using core vocabulary like break, one can use 
damage, smash, tear to bits, etc., in order to indicate negative Judgement of the person 
doing the breaking (Martin and White, 2005, 65‒66). Another way to Flag evaluation 
Martin and White mention is “[c]onstruing some action or event as contrary to 
expectation” (2005, 66). The following extract is from an example Martin and White give 
of the effect of counter-expectancy: 
 
 (20) This is another book by an American who writes about the pleasures  
  and pains of owning a house in France. Barry, however, is something  
  of an exception because, unlike other authors in this genre, she does  
  not actually live in her house in France. (2005, 66) 
   
By the use of however and actually, it becomes clear that the author does not meet the 
reviewer’s expectation of somebody writing about living in France (Martin and White, 
2005, 67).  
 Further, Provoked evaluations are made by using lexical metaphors. As Martin 
and White state, “ideational meaning can be used not just to invite but to provoke an 
attitudinal response in readers” (2005, 64). This is well illustrated in a government report 
on the Stolen Generations, in a statement by an indigenous Australian child describing 
how they were taken from their parents: 
 
 (21) We was bought like a market. We was all lined up in white dresses,  
  and they’d come around and pick you out like you was for sale. [BTH  




Even though white authorities are not explicitly Judged in the statement, the lexical 
metaphors indicate rather clearly that they are seen as inhumane; “the treatment of people 
as commercial goods arguably does more that evoke a judgement ‒ it provokes one” 
(ibid.; emphasis as in the original). 
 Since the basic idea of implicit evaluation is—as mentioned above—that 
ideational meanings have the potential to Invoke evaluation, naturally the more implicit 
the evaluation is, the greater influence the reader position has on the interpretation (Martin 
and White, 2005, 62, 66). This in turn means that also the risk of subjectivity increases 
accordingly (ibid.). However, although taking implicit evaluations into consideration 
makes it more challenging to avoid subjectivity in the analysis, the alternative—the idea 
of leaving them out altogether—is even more unpleasant; doing that would suggest that 
they were chosen for no reason (ibid.). What is more, it would naturally also suggest they 
have no influence on how the text is understood. Therefore, since the probability of 
subjectivity increases when implicit evaluations are included in the analysis, “it is 
certainly critical to specify one’s reading position as far as possible with respect to 
[gender, generation, class, ethnicity and in/capacity] and also to declare whether one is 
reading a text compliantly, resistantly or tactically” (ibid). A resistant reader opposes the 
views supported by the text; a tactical reader, in turn, uses the text for other social 
objectives than what it was initially created for; and further, a compliant reader goes along 
with the views expressed and naturalised in the text (ibid.).  
 According to Don, there are more ways—besides the three suggested by Martin 
and White—to invoke evaluation in text (2016, chap. “Introduction”). As Don notes, 
several researchers have dealt with problems related to subjectivity of categorising 
Appraisal choices, but “the ‘cline of invocation’ itself has not been substantially 
reviewed” (ibid.). Therefore, they propose “that analysts attend to a wider array of 
discursive features and ‘strategies’ than has previously been taken into account, justifying 
decisions as to invoked attitude categories” (2016, chap. “A proposed amended cline”).  
However, Don is not proposing anything totally different from Martin and White’s 
taxonomy but 
 
 an amended version of what has been proposed by Martin and White in the 
 form of a set of overlapping 'categories' designed to fill gaps in the  interpretive 
 paradigm, and to call for a more precise means of tracking and identifying  how 




Don’s “invocation spectrum” is divided into two broader subtypes, namely Evoked and 
Provoked; Evoked corresponds to Martin and White’s (2005) Afford, while Provoked 
combines their categories Provoke and Flag (Don, 2016, chap. “The spectrum of 
invocations”). With this kind of categorisation, Don highlights an essential difference 
between the two broader Invocation types: 
 
 [There are] invocations which rely entirely on assumed (e.g. cultural, 
 intertextual)  knowledge or values for the attitudinal inference to arise (i.e. 
 ‘evoked’) and  those which, in addition to relying on assumed cultural 
 knowledge, also involve local co-textual signals or other in-text indicators  that 
 an attitudinal value is at stake […] This two-way taxonomy gives prominence 
 to this particular distinction (experiential meanings/cultural framing, versus 
 textual signalling). (ibid.; parentheses as in the original) 
 
In my view, this distinction clarifies the whole concept of implicit Appraisal considerably 
and adds welcome consistency to analysis. For some reason, however, as Don notes, this 
distinction “is obscured to some degree in Martin and White” (ibid.).  
 Another aspect emphasised by Don (2016), but in this particular sense not 
discussed by Martin and White (2005), is the role of intertextuality when implicit 
evaluations are analysed; according to Don, “all evaluation is inevitably intertextual in 
nature” (2016, chap. “Introduction”), and intertextuality “is central to […] the analysis of 
invoked attitude” (2016, chap. “Attitude, invocation and associations”). This is how they 
describe the way intertextuality connects the texts being analysed, via associations, to 
other texts that readers have encountered: 
 
 [I]nstances of attitudinal stance in discourse are dependent on ‘associations’ 
 attaching to phrases and other linguistic signs due to the way these signs have 
 been used, and are typically used, in other texts. These associations and the 
 attitudinal positions they invoke are thus ultimately a function of 
 intertextuality, in the broadest sense of the term–i.e. in the sense which 
 underlies Bakhtin’s much quoted dictum that ‘Each utterance is filled with 
 echoes and reverberations of other utterances to which it is related by the 
 communality of the sphere of speech communication’ (Bakhtin 1986: 91).  (Don, 
 2016, chap. “Attitude, invocation and associations”) 
 
 Further, Don’s spectrum of invocation differs from Martin and White’s model in 
that it includes a wider selection of indicators of implicit evaluation (Don, 2016, chap. 
“The spectrum of invocations”). What is to be noted, however, is that some of them are 
included in the Graduation or Engagement system in Martin and White (2005) (Don, 
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2016, chap. “Alerting readers to stance”, “The spectrum of invocations”). Similarly, some 
of Martin and White’s strategies for Invoking Attitude overlap with Graduation (Martin 
and White, 2005, 67). In Don’s spectrum, there are eight (1‒8) “mechanisms/textual 
arrangements potentially giving rise to attitudinal inferences”—and five submechanisms 
in the sixth mechanism (a‒e) (2016, chap. “The spectrum of invocations). What is to be 
noted is that these mechanisms “are not presented as sub-types in a taxonomy of invoked 
attitude […] but rather are offered as some of the key mechanisms and textual features 
by which attitude may be indirectly ‘evoked’ or ‘provoked’” (ibid.; emphasis added). 
What is more, they “should not be seen as a typology, but rather considered as 
overlapping sets of mechanisms or text-strategies in context” (Don 2016, chap. 
“Conclusion”; emphasis added). Next, I will discuss in more detail these mechanisms, 
starting from the most implicit tokens. 
 As mentioned above, Don divides Invoked Appraisal into Evoked and Provoked 
evaluations (2016, chap. “The spectrum of invocations”). Simply put, Evoked evaluations 
are about what has happened and what has been said, while Provoked evaluations contain 
some type of in-text signals of Attitude (ibid.). For Evoking evaluation, Don lists four 
mechanisms: under the title Experiential tokens, there are In-group allusions and Cultural 
doxa, and under the title Extra-vocalisation, there are Constitutive intertextuality and 
Manifest intertextuality (ibid.). In-group allusions refer to “material which references 
attitudinally charged knowledge, beliefs and values likely to be exclusively held by 
members of the current smaller-scale discourse community” (Ibid.); Cultural doxa refers 
to “material which references widely held and attitudinally charged knowledge, beliefs 
and values” (ibid.); and Constitutive intertextuality refers to “indirect referencing of 
particular genres or registers so as potentially to activate attitudinal positions associated 
with these (ibid.), i.e. bringing features such as style or structure from another text to the 
one under creation, without directly or indirectly quoting the former. The last mechanism 
Don considers to Evoke evaluation, Manifest intertextuality, refers to “overt quoting of 
material from other texts by which attitudinal associations are called up for those readers 
with knowledge of these texts or at least of their provenance” (ibid.). As Don further 
elucidates, it is possible for a quotation to evoke evaluation e.g. when its source “is an 
authoritative one or is favoured in some way” (Don, 2016, chap. “Intertextuality”). 
 The mechanisms that are used to Provoke evaluation are Ventriloquism, Local 
signals/flagging (henceforth referred to as Local signals, to differentiate it from Martin 
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and White´s Flagging), Attitudinal tokens and Figurative tokens (Don, 2016, chap. “The 
spectrum of invocations”). Ventriloquism refers to 
 
 pseudo or parodic quoting of other sources ‒ typically via free indirect 
 speech involving intensification and/or counter-expectancy ‒ so as to 
 activate negative assessments of these sources and their value positions, i.e. 
 as ridiculous, extreme, unfeeling etc; often interpreted as ironic. (ibid.) 
 
Local signalling can be done e.g. by denial, counter-expectancy or up- or downscaling of 
intensity, quantity or measure, just to mention a few possibilities (ibid.). Attitudinal 
tokens in turn refer to situations where “an inscribed attitudinal assessment of one type 
invokes an attitudinal assessment of a different type (ibid.). What is worth mentioning 
here is that also Martin and White discuss this type of implicit evaluations (2005, 67‒68), 
but they do not—at least explicitly—categorise them as either of the subtypes of Invoked 
Attitude. Instead, they “allow for double codings of the borderline categories” like this 
(ibid.). The final mechanism, Figurative tokens, refers to a situation where a lexical 
metaphor is used to invoke evaluation (ibid.); this is identical with Martin and White’s 
Provoked evaluation, which is also done by using lexical metaphor. As Don notes, 
“lexical metaphor shades into inscribed attitude” (2016, chap. “Attitudinal Tokens”) 
which, I assume, is the reason Martin and White suggest a separate category for them—
for the most explicit cases among implicit Invocations.  
 In my view, Don’s categorisation definitely has its advantages compared to Martin 
and White’s discussed above. First, as mentioned, Don’s two-way taxonomy emphasises 
the important difference between Evoked and Provoked evaluation, which, in my view, 
is of particular importance because it offers a somewhat concrete tool for a linguist to 
analyse invocations: if there is a textual signal in a stretch of text which gives rise—or 
has the potential to do so—to attitudinal inference, it is a Provoked evaluation; if the 
evaluative interpretation of a stretch of text is entirely dependent on the reader’s values 
and prior knowledge, an Evoked evaluation is at stake. Second, I find it important and 
well-grounded that Don emphasises the importance of intertextuality in implicit appraisal: 
texts we have earlier encountered indeed influence how we receive and interpret new 
ones, even if their role is different in different situations. Don only discusses explicitly 
the significance of intertextuality with respect to In-group allusions, Cultural doxa, 
Constitutive intertextuality, Manifest intertextuality and Ventriloquism (2005, chap. 
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“Intertextuality”), but in my view, actually, it influences the way at least some of the other 
mechanisms function as well. As Don states, 
 
 instances of attitudinal stance in discourse are dependent on ‘associations’ 
 attaching to phrases and other linguistic signs due to the way these signs  have 
 been used, and are typically used, in other texts”. (2016, chap. “Attitude, 
 invocation and associations”; emphasis added) 
 
To give a very simple example, in order for a lexical metaphor in Your father is a chicken 
to invoke certain, evaluative associations, one needs to be aware of how the metaphor is 
typically used, not what a chicken is. Thirdly, with a wider selection of indicators of 
implicit evaluation, it is possible to add transparency and objectivity to the analysis. Next, 
let us move on to another important aspect of sppraisal, namely the identification of 
appraisal units. 
 
3.3 The Identification of appraisal units 
An aspect of appraisal that does not seem to have been very eagerly discussed in research 
literature is how to identify evaluative expressions in texts. As Hunston notes, “many 
writers on the topic [evaluation] avoid the issue of identification altogether and focus on 
classifying and analyzing instances of evaluation and other aspects of interpersonal 
meaning” (2004, 2). According to Fuoli, this “seems to apply well to the case of appraisal 
theory, where the process of identification of evaluative expressions has not been 
sufficiently problematized” (2018, 3). I must agree with Fuoli in that  
 
Martin and White (2005) devote considerable space to describing the framework 
and presenting various analyses and worked-out examples. However, most of the 
coding choices made in the analyses are treated as self-evident and unproblematic. 
But identifying and coding evaluation in text is, in fact, a problematic task for a 
number of reasons (ibid.) 
 
Naturally, everybody doing research on evaluation have their own—undoubtedly 
valid—reasons for focusing on and foregrounding certain aspects of the topic, and 
correspondingly focusing less on others. However, I find it highly likely that many avoid 
going very deep into the identification issue due to its nebulousness. I am sure 
everybody—be they researchers or not—is familiar with the feeling that some sort of a 
value judgement is being made, but it is difficult to get hold of how exactly. As Mauranen 




[e]valuation in discourse is an elusive concept. As readers and writers, we seem 
to be vaguely aware of evaluation being constructed in texts we encounter and 
produce; it is harder to tell exactly how this happens, that is, which linguistic 
means are involved, and which (if any) are not. (2003, n.p.) 
 
In this section, I will discuss some factors that have influence on whether something in a 
text is interpreted as evaluative, and furthermore, how to decide on the textual boundaries 
of evaluations. 
Fuoli divides the challenge of identifying appraisal in four—in my view partly 
overlapping—components (2018, 3‒6). The first one is the large number of possible 
realisations of evaluation. As they describe, “evaluation may be realized through an open-
ended range of expressions of varying length and complexity and belonging to any word 
class” (2018, 4). Since possible realisations of appraisal were already discussed earlier in 
this thesis, suffice it to note that their large amount, or infinite more like, naturally makes 
it challenging to identify them. As Hunston notes, “evaluation is indicated by such a large 
range of lexical and other items that it would be pointless to try and list them” (Hunston 
2011: 13). Therefore, the analyst themselves have the “ultimate responsibility to decide 
what counts as evaluation in any given text, which is an inherently subjective process 
(Fuoli, 2018, 4). It seems that it is not an overstatement to say that one will only know 
what to look for when it is already found, and even then they are left uncertain about their 
choices.  
 The second complication is the context-dependency of meaning: as Fuoli states, 
“[t]he task of identifying appraisal is further complicated by the fact that evaluation is a 
highly context-dependent phenomenon” (2018, 4). In practice this means that the context 
and the text where a certain expression occurs determines whether the expression is 
interpreted as evaluative or not (ibid.). Fuoli (ibid.) gives a simple but illustrative example 
of such case:  
 
 (22) There’s thin and light. Then there’s thin and light on a whole new level. 
  iPodtouch has a super-thin aluminum body that feels barely there in your 
  hand or pocket. 
 
According to Fuoli, without context, adjectives thin and light would seem relatively 
neutral, but when they are used to advertise mobile phones, they become “value-laden, as 
they are clearly used to positively evaluate the advertised product, based on the implicit 
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assumption that thinner and lighter phones are better, more desirable phones” (ibid). In 
this case, the subgenre—mobile phone advertisement—is the context that tells the reader 
how to interpret the words.  
 In the next example concerning context-dependency of evaluation, the context 
that determines the meaning of the word or phrase under examination is the immediate 
words surrounding it (Hunston 2011, 14). In electric fire or electric storm, the word 
electric would be considered as non-evaluative, whereas in her performance was electric 
the word would be interpreted as evaluative (ibid.), and thus identified as evaluation.   
 The next component concerns unitising, i.e. where the textual boundaries of each 
evaluation should be set. As Fuoli states, one’s unitization choices might, in quantitative 
studies in particular, change the outcome of the analysis considerably (2018, 5). They 
even claim that “[s]etting the textual boundaries of evaluative expressions (unitizing) is 
often a complicated and arbitrary exercise” (Fuoli 2016, slide 9; parenthesis as in the 
original; emphasis added). To illustrate possible unitising options, they use the following 
sentence (Fuoli 2018, 5; square brackets added): 
 
 (23) We are well-positioned to generate shareholder value with distinct  
  competitive advantages and a [[[steadfast commitment] to the  
  [highest standards]] of [[ethics], [safety], and [corporate   
  citizenship]]]. 
  
According to Fuoli, evaluation in the sentence could be unitised in several ways: steadfast 
commitments, highest standards, ethics, safety and corporate citizenship could be 
annotated as five separate units. It could also be argued that there are only two evaluative 
units, namely steadfast commitment to the highest standards and ethics, safety and 
corporate citizenship. Further, the whole phrase a steadfast commitment to the highest 
standards of ethics, safety and corporate citizenship could be seen as one single appraisal 
unit (2018, 5). 
 Another question concerning unitisation has to do with coordinated words and 
expressions such as in the following example (Fuoli 2018, 5; brackets and emphasis 
added): 
 




Fuoli sees two possible unitisation options here: systematic and unwavering may be 
annotated either as one single or two separate Appraisal units (ibid.). However, as they 
note, “[t]he implications of such a choice are considerable, given that the observed 
frequency of certain annotated types could substantially increase if the ‘separation rule’ 
was applied to a text that included several such expressions” (ibid.).  
 A further issue Fuoli mentions concerning unitisation is how to handle evaluations 
that are discontinuous, like in their example from Carretero and Taboada (2014, 228): 
 
 (25) That is the most boring (book) I have ever read (Fuoli 2018, 5; emphases 
  and parenthesis added)   
 
In this sentence, there is an expression of Attitude (boring) and that of Graduation (the 
most I have ever read), and addition to those, a non-evaluative word (book) in the middle, 
a situation which might be a problem when annotating a text (ibid.): the analyst would 
either have to annotate the Graduation expression as two separate units or accept the 
“redundancy and ‘noise’ in the coding” (ibid.) caused by the extra items (ibid.). As Fuoli 
notes again, also “decisions concerning how to handle discontinuous evaluative 
expressions may have implications for how evaluation in text is quantified” (2018, 6). 
 Also Read and Carroll deal with the unitisation issue. In order to make their 
annotation system as consistent as possible, they considered various unitisation options: 
first they were thinking of allowing only one token per appraisal unit but had to realise 
that very often evaluations consisted of more than one word (2012, chap. “Annotation 
methodology”). However, allowing multi-word annotations had its limitations as well: as 
Read and Carroll state, it “increases the complexity of the annotation task, and reduces 
the likelihood of agreement between [analysts], as the annotated tokens of one [analyst] 
may be a subset of, or overlap with, those of another” (ibid.). Therefore, they also 
considered having whole sentences as appraisal units, but then the problem was that there 
could be several appraisals per sentence (ibid.). Yet another option they had in mind is 
from Bruce and Wiebe (1999): “to create units from every non-compound sentence and 
each conjunct of every compound sentence” (ibid.). However, even this was not a 
functioning strategy as naturally also these smaller grammatical units could contain more 
than one evaluation (ibid.). Finally, Read and Carroll decided on allowing any number of 
Appraisal units of any length per sentence, in order to capture all the evaluations in the 
material under consideration, even though it might have increased to some extent the level 
of inconsistency (ibid.). 
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 The last identification challenge Fuoli raises is the distinction between explicit 
and implicit Appraisal:  
 
While intuitively appealing, this distinction raises several issues. Distinguishing 
between inscribed and invoked evaluation in text is far from straightforward. As 
seen above, even apparently descriptive and neutral terms may perform an 
evaluative function in certain contexts. This entails that there is no simple rule that 
can be consistently applied to discern the two types. (Fuoli 2018, 6) 
 
 In my view, however, distinguishing between explicit and implicit evaluation does 
not so much concern identification of evaluative expressions but is rather a matter of 
classifying them, i.e. deciding on which sort of Appraisal is being conveyed by that 
particular expression. As far as I understand, in Fuoli’s view the classification issue only 
concerns Appraisal categories “proper”, more particularly those of Attitude and 
Engagement, for example Judgement and Entertain (2018, 7, 10). I, in turn, suggest that 
when a stretch of text needs to be categorised as a certain type of appraisal (Judgement, 
Evoked, negative, etc.), it is a matter of classification; Identification in turn is in question 
when the aim is to recognise the stretches of text that are evaluative, be they of any type 
of appraisal. In the next section, the primary material will be presented. 
  
4 Primary material – letters to the editor 
The primary material for this thesis consists of letters to the editor that were published in 
The Times between 1875 and 1884. They were collected from The Times Digital Archive, 
which contains the facsimiles of the issues from 1785 to 2014. The Times was chosen for 
the purpose because, besides being widely read, people from various backgrounds had 
access to it. I wanted to study texts that were available to as many people as possible, not 
just e.g. to scholars or otherwise particularly privileged people. Furthermore, although 
vivisection-related texts were also published in other sections, besides Letters to the 
Editor, I wanted to focus on letters to the editor in particular, in order to examine the 
language use of people who were not professional newspaper writers. What is more, the 
material consists of texts the purpose of which is to defend something and which are 
meant to be published in a public forum for expressing opinions. I believe it is safe to 
assume that this type of material, i.e. letters to the editor, intended for a wide, 
heterogeneous audience, written by non-professional writers, can reveal rather much 
about people’s attitudes towards the topic in question.   
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 The material consists of 33 letters to the editor that in one way or another defend 
vivisection; 16 of them were published before and 17 after 15 August 1876, the day the 
Cruelty to Animals Act 1876 was passed (henceforth, collections A and B, respectively). 
I started the search by selecting the article type (Letters to the Editor) and the publication 
date (Before 16 August 1876 / After 15 August 1876) and by using the search term 
“vivisection”. I also searched by terms such as “animal experimentation” and 
“experimentation on living animals” etc., but it turned out that “vivisection” was the term 
almost exclusively used to refer to animal experimentation in the letters. In order to make 
sure no letter containing the word vivisection escaped my notice due to possible optical 
text recognition errors, I also used wildcards in the searches. 
However, I was not able to detect all the vivisection-related letters directly in the 
searches; a couple of them I found by accident as they happened to be on the same page 
as letters I had already spotted. For example, in one such letter, the pseudonym W. refers 
to the concept of vivisection explicitly only when expressing his gratitude to professor 
Ferrier, “who could not have obtained his extraordinary power unless […] by the sacrifice 
under anaesthetics of a few rabbits and monkeys.” (letter B14; emphasis added). 
Otherwise the letter consists of a description of a patient’s brain injury, the treatment 
given to him and his recovery, and thus only implicitly supports vivisection. Words like 
“vivisection”, “experiment” and “animal” are not mentioned at any point. Therefore, I 
was quite lucky to get hold of this letter—and those alike—which naturally means that it 
is more than possible that some letters related to vivisection I might have missed 
completely. However, I do not consider this a significant risk to the reliability of the 
analysis; even if I was not able to detect every single vivisection-related letter, I believe 
the material still represents fairly well the discussion that took place in the letters to the 
editor section at the time. 
At this point, I had a set of letters published during the time frame and in one way 
or the other related to vivisection. I read the letters starting from those published closest 
to the day the Act was passed and selected those defending the practice. While reading 
the letters, a few of them were excluded as it turned out that they did not suit the purpose 
of the thesis, even though in a sense they dealt with vivisection; for example, one letter 
that contained the word “vivisection” did not actually handle animal experimentation, but 
the word referred to a punishment by torture. There was also a letter in which the word 
“vivisection” did refer to animal experimentation, but the letter itself was not about the 
topic but used the term to draw parallels between animal experimentation and the 
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mistreatment of sentries. Furthermore, there were letters in which vivisection did refer to 
animal experimentation and the actual topic of which it also was, but since no sides were 
taken for or against the practice, they were not included in the material. I kept reading 
until I had enough texts to form a representative sample—estimated by comparing with 
other theses using Appraisal—and the collections were approximately of the same size. 
Fortunately, since the amount of data at this point seemed perfectly manageable in terms 
of conducting the analysis, there was no need for any random selection, but all the letters 
defending vivisection that were found could be included in the material. 
The collections consist of 9,920 and 9,741 word tokens, the total number being 
ca. 19,700. The length of the letters vary from 72 to 1313 tokens, but the collections, 
however, are rather similar to each other with respect to the length of single letters; in the 
collections the letters consist of 64 to 1,313 (A) and 204 to 1,184 (B) tokens, and in both 
of them there are texts of various sizes, in addition to these extremes.  
Both collections presumably contain texts from several writers, but since many 
write under a pseudonym, it is impossible to know how many distinct writers there really 
are. It is also impossible to know whether the “real” names really belong to the writers, 
but it is probable that there would have been some consequences and subsequent 
comments—which, to my knowledge, there were not—in the letters to the editor section 
in case any misuse of names had occurred. Therefore, I am working on the assumption 
that the 28 different names and pseudonyms give good grounds for believing that the 
letters represent opinions and attitudes of enough people to assume they give a fairly 
representative picture of the public discussion on vivisection at the time. The details of 
the primary material are shown in appendix 1. 
 As for possible limitations of the primary material, there are two things that I want 
to discuss: the difference between the length of the time periods during which the letter 
collections A and B were published, and a year-long gap in publishing any vivisection-
related letters in the newspaper after the Act was passed. The time span of the publication 
dates of the earlier collection is approximately one and a half years (30 January 1875–7 
August 1876), while that of the later collection is ca. seven and a half years (24 July 1877–
26 December 1884). The disparity results from the fact that the discussion on vivisection 
in the letters to the editor section is very lively and letters that oppose vivisection 
relatively rare during the two years before the Act is passed, whereas after it the 
discussion subsides dramatically and in addition to that, the number of opposing letters 
increase. However, since there is this “natural” explanation for the difference, and the 
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difference is not likely to jeopardise the objective of this thesis—to find out what types 
of evaluation and of what targets are used in the letters before and after the Act is passed—
l consider it more of a rather common challenge philologists encounter than a limitation. 
What I perceive as more relevant to my research is that the total time of examination is 
less than ten years; this means that no considerable changes in the writing conventions 
presumably occurred during the time the letters were written. With regard to the gap after 
the Act was passed, I actually see it more as an advantage than a limitation; one of my 
research questions deals with the influence of the new legislation on the writers’ language 
use, and since it is likely that it took some time for possible effects to take place, letters 
not immediately written after 15 August 1876 might even be a more reliable source of 
data with respect to the change in the use of evaluative language. 
The arguments for vivisection in the letters are numerous, which indicates that the 
discussion is many-sided and the topic is approached from different viewpoints; they are 
often related to the usefulness or the painlessness of the practice, The reason why this is 
relevant with regard to the thesis at hand is that the more varied the matters discussed are, 
the more comprehensive a picture the data give of the examined linguistic phenomena. 
What is more, since the purpose of this thesis is to examine the evaluative language used 
by defenders of vivisection—and the reasons for the use—it is important to also 
understand the “ultimate” goal of the writers; evaluative language is not an end in itself 
but a means to influence the audience, in this case convince them of vivisection being an 
appropriate way to do scientific research and hence improve the wellbeing of the 
humankind. In the next section, I will describe the analysis. 
 
5 Analysis 
Naturally, when starting analysing the letters included in the primary material, I had 
already read each of them at least once during the material gathering process and thus 
knew that they contained a great deal of attitudinal lexis; that was also one of the reasons 
why I chose to examine the use of evaluative language in them in the first place. However, 
I wanted to have a more accurate idea of what I was dealing with before taking the UAM 
CorpusTool into use, so I conducted a “preliminary” analysis on the letters with pen and 
paper. The aim was to familiarise myself with the material before the annotations 
“proper” so that I would have to return to and modify the annotations as little as possible. 
However, in the end I modified the annotation system so many times I stopped counting 
at some point, but finally I reached the stage where I could say the annotations were 
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ready—and in this section, I will describe the outcome of that process. What is to be noted 
is that before moving on to annotating them, the letters needed to be transcribed, 
converted to txt documents and added to the annotation tool. Since the optical character 
recognition of The Times Digital Archive could not recognise the characters in the letters 
very accurately, the transcriptions were partially created manually. 
 To return briefly to the challenges related to distinguishing between Judgement 
and Appreciation, in my view, the safest way seems to be to rely on the form, i.e. what 
has actually been said: that way, as little as possible is left open to interpretation. 
However, as became clear earlier in this subsection, this decision is only one part of the 
question of how to distinguish between Judgement and Appreciation. As for the other 
aspects discussed above, I believe it depends rather much on the purpose of the study in 
question what aspects should be prioritised. For example, in this thesis, in which one of 
the research questions is about defining the targets of evaluation in the material, the 
natural starting point is the target of each evaluation. However, even if I did not have that 
type of a question to answer, I would probably prefer prioritising the target; considering 
the influence of the context on the meaning of a word, I find it rather impossible to define 
what items belong to Judging or Appreciating lexis. However, this does not mean that no 
linguistic item should ever be referred to as e.g. “appreciating lexis”, as often that type of 
labelling helps distinguishing between different types of evaluations. But depending very 
much on the lexis in the initial phase of analysis might not work. Bednarek notes, with 
regard to target-based analysis, that “it must be clear that this is no longer purely a 
classification of APPRAISAL dependent on attitudinal lexis, but rather a classification of 
APPRAISAL dependent on the attitudinal target” (2009, 20). It seems to me that “a 
classification of APPRAISAL dependent on attitudinal lexis” (ibid.) is purely impossible, but 
as soon as the target is defined, it should be examined as accurately as possible how that 
target is evaluated, i.e. what appraisal categories, what grammatical means and what lexis 
is used. This naturally applies to all evaluations, not just Judgements or Appreciations. 
 I will start by describing how the targets of appraisal were identified and how they 
were grouped into more general categories. Then I will describe the analysis concerning 
Judgement, Appreciation and Affect, after which I will discuss how implicit evaluations 
and the cumulativeness of appraisal show in the material. Finally, I will discuss the 





5.1 Targets of appraisal 
Already in an early stage of the analysis, I could naturally make different types of 
observations about the targets in the material, but many things could be figured out only 
when the whole analysis was done. The whole process can be divided roughly into two 
phases—although in practice they often overlapped each other—i.e. identifying the 
targets, which was fairly straightforward for the most part, and grouping them, which in 
turn turned out to be somewhat more complex than expected; in order to answer the 
research questions, I needed to not only identify all the relevant targets in the material but 
also categorise them in a way that would  enable a productive data analysis. Next, I will 
present the process in more detail and—when considered useful for the reader—illustrate 
some of the points with examples taken from the letters.  
The first research question being “What and who are the targets of evaluation 
when vivisection is defended?”, the aim naturally was to identify all the targets in the 
material, without focusing on any particular target type. This part of the analysis consisted 
broadly speaking of the following three, partly overlapping, stages: recognising all the 
actual targets of evaluation in the material, determining what target category, i.e. Target, 
they belonged to, and, if needed, creating umbrella categories for them, in order to 
organise the data in the most appropriate manner.  
In some cases, it was somewhat uncomplicated to determine the Target and 
understand what types of lexical items referred to them. For example, Vivisectionist and 
Vivisection were among the first Targets to recognise, and lexical items referring to them 
were usually easy to detect due to the wider context—be the item the clause, the sentence 
or the larger discourse unit the target occurred in. For example, vivisectionist can appear 
in the letters as e.g. physiologist, physician, teacher, professor, surgeon, and master, like 
in the example below. The great masters refer to certain vivisectors in the past that were 
discussed earlier in the letter. 
 
(25) It may, I think, be safely left to those who follow in the footsteps of these 
great masters to carry on the work of alleviating human suffering (A1) 
 
Vivisection in turn can be referred to for example as experiment on animals, 
experimentation on animals, experiment, (physiological) research, operation, 
demonstration, (experimental) study and physiological exploration. Actually, it is rather 
rare that the words vivisectionist and vivisection are used in the letters, which was of 
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course expected, giving their negative associations. However, vivisection is mentioned at 
least once in almost every letter—mostly in the titles.  
Some of the Targets were merged so that comparing them would be as useful as 
possible, i.e. have the potential for revealing relevant information on the topic. In fact, 
when I started the analysis, I expected there would be need for both Vivisector11 and 
Vivisectionist, the latter at that point referring to those who support vivisection but not 
necessarily practise it themselves. However, when all the targets had been gathered, I 
learnt there were few cases where the target was clearly “just” an advocate of vivisection, 
not a vivisector. Therefore, due to both this over-representation of vivisectors and the 
considerable overlap in the two—it is reasonable to assume that those who practise 
vivisection also support it—Vivisector and Vivisectionist were emerged into one. Since 
the word vivisectionist12 can refer to both those who support and those who practice 
vivisection, it was sensible to name the category based on that term. Furthermore, in order 
to avoid creating an impression of anti-vivisectionists being the only ones taking a stand 
and acting accordingly, I modified the term into Pro-vivisectionist. What is to be noted is 
that Pro-vivisectionist can also refer to the writers of the letters.   
 Another example of such Target is Animal user13: the term covers both those who 
treat or kill animals in an inhumane or violent manner for their own pleasure; those who 
otherwise exploit or kill animals for their own benefit; and those who have animals 
exploited or killed for the same reasons. The target group includes individuals such as fox 
hunters and alike participating in blood sports, owners of working animals, recreational 
fishermen, maggot and worm breeders, rabbit and pheasant farmers, cooks, epicures, 
people killing flies, etc. The aim was not to discover how evaluations made of all these 
separate types of “animal users” differ from one another, but the relevance lies in the 
difference between how the writers evaluate those using animals for scientific purposes 
and those using them to other ends—and how this difference serves the goal of the 
defenders of vivisection. 
The category Legal documents and procedures, in turn, is an example of an 
umbrella category. It comprises eight Targets, namely Memorial, Investigation, 
Commission’s report, Bill, Act, Amendment, Regulation and Abolition. These Targets 
                                                          
11 Vivisector, ‘one who vivisects or practises vivisection’ (OED, s.v. “vivisector,” n.) 
12 Vivisectionist, ‘one who practises or defends vivisection’ (OED, s.v. “vivisectionist,” n.) 
13 Unfortunately, Animal user is a somewhat ambiguous term, as today it is also used to refer to people 
working with animals in research and teaching, which practically means the same as Vivisector in this study. 
However, having such a loose meaning, user seems to be the best term to cover several types of animal use. 
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appear in the letters mostly in the form of the name of the Target they represent, but in a 
few cases, other terms are used, like in the following evaluations targeted at Regulation 
and Abolition, respectively: 
 
(26) [T]he Commissioners show that restrictive legislation is desirable to 
   prevent abuse. (A7) 
 
(27) [B]oth the practical and the logical objections to total prohibition are so 
  numerous and strong. (B3) 
 
So far, I have only discussed cases where targets are expressed explicitly, but very 
often they are implicit and need to be inferred from the context, which, however, is 
usually fairly easy. For example, in the sentence below, both foreigners and Englishmen 
(in bold) clearly refer to Vivisectionists, even though their denotative meanings have no 
reference to animal experimentation: 
 
(28) [h]ow is it that we see eminent foreigners rather that eminent Englishmen 
  making such enormous strides into the true nature of hydrophobia, cholera, 
  and tubercle? (B14)  
 
In the same example above, there is an implicit evaluation targeted at Vivisection 
(underlined). However, there is no specific lexical item referring to the practice—like 
Englishmen refers to vivisectionists—but it is the context that reveals what the sentence 
is about. Further, in some evaluations the target was indicated explicitly, but since the 
target in question was not included in the Targets of this study, the evaluation was coded 
as targeted at one of the Targets which where. However, this was only done in case the 
explicit target had a clear connection to some of the Targets. For example, the actual 
target of the evaluations in the example below is medical science, which is evaluated as 
precise and veracious, but since I did not consider it useful to include medical science in 
the Targets—but it has a clear connection to one of them, namely Vivisection—the 
evaluations were coded as Provoked Appreciations targeted at Vivisection: 
 
(29) It [a medical case] […] reveals impressively the precision and veracity of 
modern medical science. (B10)  
 
After briefly discussing these main points related to defining and grouping targets of 





In this subsection, I will present some of those evaluations that were somewhat 
unambiguously analysable as Judgement; in all the examples, typical targets of 
Judgement are evaluated by using typical Judging lexis (as discussed in 3.1.5, I do not 
find it possible to define e.g. Judging lexis). I will also discuss briefly the reasons behind 
the decisions. The first example is of negative Judgement of Veracity, targeted at Anti-
vivisectionists: 
 
(30) and yet they have not hesitated to deceive the public by representing mere 
automatic movements as indications of “intense and protracted agony.” 
(A4) 
 
Here norms of Social sanction are clearly violated; deceiving has to do with one’s 
truthfulness and is generally considered immoral, even a sin. In principle, it would even 
be possible to hold the deceiver legally responsible for their actions. What is more, the 
evaluation is targeted at people, more particularly their behaviour, which is characteristic 
of Judgements. 
 The second example is of negative Judgement of Propriety, targeted at the 
Government: 
 
(31) We have already been rudely handled by an authority which represents 
force; (A13) 
 
In this sentence, the Government’s behaviour is evaluated as rude, which means that 
society’s shared expectations regarding good behaviour and ethics are not answered. 
Further, the Target is a human collective, a typical target of Judgement. What is to be 
noted is that the wider context of rudely reveals that the word refers to disrespectful and 
unfair behaviour, not behaviour that is due to one’s ignorance: for example, in the next 
sentence in the letter, the Government is accused of threatening vivisectionists. 
 The next example contains two negative Judgements of Capacity, targeted at Anti-
vivisectionists: 
 
(32) he is profoundly ignorant of cerebral anatomy […] and is therefore quite 




The third example is a negative Judgement of Tenacity, targeted at Anti-vivisectionists: 
 
(33) [a]ll the random accusations of reckless agitators (A7) 
 
In both (32) and (33), norms of Social esteem are violated; the above-mentioned qualities 
are not usually valued or encouraged in society, but they are not, however, considered 
immoral or illegal. In the former, the mental capacity of an Anti-vivisectionist is doubted, 
whereas in the latter, their dependability is at stake. 
 The next example is a positive Judgement of Normality, targeted at 
Vivisectionists: 
 
 (34) a few men of known character and reputation (A8) 
 
In this phrase, vivisectionists are described as widely known for their positive qualities, 
and thus the evaluative items refer to positive abnormality, the same way as celebrated in 
Martin and White’s table 2.6 (2005, 53).  
 As mentioned, it is not always this straightforward to classify Judgement values 
into the Judgement subcategories, which I will illustrate with an example from the data, 
namely pioneers of knowledge, an item that could be seen as an evaluation of either 
Normality or Capacity: 
 
 (35) It is to be hoped that the united remonstrances […] may still have  
  some force in the house of Commons to set free the hands of the 
  pioneers of knowledge. (A11) 
 
In my view, Pioneers of knowledge could be seen as referring to the target’s intellectual 
capacity the same way as e.g. inventor/inventive or creator/creative. However, since 
pioneers does not actually refer to a trait or a quality ascribed to vivisectionists but has 
more to do with how vivisectionists and their work is seen in comparison to the rest of 
the community, the Appraisal unit was coded as positive Judgement:Normality. In other 
words, vivisectionists are considered to do something that has not been done before and 





In this subsection, I will present some of those evaluations that were unambiguously 
analysable as Appreciation. In each example, the evaluative item is in bold. The first three 
examples are of Valuation, targeted at Vivisection. In each example, I will introduce a 
value of Valuation that was relatively frequently used in the material. 
 
 (36) Biological science requires the sacrifice of a limited number of animals. 
  (A13) 
 
 (37) [O]f the necessity, in modern medical education of a certain number of 
   such painless demonstrations, under given conditions, I entertain no 
   doubt. (A1) 
 
 (38) [F]or certain objects, and in certain surroundings, [vivisection] is entirely 
   justifiable. (A16)  
 
In examples (36), (37) and (38) above, Vivisection is evaluated as rare, useful and 
painless, and justified, respectively. Useful and justified are rather similar to the values 
of Valuation listed in Martin and White (2005, 56), but rare and painless do not seem to 
fit any of the Appreciation subtypes. Nevertheless, I coded them as values of Valuation 
because also today, they are values that are commonly ascribed to animal experimentation 
in order to present it as worthwhile. In a way, the negative consequences are diminished, 
in order to emphasise its value. This is, however, a somewhat forced categorisation, and 
the values do not only demonstrate well the especial field-dependency of Valuation 
discussed in 3.1.2, but also of the whole Appreciation. Another option would have been 
to create additional Appreciation categories, but for this study, it was not considered 
necessary. 
 Both things, humans and animals were evaluated in the material by using 
Appreciation. Examples (37) above and (39) below are positive Appreciations of 
Valuation, targeted at Vivisection and a Patient, respectively. Example (40) contains 
negative Appreciations of a sheep and many sparrows.  
 
(39) He has been snatched from the grave and […] he will be restored to a life 
of comfort and usefulness. (B10) 
 
 (40) we have an authority higher than mere sentiment for holding the life of a 
  man to be immeasurably more sacred than the life of a sheep, or even




In both examples, the value ascribed to the Target is a prototypical realisation of 
Valuation: something necessary and useful is undoubtedly worthwhile. 
 As for values that in Bednarek’s view cannot straightforwardly be categorised as 
good or bad (important, genuine, expected, possible, necessary) (see section 3.1.5), in my 
material and analysis, four of them were considered positive values of Valuation: 
 
 (41) These, however, were not experiments of illustration, but of high original 
  research probably little less important in their results than those of 
   Marshall Hall or Sir Charles Bell. (A2) 
 
 (42) the limitation of all experiments to registered places would tend seriously 
  to obstruct genuine scientific inquiry. (A11) 
 
 (43) I believe that the total abolition of the practice is not only not possible, 
  but is not even desirable, (A16) 
 
(44) [T]hose who practise this mode of painless demonstration do so because 
they at least believe it necessary. (A2) 
 
As one can see, in these cases, it is evident already from the immediate textual context, 
not to mention the wider context, that these values are positive—or good. In fact, their 
meaning is very close to core values of Valuation such as worthwhile and effective.  
 As for Composition, there were no appraisal units in the material coded as either 
Balance or Complexity, which, again, is a clear indication of the field-dependency of the 
whole Appreciation system; it can be expected that texts concerning Vivisection do not 
deal with values of Composition, unlike texts related to e.g. art, fashion or writing. There 
was one borderline case that at first sight seemed an evaluation of 
Composition:Complexity, the same way as e.g. ‘woolly writing’: 
 
 (45) After giving an inaccurate description of the mode of experiment adopted 
  by Professor Ferrier in his important researches (A4) 
 
However, since the value refers to the incorrectness of the description, not its 
organisation, the evaluation is of Valuation, the same way as e.g. misleading, and thus 
harmful or useless. 
 The next example is an Appreciation of Impact, targeted at the bill that became 




(46) The striking feature of this whole vivisection legislation is the paltriness 
and unfairness of the whole thing. (A9) 
 
The second example is Negative Appreciation of Quality, targeted at Anti-vivisectionists’ 
accusations.  
 
(47) I cannot think they would have […] sanctioned the circulation of odious 
charges resting on so flimsy a basis. (A2)  
 
Striking and odious clearly refer to the reactions of the Appraisers, instead of directly 
telling us what the targets are actually like: the legislation astonishes the Appraiser, and 
Anti-vivisectionists’ accusations are not liked.  
 
5.4 Affect 
In this section, I will present some of those evaluations that were somewhat 
unambiguously analysable as Affect; in all the examples, Emoters’ feelings or reactions 
are described by using affective lexis. I will also discuss briefly the reasons behind the 
decisions concerning the more specific categorisation. I will only give examples of either 
the positive or the negative subcategory, i.e. either of Cheer or Misery, Affection or 
Antipathy, etc., like was the case with Judgement and Appreciation. In each example, the 
evaluative item is in bold. The first two examples are of Misery and Antipathy, 
respectively: 
 
(48) Is it the extreme commonness of the habit that makes people admit […] 
that horrible sticky paper to which miserable flies adhere (A3) 
 
(49) For my own part, not being either a sentimental vegetarian or a hater of 
sport (B17) 
 
Both (48) and (49) are clear examples of Happiness. As Martin and White describe the 
category, “[i]t involves the moods of feeling happy or sad, and the possibility of directing 
these feelings at a Trigger by liking or disliking it” (2005, 49). The essential difference 
discussed in 4.1.3 between the two Happiness subcategories is also clearly noticeable: 
miserable describes the mood of the Emoter, whereas hater directs the feeling at the 
Trigger. 
 The next two examples are of Interest and Pleasure, respectively. It could not get 




 (50) Any of your readers whose interest this letter may have excited (B9) 
 
(51) any cruelty perpetrated in the pursuit of game is solely for the sake of the 
pleasure it affords (A5) 
 
The next three examples are of In/security—(52) of Quiet and (53) of Disquiet, and (54) 
containing both Trust and Distrust: 
  
 (52) The man is now convalescent […] and full of gratitude for the relief  
  afforded him. (B12) 
 
(53) I confess that if [the Bill is not revised] I look with some apprehension to 
the future before us. (A16) 
 
(54) We are trusted […] with the accidents of the birth […] but we are not to 
be trusted with the lives of the few animals required by our science. (A13) 
 
As discussed in 3.1.3, Security system covers values related to our ecosocial well-being, 
such as relaxed, anxious and trust, like in the examples above. It is also illustrated in the 
examples how the positive and negative subcategories of the modified In/security system 
‘mirror’ each other, resulting in a clearer and more coherent analysis. 
 The next example is of Desire: 
 
(55) [i]t is to be desired that the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals should seriously undertake the duty of feeding or else destroying 
the [stray cats]. (B2) 
 
This is a straightforward example of positive Inclination: the writer wants the Society to 
perform their duty. The case also illustrates the point discussed in 3.1.3 concerning the 
difference between Inclination and the other Affect categories: the actual emotion leading 
to desiring the Target is not stated. What is to be noted here is that Inclination does not 
concern the other meaning of desire, the sexual one. In fact, Martin and White (2005) do 
not discuss sexual desire at all, which, however was not a problem in terms of my analysis, 
as the material did not contain any reference to sexual desire. 




(56) [c]ostumed as we are to all sorts of exaggeration and calumny when 
vivisection is spoken of, we could not help being highly surprised at its 
transformation into vivicoction. (B1) 
 
Here we can see in practice why Bednarek’s Surprise as a separate type of Affect, instead 
of a negative subcategory of Security, is justified. First, surprised in this extract does not 
seem to refer to distrust: the writer and their fellow vivisectionists did not actually trust 
that anti-vivisectionists would not do X—they probably did not have any presumptions 
about the topic—they just got surprised when X happened. Second, surprised itself seems 
to be neutral here with respect to valence; it is only the wider, ironic context that reveals 
the vivisectionists’ negative attitude towards Anti-vivisectionists’ behaviour. 
 
5.5 Pain ‒ quality or feeling 
The evaluations of Vivisection related to pain are made by using both Affect and 
Appreciation in the material, but the boundaries between the two categories are not 
always clear. Broadly speaking, the difference is the following: when there is an Emoter, 
i.e. an animal who is feeling or not feeling pain or suffering—explicitly or implicitly 
present—Affect is at stake: 
 
 (57) The frog or turtle, or whatever the creature may be, is already dead-to 
  pain. (A1) 
 
 (58) The movements and cries [of the animal] produced by the faradization of 
  the brain were  not expressive of suffering, but simply of the stimulation 
  of a motor centre, (A4) 
 
The clearest case of Appreciation, in turn, is in question, when Vivisection is described 
as painless or not painful by the use of an attributive or predicative adjective, and animals’ 
emotions are not mentioned (apparently in (60) does not refer to any concrete sings of 
pain): 
 
 (59) Of the propriety […] of such painless demonstrations […] I entertain no 
  doubt. (A1)   
  
 (60) [T]he destruction of the brain by the methods described by Mr. Reid, 
   though apparently very painful, is not so in reality, the brain being […]




However, not all cases are that clear-cut. For example, in the Evoked evaluations of 
Vivisection below, Vivisection is not evaluated as painless by the use of attributive or 
predicative adjectives but by the use of ideational meanings that describe the use of 
anaesthetics during the experiments, which makes the evaluations not as prototypical 
Appreciations as (59) and (60) above. What is more, animals are mentioned explicitly, 
which, at first sight, seems to indicate that Emoters are present, which, in turn, would 
refer to Affect. However, neither of the evaluations below contain any description of any 
of the animals not feeling pain, but they are more about describing the procedure, i.e. how 
and to whom the experiments are done: animals are used, anaesthetics are given, and the 
animal is killed at a certain time. The latter point certainly implies that the animal does 
not suffer, because they are killed in time, but there is no actual reference to any feeling 
or lack of feeling of the animal. 
 
 (61) treatment that has been made practicable by the sacrifice, under     
   anaesthetics, of few rabbits and monkeys. (B10) 
 
 (62) I have seen only one vivisection, that under chloroform, and the animal 
  being killed before the effects of the anaesthetic had disappeared. 
   (A10) 
 
While (61) and (62) above were annotated as Evoked Appreciations, example (63) below 
is a borderline case that was annotated as Provoked Affect. Because the word painful is 
used, it first looks like an Appreciation. However, since there is a clear reference to an 
Emoter—i.e. the animals who are directly and clearly connected to the feeling of pain by 
the preposition to—it was considered more of a case of Affect that Appreciation. In other 
words, the author is not just describing an experiment, but by asking this rhetorical 
question (hence Provoked), the author questions whether the animals receive the 
experiment as painful: 
 
 (63) Is it painful to the animals? (A2)  
 
As has been demonstrated, pain is connected to Vivisection both as a quality of the 
practice and as a feeling felt by an animal. Actually, to be precise, Vivisection is presented 




5.6 Implicit appraisal and the accumulation of evaluation  
In this subsection, I will discuss those implicit means of conveying evaluation that best 
represent the material or are otherwise relevant to the study at hand. First, I will discuss 
how prosody—the cumulative nature of evaluative meaning—is present in the letters, and 
second, I will demonstrate how Don´s mechanisms for Provoked and Evoked evaluation 
(see 3.2) are realised in the letters. However, before moving on to the analysis, I want to 
specify my reading position, which inevitably had an influence on how I interpreted the 
texts. With respect to the variables listed by Martin and White—gender, generation, etc., 
I define myself as a white, Finnish, able-bodied, middle-aged and middle-class cis-
woman. However, with regard to the current thesis, I find it more relevant to define my 
reading position according to my view on animal experimentation: I find the practice 
ethically untenable, and therefore, read the letters resistantly. However, above all, as a 
thesis writer, I read the letters tactically, i.e. aiming at gathering linguistic evidence to 
answer the research questions.  
 I knew from an early state of the analysis that the letters contained a great deal of 
explicitly attitudinal lexis, but what I did not realise, was that they would also contain so 
much implicit evaluative material. On the other hand, this can be explained fairly 
exhaustively by two factors: First, the topic of the letters naturally directed the 
interpretation of the texts towards a certain direction. In other words, an excerpt that in 
other contexts might have been interpreted as non-evaluative, as evaluating another target, 
or as another type of evaluation, was analysed in a certain way in this thesis because the 
purpose of the letters—to defend vivisection—had been identified beforehand. For 
example, the sentence below, which is used in the letter to justify the need for animal 
experimentation, was coded as an Evoked Positive Appreciation:Valuation targeted at 
Vivisection, but in a different context, it could have been interpreted very differently: 
 
 (64) [t]he fact really is that the operation known as transfusion of blood is a 
   complete failure; a large number of different methods have been 
  introduced for its performance, all of which are extremely defective and 
  most exceedingly dangerous. (B11) 
 
In fact, out of context, it would be impossible to connect the statement to animal 
experimentation. Instead, it could be targeted e.g. at the operation, the different methods, 
the developers of the methods or the doctors using them—or it could be targeted at 
somebody claiming that the operation is e.g. safe. 
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 Second, since evaluative meaning is cumulative, evaluative content colours also 
its surroundings evaluatively. In my view, this can be understood broadly speaking in two 
ways: first, in the way it seems to be typically understood in previous research, i.e. that 
every evaluation—especially explicit—in a text guides the reader to interpret other parts 
of it evaluatively as well; and second, in another way Martin and White (2005, 19‒20) 
discuss with regard to prosody, i.e. saturation, intensification and domination. However, 
as mentioned in 3.2, I consider the latter to concern mainly how evaluative material is 
situated within the text to increase the text’s effectiveness. However, all the means 
discussed so far, in one way or the other, increases the text’s potential to influence the 
reader. 
 In the letters, especially saturation, but also intensification, are used frequently. In 
the following examples, both are used, partly overlapping each other: 
  
 (65) [d]o turtles, frogs, and other animals, when rendered insensible by  
  chloroform, chloral, or other anaesthetics, feel pain? (A2) 
                                                                                         
The sentence is saturated with meanings of painlessness, which is manifested in the direct 
object of the main clause (pain), in the subject predicative of the adverbial clause 
(insensible), and as the prepositional complement in the adverbial embedded in the 
adverbial clause (chloroform, chloral, or other anaesthetics). Further, the impression of 
painlessness is further intensified by the list of anaesthetic substances (chloroform, 
chloral, or other anaesthetics). 
 As for domination, it was either not used much in the letters, or I was not able to 
detect it due to such a large amount of evaluative material in them. Domination seems to 
be mainly realised in the last sentence of several letters, before the closing formula, like 
in the example below: 
 
 (66) To such base practices may not ill-judged enthusiasm or a thirst for 
   subscriptions reduce even a benevolent society! 
     I am, Sir, your obedient servant, 
        J. CRICHTON BROWNE (A4) 
 
Situated like this, i.e. at the end of the text, the sentence functions as a summary of the 
preceding text and thus further strengthens its overall effect. However, as one might have 
noticed, the sentence functions also as a realisation of saturation (in bold): evaluation is 
manifested in the prepositional object such base practices, in the subjects ill-judged 
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enthusiasm and a thirst for subscriptions, in the verb reduce14 and in the object a 
benevolent society. What is more, the exclamation mark further emphasises the writer´s 
disapproving attitude. Next, I will move on to discussing how Don’s mechanisms for 
making implicit evaluations are realised in the letters. 
 The material is very diverse with respect to implicit evaluations. This diversity 
will be illustrated both with examples in which Don´s mechanisms are utilised and with 
additional categories created based on the data. Let us start with Evoked, i.e. the most 
implicit evaluations. The first example is of cultural doxa: people’s widely held 
knowledge of fox hunting and its popularity—and the controversy over the sport—is 
utilised to evaluate it as cruel. 
 
 (67) You have foxes preserved in order that they may be pursued to death for a 
  whole day by a pack of hounds. (A9) 
 
In example (68), in turn, in-group allusion is utilised: in order to fully understand the 
evaluation, the reader needs to be aware of the concerns about foreign vivisectors’ 
inhumanity, which, I assume, were mainly familiar to those interested in the topic.  
 
 (68) Such regulations […] would have a fair chance of imitation abroad, and 
  thus of teaching humanity to the German or Italian physiologists. (A7) 
 
 The next example is of manifest intertextuality: a motion agreed to by an esteemed 
authority is quoted directly, and the quotation functions as an Evoked Negative evaluation 
targeted at Carnarvon’s bill. 
 
 (69) At a meeting of the Senate of the University of London on the 21st inst., 
  the following motion was considered and agreed to by a majority of 14 to 
  4:‒"That the Senate do memorialize the Government on  
  [Carnarvon’s] Bill now before Parliament […] and do pray that the 
  provisions of this Bill be so modified as to meet the objections stated 
  in the Memorial of the General Medical Council, adopted the 1st of 
  June, 1876." (A11) 
 
                                                          
14 ‘[t]o bring down or lower (a person) to engaging in an undesirable or unsatisfactory activity’ (OED, 




 Example (70), in turn, illustrates the use of constitutive intertextuality: in the 
passage which has borrowed its style and imagery from the horror genre, anti-
vivisectionists are ridiculed for their alleged concern about vivisectors turning into 
vivicoctionists: 
  
 (70) in happier days to come, the vivicoctionists will enjoy […] the  
  advantage of taking their wives and children to the boiling, baking, and 
  roasting rooms, and allowing them to tear to pieces, with nail and tooth, 
  the quivering flesh of the half-cooked animals, and to quench their thirst 
  with the foaming blood of the yelling victims. (B1) 
 
 Next, let us move on to Don’s mechanisms for making Provoked evaluations. The 
first example is of ventriloquism: it is a pseudo quote of an imaginary anti-vivisectionist, 
involving intensification and intended to present anti-vivisectionists as thoughtless. 
 
 (71) Any man can cry, Let animals be saved though science and medicine 
   perish! (B6) 
 
The next evaluations are made by using local signals, more particularly downscaling of 
quantity, counter-expectancy and logico-semantic relations of contrast, just to give a few 
clear examples of the mechanism: 
 
 (72) Biological science requires the sacrifice of a limited number of animals. 
  (A11) 
 
 (73) Startling though such a statement may appear, it is, nevertheless,   
  essentially true. (B14) 
 
 (74) It is use and familiarity with old and common forms of necessary cruelty 
  which makes us blind and callous to them, while a now one of infinitely 
  less extent strikes us with horror. (B17) 
 
  
Further, attitudinal tokens and figurative tokens are illustrated in the following examples, 
respectively: 
 
 (75) [T]hat one outlet of escape […] was open to him in an operation […] from 
  which he might, perhaps, obtain complete relief. (B10) 
  
 (76) [T]hey [anti-vivisectionists] are habitually straining at gnats and   




Example (76) is fairly self-explanatory, but (75) might need some clarification: operation 
is the explicit target of the evaluation, but the actual Target is Vivisection, which has 
made the operation possible.  
 In addition to Don’s mechanisms, there are other types of implicit evaluations in 
the letters; at least certain types of rhetorical questions (77), quotation marks used in a 
specific way (78) (so-called would belong to the same category) and glaring 
exaggerations like those in (79) would need their own categories.  
 
 (77) Why should dogs and cats be put in a position of immunity which they 
   have not enjoyed since they were worshipped in Egypt? (A7) 
 
 (78) Since the so-called “friends of animals” have apparently repudiated all 
   sympathy with these outcasts [stray cats] (B3) 
 
 (79) The very man whose nerves will shrink and whose blood will boil on 
   meeting with the terrible word "vivisection" in innocent type, will pass a 
   flock of sheep when being driven to the slaughterhouse without a thought 
  of sympathy. (B17) 
 
5.7 Identifying the Appraisal units in the material 
The first task when doing Appraisal analysis is of course to determine what to analyse, 
that is to identify the Appraisal units in the primary material. Since the first objective of 
this study was to examine what and who are evaluated when vivisection is defended, and 
how these evaluations are made, I needed to gather all evaluations in the letters, without 
focusing on any particular types of evaluation. In other words, I included in the data all 
evaluations of Attitude, targeted at anything or anyone and made by anyone. Furthermore, 
both explicit and implicit, and positive and negative evaluations were included.  
 As discussed in 3.3, there are varying opinions on what aspects of appraisal count 
as questions of identification, and there is also a considerable overlap between them. In 
this section, however, the focus will be mainly on unitising, i.e. setting boundaries on 
Appraisal units, and recognising implicit evaluation, which intertwines considerably with 
the context-dependency of evaluative meanings, as mentioned earlier. 
 As discussed in earlier, there are different ways to unitise evaluation.  What is 
more, it is claimed that although researchers’ unitisation choices might influence 
significantly the results of the study, the different choices are equally valid (Fuoli 2018, 
5). Based on my knowledge on the topic, however, I must disagree on that. I also claim 
that unitising choices might affect greatly both qualitative and quantitative analyses, not 
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mainly the former, as suggested earlier (ibid.). To clarify my point of view, let us look at 
examples X and X below. In the first one, the writer evaluates vivisection positively by 
comparing the destiny of stray cats living on the street with “[a]n hour or so under the 
hands of a skilful experimenter [which] would be infinitely less horrible” (B2): 
 
 (80) the slow agony of death by hunger and thirst (B2)  
 
In (80), all the evaluative items are of Misery, agony an explicit one, and death, hunger 
and thirst implicit ones, describing physical states that in this context are considered to 
cause negative feelings. Furthermore, following e.g. Fuoli’s (2018) thoughts, the phrase 
could be annotated in various ways: the whole phrase could be seen as one Appraisal unit; 
agony and [death by hunger and thirst] could be annotated as two separate units; agony,  
death and [hunger and thirst] as three separate units; or all four evaluative items could 
be coded separately. In this particular case, therefore, the unitisation choice does not have 
influence on the Attitude type of the given phrase, as all the evaluations are of Misery, 
but it does affect the amount of certain type of Attitude, in this case Affect:Misery, in the 
whole data. 
 Example (81) in turn, in which Anti-vivisectionists are evaluated, contains 
evaluations of Surprise, Propriety, Capacity and Tenacity: 
 
 (81) [i]t is indeed surprising that these well-meaning opponents of  
  physiological investigation do not see that they are habitually  
  straining at gnats and swallowing camels. (B15) 
 
In this sentence, the writer is surprised by Anti-vivisectionists’ inability to see how they 
are behaving (Surprise). Anti-vivisectionists are also described as well-meaning 
(Propriety) and opponents of physiological investigation, which implies that anti-
vivisectionists oppose science and are willing to remain in ignorance (Capacity). Further, 
they are accused of straining at gnats and swallowing camels, which in this context refers 
to inconsistent behaviour: they disapprove of animal experimentation, which is relatively 
harmless, and yet treat animals much worse themselves (Tenacity). 
 As for unitisation, there are various options again: following Fuoli’s (2018, 4‒6) 
and Read and Carroll’s (2012, chap. “Annotation methodology”) ideas of possible 
unitisation strategies, the entire sentence can be seen as one appraisal unit, the three 
clauses can be annotated separately, or all the evaluation-bearing items (surprising, well-
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meaning, opponents of physiological investigation, do not see and straining at gnats and 
swallowing camels) can be coded as separate units. It would also be possible to combine 
well-meaning and opponents of physiological investigation into one Appraisal unit and 
annotate it as Propriety or Capacity. However, the unitisation strategy I chose to use was 
to code all the above-mentioned evaluation-bearing items separately, except for 
surprising and do not see, as the latter is actually the Trigger that causes the Emoter to be 
surprised. Naturally, it would also be possible to code the entire rest of the sentence after 
It is indeed surprising as the Trigger, but that way several evaluations in the passage 
would remain uncoded. Therefore, in order to capture all the relevant evaluations in the 
sentence, surprising, well-meaning, opponents of physiological investigation and 
straining at gnats and swallowing camels were coded as separate appraisal units, and do 
not see as the Target Anti-vivisectionists’ behaviour. What is to be noted is that in a 
different study, for example in one aiming at detecting all the Judgements in the material, 
it would be appropriate to code do not see as Judgement:Capacity, but in the one at hand, 
where the aim is to discover how the evaluations are made,  it is important to identify and 
categorise all of them. However, since It is indeed surprising and do not see are 
components of the same appraisal unit—the former the appraisal itself and the latter the 
Target—only It is indeed surprising was coded as Appraisal. This leads us to the next 
question concerning unitisation, namely how to decide on the textual boundaries of the 
Appraisal units that overlap one another and/or share components. 
 The appraisal unit It is indeed surprising…do not see in the previous example is 
a good illustration of how evaluations are sometimes interrupted by other evaluations, 
and thus often seem incomplete taken out of the context. It also serves as an example of 
a situation where the analyst has to decide on which part is the primary part of the 
Appraisal unit in question and thus determines the Appraisal category of that particular 
unit. In the example above, as was mentioned earlier, it would have been possible to put 
more importance on the latter part of the unit and code the unit as Judgement:Capacity, 
but in the current study, it would not  have been appropriate. Since the aim of this study 
is to analyse all the evaluations in the letters, and in this study, one appraisal unit cannot 
represent more than one appraisal category (proper) at the same time, it was necessary to 
take into account both It is indeed surprising and do not see and to choose the appraisal 





There are 1122 Appraisal units in the data, and each unit has been annotated according to 
their Target, Attitude type and subtype and Valence (Polarity in UAMCorpusTool), 
Explicitness. The relatively large number of evaluations can partly be explained by the 
decisions related to the implicit evaluations included and the unitisation strategies 
employed. There are 1122 targets of evaluation in the data, and these targets are classified 
into 58 different target groups, i.e. Targets. However, several of them only contain one or 
two targets, but since the targets in question could not be included in any other Target, 
they have to form their own. Furthermore, I have formed higher-level categories of some 
of the Targets, in order to analyse and present the data in the most fruitful way.  
 The two most common Targets in the material are Vivisection (284) and Anti-
vivisectionists (241); these two Targets compose almost a half of all the targets (47%). 
Next comes a Target group that contains different types of Legal documents and 
procedures (178), and after that Pro-vivisectionists (113) and Other animal use (95). Other 
Targets of considerable size are Other animal users (39), People involved in legal 
procedures (37), Anti-vivisectionists’ statements (30) and Diseases (21). Furthermore, 
there are 58 evaluations in which animals are either Emoters or Targets of evaluation and 
26 evaluations in which Patients are either Emoters or Targets.  
 In order to save space for discussing the Targets that seem the most relevant with 
regard to the research questions and the hypotheses, the Target groups Legal documents 
and procedures and People involved in legal procedures were omitted from the more 
detailed description of the findings below. In the following subsections, the most relevant 
findings of the most relevant Targets and Emoters are presented, after which I will discuss 
the differences between the evaluations published before the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876 
and those published after it. 
 
6.1 Vivisection 
The most common Target of evaluation in the whole material is Vivisection, which was 
of course expected, considering that the letters were selected on the grounds of the topic—
defending vivisection—and not e.g. the author, the year of publication, etc. Vivisection 
is evaluated 284 times, which is 25% of all the evaluations. It is evaluated by using 
Appreciation (Valuation and Reaction:Quality) and Affect (Un/happiness:Misery/Cheer, 
Dis/satisfaction:Dis/pleasure, In/security:Dis/quiet and Dis/inclination). 55 (20%) 
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evaluations are Inscribed, 63 (22%) Provoked and 166 (58%) Evoked. The majority of 
the evaluations of Vivisection, 257 (90%), is Positive. 
 When vivisection is evaluated, its usefulness is addressed much more frequently 
than other values: out of all the evaluations targeted at Vivisection, 166 (59%) are related 
to its usefulness. In fact, 15% of all evaluations in the material, 166 out of 1122, are 
related to the utility of the practice. Almost all of them, 164 (99%), are Positive.  
 The second most common value ascribed to Vivisection is painlessness/ 
painfulness, with 63 evaluations, which is 22% of the evaluations targeted at Vivisection. 
They are made by using both Affect and Appreciation. 51 (81%) of them are Positive. 
Out of the 12 Negative evaluations, in only one case, Vivisection is clearly and genuinely 
evaluated as causing suffering, without somehow diminishing the issue. However, even 
then avoiding using explicit words such as pain or suffering: 
 
 (82) That very severe experiments are constantly performed cannot be doubted 
  by those who read the documentary evidence (A16) 
 
In the rest, the Negative evaluation is either 1) used sarcastically, like in the following 
example: 
 
 (83) I succeeded in accomplishing my “nefarious designs,” and without  
  causing pain to several dogs (B11),  
 
or the evaluation is 2) targeted at foreign vivisection: 
 
 (84) The Bishop himself draws the very valid distinction between vivisection 
  that is unobjectionable and vivisection that is cruel; why should the
   former  be prohibited at home because the latter is taken to be practised 
  abroad? (B13), 
 
or the evaluation is 3) accompanied by some sort of a comment or structure that in some 
way weakens its effect, like in the examples below (cf. Engagement and Graduation): in 
(85), the existence of pain is practically denied by comparing it to the pain caused in blood 
sports and by down-scaling the small amount of it to even smaller by the pre-modification 
of the adjective: 
 
 (85) the pain caused by vivisectionists is, by comparison with the pain caused 




in (86), in turn, this is done by using a conditional construction, the modal auxiliary may, 
the verb seem that is used evidentially, and the last two nouns that further clarify that only 
minor changes might be needed, but vivisection as such is appropriate: 
 
 (86) But if, indeed, there be anything in our proceedings that may seem to  
  require modification or alteration (A13) 
 
The rest of the Negative evaluations, i.e. those that are not related to the painfulness or 
cruelness, are either 1) related to the demanding nature of the practice and thus actually 
evaluate vivisectors positively, like here: 
 
 (87) medical men in their researches, laborious and unremunerative  
  researches (A7), 
 
or they 2) evaluate Vivisection as common: 
 
 (88) That very severe experiments are constantly performed cannot be  
  doubted (A16), 
 
or they are 3) Evoked Negative evaluations: two passages describe how a patient’s 
condition first gets worse and then they die, after an operation that was guided by 
knowledge gained from vivisection. Below is one of them: 
 
 (89) Intelligence has just reached me that the man from whom the tumor was 
  removed, and who was regarded as convalescent, died unexpectedly (B18) 
 
In summary, it is relatively rare that Vivisection is evaluated negatively (27/282). When 
it is, it is described as painful/cruel, demanding, common or not useful. Furthermore, in 
10 out of 11 cases in which vivisection is evaluated as painful or cruel, it is related to 
foreign vivisection, or it is done sarcastically or diminishing the issue. 
 Besides the usefulness of vivisection and the pain related to it, also the frequency 
of the practice and the appropriateness of it are mentioned relatively often: f/Frequency 
is mentioned 23 times, which is 8% of all evaluations targeted at Vivisection. Almost all 
of them, 21 evaluations, are Positive, i.e. describing vivisection as rare. The 
appropriateness of Vivisection occurs 15 times in the material, which is 5% of the entire 
data. All of them are Positive. The rest of the evaluations targeted at Vivisection belong 
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to the categories ‘Underspecified’ or ‘Other’, the latter including all the values that are 
ascribed to Vivisection only once or twice, e.g. ‘modern’ (A1) and ‘veracity’ (B10).  
 
6.2 Anti-vivisectionists  
The total number of evaluations targeted at Anti-vivisectionists is 241, which is 21% of 
all evaluations in the material. The majority, 205 evaluations (85%), is Negative. More 
than a half (55%) of the Negative evaluations are related to anti-vivisectionists’ Capacity, 
with 112 evaluations. Further, 35 Negative evaluations are related to their Propriety 
(17%), 28 to their Tenacity (14%), and 25 to their Veracity (12%). There are also 4 
Underspecified evaluations (2%) and 1 of Normality (0,5%) among the Negative 
evaluations. Most Negative evaluations are made by using Judgement, with 167 cases 
(81%), while 21 are made by using Nominalisation (10%) and 17 by using Affect 
resources (8%). What is to be noted again is that all the evaluations have been classified 
as belonging to one of the Judgement subtypes, irrespective of whether they are made by 
using Judgement, Nominalisation or Affect resources.  
 There are 36 Positive evaluations targeted at Anti-vivisectionists in the material 
(15%). Both Judgement and Affect resources are used to evaluate them. Almost a half of 
them are related to Anti-vivisectionists’ Propriety, 10 to their Capacity, and the rest is 
Underspecified, Other or of Veracity. However, the kind words of the authors do not 
always seem to be quite sincere; in fact, in my view, none of the Positive evaluations are 
genuinely positive. For example, in several evaluations of Propriety, Anti-vivisectionists 
are rather patronised than shown respect to, like in the example below: 
 
 (90) there is a great misapprehension in the minds of many well-meaning 
   people as to the frequency of vivisections at medical schools. (A10) 
 
In another example of Propriety below, Positive Affect is used to create an ironic 
evaluation that first indicates positive feelings towards Anti-vivisectionists—their good 
intentions in particular—after which it becomes evident that that is not at all how the 
author feels about the situation: 
 
 (91) [i]t is satisfactory to know that Mr. Hutton and the promoters of the  
  Memorial against Vivisection did not aim at inflicting reprobation on any 
  one; their language, however, in that case was singularly well adapted to 




It is also common that compliments are actually in some way used against anti-
vivisectionists or for vivisection. In the example below, by praising the secretary of 
another society, the author actually criticises Frances Power Cobbe, the founder of 
NAVS. The first value is Underspecified, the second one is of Capacity, and the third one 
is of Veracity: 
 
 (92) [w]riting of the secretary of another and universally respected society, 
   whose action in circumstances of difficulty was, at least, prompted by 
   judicious sincerity, Miss Cobbe remarks […] (B5) 
 
In the example below, Auberon Herbert, an anti-vivisectionist, is praised using values 
related to their Capacity, but at the same time, it is suggested that without vivisection, 
there would not be much to praise: 
 
 (93) the great and ceaseless work of accumulating the vast stores of human 
   knowledge, to which Mr. Auberon Herbert owes it at this moment that he 
   is […] a man of high sensibility and culture, and not an untutored 
   savage. (A5) 
 
6.3 Pro-vivisectionists 
The total number of evaluations targeted at Pro-vivisectionists is 113, which is 10% of all 
evaluations in the material. The majority, 101 evaluations (89%), is Positive. More than 
2/3 of the Positive evaluations are related to vivisectionists’ Capacity and Propriety, each 
category containing 34 evaluations (34%). The rest is distributed among Underspecified 
(17/17%), Tenacity (9/9%), Normality (4/5%) and Veracity (3/3%). Most Positive 
evaluations are made by using Judgement, with 87 cases (86%), while the rest, 14 
evaluations, is made by using Affect resources. What is to be noted is that all the 
evaluations targeted at Pro-vivisectionists have been classified as belonging to one of the 
Judgement subtypes, irrespective of whether they are made by using Judgement or Affect 
resources. 
 There are 12 Negative evaluations targeted at Pro-vivisectionists, 9 of which are  
from one person, George Rolleston, who was one of the few authors sincerely advocating  
for the regulation of vivisection. These evaluations are genuinely Negative. However, 2  
of them are comments on other Pro-vivisectionists’ thinking and conversational skills,  
(Capacity), and the rest, which concern Pro-vivisectionists’ ethics (Propriety), are 




 (94) I will quote some of the words of the Commission upon this point […] “It 
  is not to be doubted that inhumanity may be found in persons of very high 
  position as physiologists. We have seen that it was so in Maj/gendie. (A16) 
 
In the other 3 evaluations, hypothetical future students of medicine are evaluated as 
‘thoughtless’ (A7) and English vivisectors might, hypothetically speaking, be forced to 
break the law in order to do their job (A7, B13). 
 
6.4 Anti-vivisectionists’ statements 
There are 30 evaluations targeted at Anti-vivisectionists’ statements in the material, all of 
which, apart from one, are Negative. What is more, the one Positive evaluation—in 
example X below—is used sarcastically. The writer expresses their “satisfaction” with a 
statement given by an anti-vivisectionist, but from the letter as a whole it is clear that that 
is not at all how the writer feels.  
 
 (95) I desire to express my thanks to the Bishop of Oxford for his remarks 
   upon vivisection, seeing that they furnish so good an example of the kind 
  of “feeling” and the kind of “logic” against which we have now to contend. 
  (B13)  
 
The majority, 24 evaluations (80%), is made using Appreciation:Valuation, and all of 
them are related to the falsity or unreliability of the statements, like in the following 
example: 
 
 (96) [t]he assertion that I have ever suggested or desired the introduction of 
   vivisection into the teaching of elementary physiology in schools is, I 
   repeat, contrary to fact. (A6) 
 
There are also 2 evaluations of Affect, like in example (X) above, and 4 evaluations of 
Appreciation:Reaction, which indicate rather strong negative feelings towards the 
statements: 
 





There are 58 evaluations in the material in which animals are either Emoters or Targets 
of evaluation; in 53 cases, they are Emoters, and in 5 cases, they are Targets. Further, in 
20 evaluations, the Emoter is Experimental animal, and all these evaluations are Positive 




 (98) I make bold to say that animals under chloroform do not suffer, as it is 
   certain men do not. (A2) 
 
 (99) Do turtles, frogs, and other animals, when rendered insensible by 
  chloroform, chloral, or other anaesthetics, feel pain? (A2) 
 
 (100) it was essential to [Professor Ferrier’s experiments’] success that the 
   animals employed in them should be unconscious and incapable of […] 
   making any voluntary effort. (A4) 
 
In 33 evaluations, the Emoter is Other animal. Unlike the evaluations targeted at 
Experimental animals, all of these are Negative and made using Inscribed, Provoked and 
Evoked Misery. Below are examples of all three categories, respectively: 
 
 (101) These little animals are brought to life […] for the sole purpose of   
  suffering torture as great and as prolonged as it is in their nature to 
   endure. (A3) 
 
 (102) the rapid and forcible efforts of the resisting animal (A3) 
 
 (103) in the pursuit of game with a gun, whenever an animal is shot but not 
   killed, the wounded bird, hare, or rabbit must be recovered (A8) 
 
 In the 5 evaluations in which animals are Targets, they are either described as 
‘distressing objects’ (B3), their lives are considered less sacred than humans’ (B13), or 
they trigger feelings of Happiness:Affection in the author, “a lover of animals” (B5, B6). 
 
6.6 Other animal use 
There are 95 evaluations in the material that are targeted at Other animal use, which is 
8% of all the evaluations. The large number is partly due to one person, Henry Thompson 
(A3), making 48 evaluations. Most of the evaluations are Negative, and the Positive ones 
describe the feelings the Animal users get from the use—feelings that are actually used 
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against them by the authors. The majority, 60 evaluations, is Appreciations, and they are 
made by using both Valuation and Reaction:Quality, each making up 50% of the them. 
The 2 examples below illustrate the 4 values ascribed to Other animal use in the material. 
Valuation is used to evaluate it as painful, unnecessary and common, and Quality is used 
to evaluate it as cruel/atrocious: 
 
 (104) [I]t is impossible to regard the sport in any other light than as a painful 
  and wholly unnecessary vivisection, (A3) 
 
 (105) Every year in this country alone rabbits are put to death in spring traps  
  by torture as atrocious as the wildest delirium of an anti-vivisector could 
   imagine, and this in numbers that would supply all the physiological 
   laboratories in Europe for all centuries to come. (B5) 
  
 The rest of the evaluations targeted at Other animal use, 35 evaluations, is of 
Affect. They are mainly of Un/happiness, more particularly of Misery, with 23 cases. All 
23 evaluations describe the suffering of different types of animals: 
 
 (106) [m]any suffer severely from the insertion of rings and wires in the nose, 
  by branding with hot irons, and the like. (A8) 
 
The rest of them, 10 evaluations, is of Dis/satisfaction, almost exclusively of Pleasure. 
The evaluations of Pleasure describe the positive feelings the Emoters get from eating, 
hunting, killing, etc. different types of animals: 
 
 (107) [h]e will eat his mutton with a calm conscience-nay, sometimes with gun 
  in hand he will sally forth bent upon the pleasure of doing the killing 
   himself. (B17) 
 
6.7 Diseases and Patients  
There are 21 evaluations in the material that are targeted at Disease, i.e. a condition or a 
disease that has been defeated or could be defeated with the help of vivisection. All of 
them are Negative, and they are made using both Affect (mainly Misery) and 
Appreciation (Reaction:Quality and Valuation). The Emoters of the former group are 
Different types of patients, and the Appraisers of the latter are Pro-vivisectionists. Below 




 (108) But are [anti-vivisectionists] aware how much they are hindering that 
   knowledge which would serve some wretched sufferer from accident or 
   disease? (A11)  
 
 (109) the fearful ravages of smallpox before the discovery of Jenner (A7) 
 
 (110) The fits had been most severe during the voyage. (B12)  
  
 There are 26 evaluations in the material the Appraisers or Targets of which are 
Patients, i.e. people who have suffered, are suffering, or might suffer from a condition or 
a disease that has been cured or could be cured with the help of vivisection. All besides 
one (example X, usefulness) of the evaluations are of Affect, and they are distributed 
among all four Affect subtypes. The Negative evaluations are either targeted at Disease 
(cf previous paragraph), or they describe the Patients as poor. The Positive ones are either 
targeted at Vivisection, Operations (developed with the help of vivisection) or Doctors 
(performing those operations), or they describe the Patients as lucky or useful. In the 
following example, there is an evaluation of Satisfaction:Pleasure and another of 
Security:Quiet, respectively: 
 
 (111) [t]he man is now convalescent, having never had a bad symptom, and full 
  of gratitude for the relief afforded him. (B10) 
 
Example (X) below, in turn, is of Inclination: 
  
 (112) [t]he man, who had faith in his doctor and no fine-spun scruples about 
   availing himself of the results of vivisectional discoveries, eagerly chose 
   the operation. (B10) 
 
In both evaluations above, the Patient is Emoter, whereas in the example below, The 
Patient is Target: 
 
 (113) suffering from a disease called progressive, pernicious anaemia, lay a poor 
  man within a measurable distance of eternity. (B13) 
 
6.8 Differences in the evaluative language between the letters before 
and those after the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876 is passed 
Before discussing the differences found in the letters, let us briefly return to my 
hypotheses. As proposed, the legitimacy afforded by the new Act could have made the 
defenders of vivisection more confident, which could have been manifested e.g. in the 
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increased use of (explicit) Negative Judgements targeted at Anti-vivisectionists and 
(explicit) Positive Judgements targeted at Pro-vivisectionists. Alternatively, the increased 
confidence could have made the writers feel less need to convince their audience and 
hence make fewer (explicit) positive Appreciations targeted at Vivisection and fewer 
(explicit) Positive Judgements targeted at Pro-vivisectionists. However, contrary to my 
hypotheses concerning Pro-vivisectionists, I did not find any notable differences between 
the data sets in the evaluations targeted at them. As to the hypothesis concerning 
Vivisection, there was no significant difference in the number of Positive evaluations 
targeted at the practice. There was, however, a slight change in how Anti-vivisectionists 
were evaluated, which will be discussed later in this section. The most considerable 
changes between the data sets concern values ascribed to Vivisection and evaluations 
related to animals. Furthermore, there are changes concerning the Targets Disease and 
Patient and the Emoter Patient.  
 There is a clear difference between the data sets in the amounts of evaluations: in 
the former, there are 687 evaluations, whereas in the latter, the number is 435. However, 
if the evaluations that are targeted at Legal documents and procedures or People involved 
in legal processes are omitted, the numbers are much closer to each other: 526 and 405, 
respectively. Naturally, the legal process that eventually led to passing of the Cruelty to 
Animals Act 1876 did not only activate people to participate in the Vivisection debate but 
also steered the discussion towards a certain direction, which explains the considerable 
difference between the numbers. This is important to know when evaluating the 
significance of the differences between the data sets; it might be more sensible to use the 
smaller figures as the reference point, which is taken into consideration when considered 
appropriate. 
 There are 142 evaluations targeted at Vivisection both before and after the Act. 
The most considerable change with regard to them is that while before the Act, 
Vivisection is evaluated 57 times as useful (40% of all the evaluations Targeted at 
Vivisection), afterwards the number is 107 (75%). There is also some change in how 
frequently and by what evaluative means suffering or cruelness are connected to the 
practice: before the Act, there are 40 such evaluations, and afterwards, the number is 11. 
What is more, in the former set, 21 evaluations are made using Affect, i.e. describing the 
animal as not suffering, while in the latter set, all the evaluations in question are 
Appreciations (examples in X). There is practically no difference in evaluating 
Vivisection as Justified/Appropriate—there are 8 cases before and 7 cases after the Act—
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and with rarity the numbers are 15 (11% of all the evaluations targeted at Vivisection) 
and 7 (5%). 
 There are also other differences between the data sets with regard to Animals—
both Experimental animals, Other animals and Other animal use. There are 41 evaluations 
before the Act where an Animal is the Emoter; in 19 cases, the Emoter is Experimental 
animal, and in 22 cases, it is Other animal. After the Act, there is one in each category 
(0,2% and 0,2%). These numbers comprise 8%, 4%, 4%, 0,2% and 0,2% of all the 
evaluations, respectively15. What is more, there are 77 evaluations targeted at Other 
animal use, whereas after the Act, the number is 18. These numbers make up 15 and 4 
percent of all the evaluations16, respectively. Otherwise there are no considerable 
differences with regard to Other animal use: in both sets, it is evaluated as painful, cruel, 
unnecessary and common (see section X for examples). 
 As for Diseases and Patients, there is a clear difference between the data sets in 
both the frequency and quality of the evaluations targeted at them. While before the Act, 
Disease is mentioned in 3 evaluations, after the Act the number is 18. Furthermore, Patient 
is either the Emoter or the Target in 1 evaluation in the former data set and in 25 in the 
latter. What is to be noted is that 7 evaluations targeted at Disease have Patient as the 
Emoter—1 in the earlier set and 6 in the later—which means that the total number of 
evaluations related to Disease or Patient is 40: 3 before and 37 after the Act, which 
compose 0,6 and 9 percent of all the evaluations17. 
 There is also a difference between the data sets in the use of Nominalisation when 
Anti-vivisectionists are evaluated: there are 108 Negative evaluations in the earlier letters 
Targeted at Anti-vivisectionists, and 15 of them are made using Nominalisation. In the 
later letters, the number is 5. These numbers compose 14 and 5 percentage of all the 
Negative evaluations targeted at Anti-vivisectionists. 
 
                                                          
15 Calculated with the smaller reference points; with the larger ones, the figures are 6%, 2%, 3%, 0,2% 
and 0,2%, respectively.  
16 Calculated with the smaller reference points; with the larger ones, the figures are 11% and 3%, 
respectively. 





In this section, I will discuss the findings presented in the previous section. I will start 
with Pro-vivisectionists and Anti-vivisectionists, after which I will move on to 
Vivisection. Finally, I will discuss the Targets Animal, Patient and Disease, 
  
7.1 Anti-vivisectionists and Pro-vivisectionists 
Considering how much the vivisection debate of the 19th century was focused on anti-
vivisectionists’ and pro-vivisectionists’ characteristics, it was expected that a large 
proportion of the evaluations would be targeted at them. However, somewhat 
surprisingly, the number of evaluations targeted at Anti-vivisectionists is twice as high as 
the number of those targeted at Pro-vivisectionists, and there was no considerable change 
in the situation after the Act. I would have expected the former group to need more 
advocating, considering their more or less fear-provoking reputation and the yet 
unestablished status of Vivisection—especially before the Act—but it seems that it was 
more important to find fault with anti-vivisectionists than to praise pro-vivisectionists. 
However, it seems that anti-vivisectionists were treated slightly more gently before the 
Act, judging from the change in the use of Nominalisation in Negative evaluations 
targeted at Anti-vivisectionists’ behaviour. Maybe vivisection having been legitimised by 
the Act really resulted in less need for amicability and thus less need for toning down 
negative evaluation. 
 Most of the evaluations targeted at Anti-vivisectionists are of Capacity, which is 
in line with previous research in that they were accused of being sentimental and 
squeamish—not to mention womanish—and there was probably little need for portraying 
them as morally acceptable since anti-vivisectionists’ whole campaign against vivisection 
was based on ethical questions. Pro-vivisectionists, in turn, are mainly evaluated by using 
both Capacity and Propriety, which in my view is also in line with previous research: they 
saw themselves as medical professionals and objective scientists on a mission to save the 
humanity, and naturally they wanted others to see them like that as well—not as heartless 
animal abusers. 
 As discussed in 2.2, it has been argued that the 19th century vivisection debate 
concerned mainly the character of the experimenter—or virtue ethics—rather than the 
utility of vivisection, which, however, does not show in my material: 15% of all the 
evaluations, 166 out of 1122, are related to the utility of the practice, while 8%, 90 out of 
1122, concern pro-vivisectionists’ qualities. The proportion of the latter is even smaller 
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if only the values related to experimenters’ ethics are included: 31 evaluations out of 1122 
(3%) are of Propriety or Veracity. 
 
7.2 Vivisection 
 As mentioned in section 6, the most common Target of evaluation in the whole 
material is Vivisection, which was expected, considering that the letters were selected on 
the grounds of the topic—defending vivisection—and not e.g. the author, the year of 
publication, etc. Further, the majority of these evaluations are related to the utility of 
Vivisection, which is probably due to at least three factors: First, as discussed in (X and 
X), the animal protection Acts from 1822, 1835 and 1849 concerned either wanton cruelty 
or cruelty, which encouraged Pro-vivisectionists to focus on the utility of Vivisection 
when the practice was discussed. The previous Acts were powerless against vivisection 
because the practice was considered to be performed deliberately, for a valid reason—not 
to inflict suffering for the sake of inflicting suffering—which made it impossible for them 
to be done wantonly or cruelly. Second, the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876 was very much 
focused on the utility of vivisection: Practically anything could be done, as long as it was 
useful. All the restrictions related to inflicting pain on animals—except for clause 6 
concerning public exhibitions of painful experiments—are moderated, or practically 
reversed, on condition that the experiments are “useful for saving or prolonging life or 
alleviating suffering” “39 & 40 Vict. c. 77, 3). Third, since vivisection had already 
established itself as an indispensable part of scientific inquiry in many countries, and 
several discoveries had been made with the help of the practice, it is likely that pro-
vivisectionists simply believed in the potential of vivisection and thus wanted to speak 
for it. 
 As for the rarity of Vivisection, indeed, vivisection was rarer in Britain than in 
many other countries at the time; it would become clearly more common only after the 
letters were published. Another question is why Pro-vivisectionists would evaluate 
vivisection as rare and see it as a positive value? All I know is that rarity of vivisection is 
one of the main arguments for vivisection of today’s pro-vivisectionists as well. For 
example, one of the three Rs, “[t]he guiding principles underpinning the humane use of 
animals in scientific research” (Understanding Animal research 2020), is to “Reduce the 
number of animals used to a minimum, to obtain information from fewer animals or more 
information from the same number of animals” (ibid.). It seems that for pro-
vivisectionists, regardless of the century, rarity of vivisection in a way justifies the 
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practice; as long as only some animals or as few animals as possible are exploited and 
abused, vivisection is a valid way to do research. Imagine if this were said about any type 
of violence against humans. 
 The fact that more than 1/5 of the evaluations targeted at Vivisection is related to 
animal suffering seems to be in line with previous research in that animals’ interests were 
not the greatest concern of the time, but, nevertheless, vivisectors were aware of the feared 
consequences of causing them to suffer. What is more, it was only few years earlier that 
Sanderson’s notorious book had been published, with well-known consequences (lisää 
historiaan!). Consequently, it was probably considered important to address the 
unpleasant problem, regardless of whether it was the experimental animal or society at 
large that would pay the highest price for the pain or death caused during or after the 
experiment. Furthermore, it was probably beneficial to convince people that vivisectors 
were not sadists who enjoyed causing pain to others, be they humans or animals; as 
discussed earlier, Magendie’s experiments were still in people’s minds at the time of the 
first Royal Commission on vivisection. Pro-vivisectionists’  
 Despite the fact that the pain and suffering related to Vivisection is mainly denied 
or diminished, the topic itself is addressed relatively frequently. One possible reason for 
that is something that I have not seen discussed much in previous research. While 
vivisectors have often been described as either heartless and indifferent or objective and 
committed, the possibility of them actually caring about the animals is very rarely brought 
up. On the contrary, in Boddice’s view, “[t]he primary benefit of anaesthetics was not 
that the experimental animal no longer suffered” (Boddice 2012, 6; emphasis added). 
Instead, as Boddice lists, “the greater good could be sought unhindered, the operator 
would not lose his nerve, and he would safeguard his ‘feeling’ heart” (ibid.). Further, 
using anaesthetics would make operating easier by keeping the animal still (ibid.). While 
I find all these outcomes likely reasons for a vivisector to use anaesthetics, I do not see 
why they could not have also cared about the animals involved. What is more, I am not 
sure why a vivisector would have been concerned about losing their nerve or safeguarding 
their heart in the first place, unless they cared about the animals’ suffering. As it has been 
argued, most vivisectors of the time were not sadists, nor indifferent, but they could 
suppress their feelings in order to be able to do their job—and save the humanity. Could 
it be that they did care, but this type of feelings simply were not something they could 
talk about openly—or even recognise in themselves—in society of rigid gender norms, 
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and in an academic field where strict masculinity was idealised and promoted? Maybe I 
am naïve, but would a cold-hearted monster describe anaesthetising an animal like this: 
 
 (X) [c]hloroform is first given to the animal by holding a sponge soaked in  
  the liquid before the creature’s nose. It is then placed on a miniature  
  operating table provided with a pillow and a mattress. (A12)  
  
It is of course possible that the writer is describing the situation this way just to manipulate 
the reader and to present vivisectors as humane and caring, but another possible 
explanation is that they actually cared and this type of framing helped them to cope with 
the situation. Maybe it was easier to see the animal as somebody being taken care of and 
themselves as those looking after them, rather than facing the somewhat brutal truth. 
Besides framing the situation as some sort of a doctor‒patient encounter, it was also 
possible—apparently—to see experimental animals as vivisectors’ co-workers, idea that 
is also present in today’s pro-vivisection discourse (e.g. Grivas 2008): 
 
 (X) [f]or how […] can a man kill an animal to satisfy his own individual 
   appetite […] and forthwith object to his neighbour killing another  
  animal, or making it to do work in a laboratory for the purpose of   
  gaining knowledge […]? (B6)  
 
7.3 Animals, Patients and Diseases 
What is particularly interesting about Animals, Patients and Diseases in the material is 
that while Animals are mainly present before the Act, most of the Patients and Diseases 
occur after it. In my view, this might indicate a shift from to some extent considering 
animals to focusing even more exclusively on humans. This change combined with the 
change in how Vivisection is evaluated—its usefulness is mentioned clearly more 
frequently after the Act than before it—one cannot but consider the possibility that the 
Act really had some influence on people’s attitudes towards Vivisection and experimental 
animals.  
 It seems that the fundamental idea, and maybe purpose, of the Act is summed up 
in the first sentence of clause 2: “A person shall not perform on a living animal any 
experiment calculated to give pain, except subject to the restrictions imposed by this Act” 
(39 & 40 Vict. c. 77, 3). The clause could just as well be, for example, “A person is 
allowed to perform on a living animal any experiment calculated to give pain, in 





The objective of this thesis was to examine the use of evaluative language in texts that in 
one way or another defend vivisection. As the primary material, I used letters to the editor 
published in The Times between 1875 and 1884. My aim was to find out what and who 
were evaluated when the practice was defended, and what type of evaluations were 
utilised. Further, I looked into the changes in the evaluative language between the letters 
published before and after the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876—the world’s first legislation 
concerning animal experimentation—was passed. My main hypothesis was that the Act 
had influenced people’s attitudes concerning vivisection, and that the change would be 
visible in the language used in the letters. In fact, I considered it possible that, instead of 
protecting animals, the Act protected vivisectors by legitimising animal experimentation 
and thus helping it become the established and generally accepted practice it still is today.  
  To investigate the evaluative language in the letters, I used appraisal theory 
(Martin and White 2005), a lexis-oriented classification system for analysing evaluations. 
The theory is divided into three subtypes of appraisal, but in this thesis, the focus was on 
Attitude, which deals with the actual feelings and opinions conveyed in texts. Attitude is 
further divided into Judgement, Appreciation and Affect, along with their subcategories. 
Besides the Attitude subtypes, the evaluations were categorised according to their target, 
valence and explicitness, and the data were analysed both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
 I assumed that the legitimacy afforded by the new Act could have made the 
defenders of vivisection more confident, which could have been manifested e.g. in the 
increased use of (explicit) negative Judgements targeted at Anti-vivisectionists and 
(explicit) positive Judgements targeted at Pro-vivisectionists. Alternatively, the increased 
confidence could have made the writers feel less need to convince their audience and 
hence make fewer (explicit) positive Appreciations targeted at Vivisection and fewer 
(explicit) positive Judgements targeted at Pro-vivisectionists. However, I have not found 
any notable differences between the data sets in the evaluations targeted at Pro-
vivisectionists, ant there is no significant difference in the number of (explicit) positive 
evaluations targeted at Vivisection either. There is, however, a slight change in how Anti-
vivisectionists are evaluated: Nominalisation is used more frequently before the Act to 
evaluate Anti-vivisectionists’ behaviour. 
 The main findings concerning the first research question, “What and who are the 
Targets of evaluation when vivisection is defended?”, are as follows: the most common 
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Targets in the letters are Vivisection, Anti-vivisectionists, Legal documents and 
procedures, Pro-vivisectionists and Other animal use. Other Targets occurring relatively 
frequently are Other animal users, People involved in legal procedures, Anti-
vivisectionists’ statements, Diseases and Patients. However, the focus was on those 
Targets and Emoters—i.e. Appraisers—that in my view were the most relevant ones. 
 As for the second research question, “What types of evaluation are used when 
vivisection is defended?”, the main findings are related to evaluations targeted at 
Vivisection, Other animal use, Other animal user, Anti-vivisectionist, Anti-
vivisectionists’ statements, Pro-vivisectionist, Disease and Patient, and those the Emoter 
of which is Animal or Patient. When Vivisection is evaluated, the value that is most 
frequently ascribed to it is usefulness. Vivisection is also described relatively frequently 
as painless or humane, and in a few times as justified or rare. Most of the few Negative 
evaluations are either dismissive of the problem, related to foreign vivisection, or used 
sarcastically. Other animal use, in turn, is mainly evaluated as Negative, more particularly 
as painful, cruel, unnecessary or common. The Positive evaluations describe Other animal 
users’ feelings they get from the use. Animals appear in the material mainly as Emoters—
either as Experimental animals or Other animals. Experimental animals are solely 
described as not feeling pain or not suffering, whereas Other animals are solely described 
as feeling pain or suffering.  
 As for the evaluations targeted at Anti-vivisectionists, they are mostly Negative 
and concern Anti-vivisectionists’ capacity. The majority is of Judgement, but there are 
also some evaluations that are made using Affect resources and Nominalisation. None of 
the Positive cases is genuinely positive, i.e. used sincerely. What is more, the one Positive 
evaluation—in example X below—is used sarcastically. Almost all evaluations targeted 
at Anti-vivisectionists’ statements in the material are Negative. Pro-vivisectionists, in 
turn, are mainly evaluated as Positive, and most evaluations are related to their capacity 
and propriety. There are a few Negative evaluations, but they are mostly from one author, 
or somewhat trivial. 
 The evaluation targeted at Disease—condition or disease that has been defeated 
or could be defeated with the help of vivisection—are Negative, Appraised either by 
Patients or Pro-vivisectionists. Patients, in turn, appear in the material both as Emoters 
and Appraisers. Most Negative evaluations are targeted at Disease, and the Positive ones 
are targeted at Vivisection, operations (developed with the help of vivisection) or doctors 
(performing those operations). 
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 The most relevant findings with regard to the third research question, “How does 
the use of evaluative language change after the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876 is passed?”, 
concern the values ascribed to Vivisection, the evaluations related to Animals, those 
related to Patients, and the Target Disease: After the Act, Vivisection is evaluated much 
more frequently as useful but less frequently as cruel or painful than before it. Other 
animal use is discussed clearly more frequently before the Act than after it. What is more, 
Animals as Emoters, i.e. not suffering, are discussed much more frequently before the 
Act, whereas Patients—as Emoters or Targets—are mentioned clearly more often after 
the Act. Further, Disease is targeted clearly more often after the Act than before it.  
 As for my main hypothesis above, I believe it is safe to claim that there is a clear 
change in the evaluative language between the letters published before the Cruelty to 
Animals Act 1876 and those published after it. Summarising the most relevant changes in 
the evaluative language and connecting them to vivisection itself, it can be concluded that 
there is a clear shift between the periods under examination in how the practice is seen 
and what aspects are highlighted: In the former letters, different types of animals, their 
use and their suffering are discussed relatively frequently, but patients, their suffering and 
diseases causing that suffering are hardly mentioned. In the latter letters, in turn, animals 
are rarely mentioned, but patients and diseases are discussed rather frequently. What is 
more, the utility of animal experimentation is raised substantially more frequently after 
the Act. It seems that before the Act, animals and their suffering were still considered 
worth discussing, but after it, people and their potential suffering replaced animals in the 
discussion. In the same time, the role of the utility of vivisection, i.e. its potential for 
helping potentially suffering people, becomes increasingly important in people’s minds. 
Therefore, the findings support the idea that the Act failed to protect animals. Considering 
that soon after the Act, animal experimentation became the norm for many types of 
scientific research, which it still is, and that extremely painful experiments are still 
constantly performed, it indeed seems likely that the Act, instead of genuinely regulating 









Letters to the editor in The Times (see appendix 1 for the details). 
 Accessed 20 November 2020. The Times Digital Archive. 
 https://go.gale.com/ps/dispBasicSearch.do?userGroupName=turkecco&prodId=T
TDA. 






Bates, A.W.H. 2017. Anti-Vivisection and the Profession of Medicine in Britain. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan. Accessed 20 November 2020. 
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-55697-4_1. 
Bednarek, Monika. 2006. Evaluation in Media Discourse: Analysis of a Newspaper 
Corpus. New York: Continuum. 
Bednarek, Monika. 2008. Emotion Talk Across Corpora. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Bednarek, Monika. 2009. “Language patterns and attitude.” Functions of Language 16, 
no. 2: 165‒192. Accessed 20 November 2020. Ebscohost. 
Boddice, Rob. 2012. “Species of Compassion: Aesthetics, Anaesthetics, and Pain in the 
Physiological Laboratory.” Interdisciplinary Studies in the Long Nineteenth 
Century no. 15. Accessed 20 November 2020. 
https://www.academia.edu/2256455/Species_of_Compassion_Aesthetics_Anaesthetics_
and_Pain_in_the_Physiological_Laboratory?email_work_card=view-paper. 
Don, Alexanne. 2016. “It is hard to mesh all this”: Invoking attitude, persona and 
argument organisation.” Functional Linguist 3 art. 9. Accessed 20 November 
2020. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40554-016-0033-1. 
Franco, Nuno. 2013. “Animal Experiments in Biomedical Research: A Historical 
Perspective.” Animals 3 no. 1: 238‒273. Accessed 20 November 2020. Proquest. 
French, Richard D. 1975. Antivivisection and Medical Science in Victorian Society. 
Princeton University Press. Accessed 20 November 2020. https://doi-
org.ezproxy.utu.fi/10.1515/9780691198446. 
Fuoli, Matteo. 2016. Annotating APPRAISAL in text and corpora: Challenges and 
strategies. ISFC conference, 27th‒31st July 2015, Aachen. (presentation). 
Accessed 20 November 2020. 
file:///C:/Users/Anna/AppData/Local/Temp/A_step-
wise_methodology_for_annotating_A.pdf. 
Fuoli, Matteo. 2018. “A step-wise method for annotating APPRAISAL.” Functions of 
Language 25 no. 2: 229‒258. Accessed 20 November 2020. 
https://doi.org/10.1075/fol.15016.fuo. 
Germain, Pierre-Luc, Luca Chiapperino, and Giuseppe Testa. 2017. “The European 
politics of animal experimentation: From Victorian Britain to ‘Stop Vivisection’.” 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 64. 75‒87. Accessed 20 
November 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2017.06.004. 
90 
 
Grivas, Rebecca. 2008. An Examination of Emotion-Based Strategies in ‘Altruistic’ 
Mobilisation: A Case Study of the Animal Rights Movement. Dissertation. 
Accessed 20 November 2020. 
https://digital.library.adelaide.edu.au/dspace/bitstream/2440/49884/8/02whole.pdf 
Halliday, M.A.K., and Christian M.I.M. Matthiessen. 2013. Halliday’s Introduction to 
Functional Grammar. Accessed 20 November 2020. 
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203431269 . 
Hamilton, Susan. 2004. Animal Welfare & Anti-Vivisection 1870-1910 Nineteenth-
Century Woman’s Mission. London: Routledge. Accessed 20 November 2020. 
Volter. 
Hamilton, Susan. 2013. “On the Cruelty to Animals Act, 15 August 1876.” BRANCH: 
Britain, Representation and Nineteenth-Century History. Ed. Dino Franco 
Felluga. Accessed 20 November 2020. 
http://www.branchcollective.org/?ps_articles=susan-hamilton-on-the-cruelty-to-
animals-act-15-august-1876. 
Home Office. 2020. Annual Statistics of Scientific Procedures on Living Animals Great 




 Hood, Susan. 2010. “Prosodies of Attitude.” In: Appraising Research: Evaluation in 
 Academic Writing. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Accessed 20 November 2020. 
  https://link.springer.com/chap./10.1057/9780230274662_5#citeas 
 Hunston, Susan. 2004. “Counting the uncountable: Problems of Identifying Evaluation 





 Hunston, Susan. 2011. Corpus Approaches to Evaluation. New York: Routledge. 
  https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/kutu/reader.action?docID=592987 
 Marino, Lori. 2016. “Why animal welfarism continues to fail.” Animal Sentience. 
 https://www.wellbeingintlstudiesrepository.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1084
&context=animsent 
Martin, J. R., and P. R. R. White. 2005. The Language of Evaluation: Appraisal in 
English. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 Mauranen, Anna, and M. Bondi. 2003. “Evaluative language use in academic 
 discourse.” Journal of English for academic purposes 2, no. 4: 269‒271. 
 Accessed 20 November 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1475-1585(03)00045-6. 
Nevala, Minna. 2016. “Solidarity in evaluation: The portrayal of murderers and their 
victims in late nineteenth-century newspapers.” The Pragmatics and Stylistics of 
Identity Construction and Characterisation 17. Accessed 20 November 2020. 
https://varieng.helsinki.fi/series/volumes/17/nevala/. 
Read, J., and John Carroll. 2012. “Annotating Expressions of Appraisal in English.” 
Language Resources and Evaluation 46, no. 3: 421–447. Accessed 29 March 
2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10579-010-9135-7. 
 Rowan, Andrew N., and Loew, Franklin M. 2001. “Animal Research: A Review of 
 Developments, 1950–2000”. In D.J. Salem and A.N. Rowan, eds. The state of 
 the animals 2001. 111‒120. Washington, DC: Humane Society Press. Accessed 





Stahnisch, F.W. 2009. “François Magendie (1783‒1855).” J Neurol. No. 256: 1950‒
1952. Accessed 20 November 2020. 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00415-009-5291-3. 
Svärd, Per-Anders. 2015. Problem animals: A critical genealogy of animal cruelty and 
animal welfare in Swedish politics 1844‒1944. Dissertation. 
 file:///C:/Users/Anna/AppData/Local/Temp/ProblemAnimals.pdf. 
Thompson, Geoff. 2014. “AFFECT and emotion, target-value mismatches, and Russian 
dolls: Refining the APPRAISAL model*,” in Evaluation in context, eds. Thompson, 
Geoff, and Laura Alba-Juez. Accessed 16 November 2020. EBSCOhost. 
Tubbs, Shane R., Marios Loukas, Mohammadali M. Shoja, Ghaffar Shokouhi, and Jerry 
Oakes. 2008. “François Magendie (1783–1855) and his contributions to the 
foundations of neuroscience and neurosurgery.” Journal of Neurosurgery 108, no. 
5: 1038‒42. Accessed 20 November 2020. 
https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/18447728/. 
Understanding Animal Research. 2020. “The 3Rs and Animal Welfare.” Understanding 
Animal Research. Accessed 15 November 2020. 
https://www.understandinganimalresearch.org.uk/animals/three-rs/. 
Wei, Yakun, Michael Wherrity, and Yi Zhang. 2015. “An Analysis of Current Research 
on the Appraisal Theory.” Linguistics and Literature Studies 3: 235–239. 
Accessed 3 April 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.13189/lls.2015.030506. 
White, Peter R. R. 2002. “Appraisal.” In Handbook of Pragmatics Online, edited by 
Jan-Ola Östman, and Jef Verschueren, Vol. 8. Amsterdam: John Benjamins 
Publishing Company. Accessed 16 November 2020. 
https://doi.org/10.1075/hop.8.app2. 
White, P. R. R. 2015a. The Appraisal Website. Accessed 3 April 2019. 
https://www.grammatics.com/appraisal/index.html. 
White, P. R. R. 2015b. “Appraisal theory.” In The International Encyclopedia of 
Language and Social Interaction, edited by Karen Tracy, 54–60. Hoboken, NJ: 





















Appendix 1. Primary material 
 
 












A1 VIVISECTION.   30 Jan 1875 Ernest Hart 860 
A2 VIVISECTION.   4 Feb 1875 Ernest Hart 742 
A3 VIVISECTION.   10 May 1875 Henry 
Thompson 
985 
A4 VIVISECTION.   4 Aug 1875 J. Crichton 
Browne 
421 
A5 VIVISECTION.   18 Jan 1876 Henry 
Thompson 
368 
A6 PROFESSOR HUXLEY 
ON LORD 
SHAFTESBURY.   
26 May 1876 T. H. Huxley 349 
A7 VIVISECTION.   May 30 1876 Common sense 1313 
A8 VIVISECTION.   3 Jun 1876 Consistent 496 
A9 VIVISECTION.   20 Jun 1876 Fair play 1214 
A10 VIVISECTION.   21 Jun 1876 A medical 
student 
131 
A11 VIVISECTION.   29 Jun 1876 William W. Gull 871 
A12 VIVISECTION.   14 Jul 1876 A student of 
medicine 
203 
A13 VIVISECTION.   17 Jul 1876 Erasmus Wilson, 
F.R.S. 
307 
A14   17 Jul 1876 A fellow of the 
Royal College of 
Surgeons 
64 
A15 THE VIVISECTION BILL.   18 Jul 1876 F. R. S. 529 
A16 THE CRUELTY TO 
ANIMALS BILL.   
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18 The names are in capitals in the letters, but in order to save space, I use lower case letters in the table. 
After each title, there is the text TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES. 
19 This column contains the number of word tokens in each letter, authors’ personal details and the text 

















B2 ed3 STARVING CATS.  26 Aug 1878 True humanity 258 
B3 ed4 VIVISECTION.   8 Jul 1880 Pembroke 557 
B4 ed 
5 
MR. DARWIN ON 
VIVISECTION. 
22 Apr 1881 Charles Darwin 491 
B5 ed 
7 










The PRACTICAL VALUE 
of VIVISECTION. 












THE FRUITS OF 
VIVISECTION. 























25 Dec 1884 Another F.R.S. 745 
B14 
ed16 
No separate title21 25 Dec 1884 A. A. M. 320 
B15 
ed17 
No separate title22 25 Dec 1884 W. S. P. 205 
B16 
ed18 
No separate title23 26 Dec 1884 F.R.S. 735 
                                                          
20 The letter is under the previous title, which covers all the vivisection-related letters on the page. 
21 See footnote 20. 
22 The letter is under the title SURGERY AND VIVISECTION, which is the title of a letter opposing 
vivisection; the title covers all the vivisection-related letters on the page. 
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Appendix 2. Finnish summary 
 
Evaluatiivinen kieli eläinkokeita puolustavissa yleisöosastokirjoituksissa, jotka on 
julkaistu The Times -sanomalehdessä vuosina 1875‒1884: Cruelty to Animals Act 
1876 -lain vaikutus siihen, mitä evaluoidaan ja miten 
Tutkimus käsittelee Britanniassa 1800-luvun loppupuoliskolla käytyä eläinkokeisiin 
liittyvää keskustelua, tarkemmin ottaen eläinkokeita puolustavien kannanottojen 
sisältöjä. Aineistona on 33 The Times -sanomalehden mielipideosastolla vuosina 1875—
1884 julkaistua, eläinkokeita tavalla tai toisella puolustavaa mielipidekirjoitusta. 
Tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on selvittää, mitä asioita kirjoituksissa arvotetaan ja millaista 
arvottavaa kieltä niissä käytetään. Lisäksi tarkastellaan, vaikuttaako 15.8.1876 voimaan 
tullut Cruelty to Animals Act 1876, maailman ensimmäinen merkittävä koe-eläinten 
kohtelua koskeva laki, kirjoituksissa esiintyvään arvottavaan kieleen. 
Tutkimuskysymykseni ovat seuraavat: 
 
1) Mitkä tai ketkä ovat evaluaation kohteina, kun vivisektiota puolustetaan? 
2) Minkä tyyppisiä evaluaatiota esiintyy, kun vivisektiota puolustetaan? 
3) Miten evaluatiivinen kieli muuttuu, kun Cruelty to Animals Act 1876 tulee 
voimaan? 
 
  Kirjoituksissa esiintyvää arvottavaa kieltä tarkastellaan J. R. Martinin ja  Peter R. 
R. Whiten kehittämän appraisal-teorian avulla. Teoriaa täydennetään mm. Monika 
Bednarekin (2006, 2008 ja 2009), Geoff Thompsonin (2014), Alexanne Donin (2016) ja 
Matteo Fuolin (2018) ajatuksilla. Teoria jakaantuu kolmeen samanaikaisesti vaikuttavaan 
osa-alueeseen, Asenteeseen (Attitude), Voimakkuuteen (Graduation) sekä Sitoutumiseen 
(Engagement), mutta omassa tutkimuksessani keskitytään Asenteeseen, joka—nimensä 
mukaisesti—koskee varsinaisia mielipiteitä ja tunteita, joita erilaisista arvottamisen 
kohteista muodostetaan. Asenne jakautuu kolmeen kategoriaan sen mukaan, mitä 
arvotetaan ja millaisin kielellisin keinoin; kyse on Tuominnasta (Judgement), kun 
ihmisen persoonaa tai käyttäytymistä arvotetaan; Arvostus (Appreciation) puolestaan 
liittyy esineiden, ilmiöiden ja prosessien arvottamiseen joko niiden esteettisyyden tai 
hyödyllisyyden perusteella. Kolmanteen kategoriaan, Tunteeseen (Affect) sen sijaan 
kuuluvat sellaiset arvottamiset, jotka ilmaistaan jonkin emootion kautta. 
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 Edellä mainitut kolme Asenteen alakategoriaa jakautuvat lisäksi alatyyppeihin: 
Tuominnan alatyypit ovat Normaalius (Normality), Pystyvyys (Capacity) ja Sinnikkyys 
(Tenacity), jotka kuuluvat Sosiaalisen arvostuksen (Social esteem) piiriin, sekä 
Rehellisyys (Veracity) ja Soveliaisuus (Propriety), jotka ovat puolestaan Sosiaalisen 
hyväksynnän (Social sanction) alakategorioita; Arvostuksen alatyypit ovat 
Reaktio:Puoleensavetävyys (Reaction:Impact), Reaktio:Laatu (Reaction:Quality), 
Koostumus:Tasapaino (Composition:Balance), Koostumus:Kompleksisuus 
(Composition:Complexity) ja Arvo (Valuation); Tunteen alatyypit ovat Onnellisuus:Ilo 
(Happiness:Cheer), Onnellisuus:Kiintymys (Happiness:Affection), 
Tyytyväisyys:Mielihyvä (Satisfaction:Pleasure), Tyytyväisyys:Kiinnostus 
(Satisfaction:Interest), Turvallisuus:Itsevarma (Security:Quiet), Turvallisuus:Luottamus 
(Security:Trust) sekä Halu (Inclination) ja Yllättyneisyys (Hämmästys). Uskoakseni 
suurimmasta osaa kategorioiden nimiä käy melko hyvin ilmi, minkä tyyppisiä tunteita ne 
kuvaavat, joten en käsittele asiaa niiden osalta tämän enempää. Osa arvostuksen 
alatyypeistä saattaa sen sijaan jäädä hieman epäselväksi: Reaktio:Laatu sisältää 
ominaisuudet, jotka kuvaavat kohdetta sen miellyttävyyden kannalta; Koostumus liittyy 
joko kohteen osien järejestymiseen tai sen tarkkuuteen ja yksityiskohtaisuuteen; Arvo 
puolestaan käsittää ominaisuudet, jotka liittyvät kohteen merkitykseen esim. sen 
toimivuuden tai autenttisuuden suhteen. 
 Ominaisuudet eivät kuitenkaan aina kuulu yksiselitteisesti tiettyyn Asenne-
kategoriaan, jolloin eri tutkijat painottavat evaluaation erilaisia aspekteja. Esimerkiksi 
Martin ja White (2005) priorisoivat evaluaation kohdetta analyysin lähtökohtana, kun taas 
Bednarek (2009) pitää evaluatiivista sanastoa (lexis) ensiarvoisena. Tästä painotuksesta 
huolimatta myös Bednarekin mielestä on kuitenkin tietyissä tilanteissa järkevää ottaa 
huomioon sekä kohde että sanasto, jotta evaluaation laatu voidaan määrittää. Thompson 
puolestaan priorisoi määrittämisen kohteena olevan kielielementin muotoa (form) 
merkityksen (meaning) sijaan; on tärkeää, että selvitetään, mitä on varsinaisesti sanottu, 
sen sijaan että pohdittaisiin, mitä on mahdollisesti tarkoitettu. Omassa tutkimuksessani 
kohdetta ja muotoa pidetään analyysin lähtökohtana, ja vasta näiden jälkeen selvitetään 
mahdollisimman tarkasti, millä sanoin ja millä kieliopillisin keinoin kohdetta on 
arvotettu. 
 Lähtökohtaisesti tunteiden ja ominaisuuksien, joita Asenne-kategorioilla 
ilmaistaan ja liitetään kohteisiin, nähdään olevan joko positiivisia tai negatiivisia, mutta 
esim. Halun ja Hämmästyksen suhteen on jonkin verran erimielisyyttä. Tässä 
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tutkimuksessa vain Hämmästyksen nähdään olevan neutraali valenssin (valence; usein 
polarity aiemmassa tutkimuksessa) suhteen, eli Hämmästykseen liittyvät tunteet eivät 
sinällään ilmaise tuntijan (emoter) positiivista tai negatiivista suhtautumista tunteen 
kohteeseen (trigger tai target).   
 Evaluaatiot voivat olla joko eksplisiittisiä tai implisiittisiä, eli ne voidaan ilmaista 
joko suoraan evaluatiivistä sanastoa käyttäen, tai ne voivat olla sinällään ei-evaluatiivisia 
mutta kontekstissaan evaluatiivisia. Arvottamisen implisiittisyyttä on tutkittu paljon, ja 
sen nähdään tekevän evaluaatioiden analysoinnista paikoin hyvin haastavaa. Martin ja 
White (2005) jakavat implisiittiset evaluaatiot kolmeen kategoriaan, joiden pohjalta Don 
(2016) on kehittänyt oman spektrinsä (spectrum), joka kuvaa mekanismeja, joiden avulla 
implisiittisiä evaluaatioita voi ilmaista. Spektri sisältää kahdeksan mekanismia ja viisi 
alatyyppiä, mutta Don korostaa, että nämä ovat vain keskeisimmät implisiittisen 
evaluaation mekanismit. Lisäksi usea mekanismi voi operoida samanaikaisesti. Tässä 
tutkimuksessa käytetään Donin mekanismeja. 
 Evaluaation implisiittisyyteen keskeisesti liittyvä ilmiö on prosodia (prosody) eli 
evaluaation kumulatiivinen vaikutus. Ilmiö kuvaa sitä, miten evaluaatio ikään kuin leviää 
koskettamaan laajempaa tekstiosuutta kuin sen varsinainen kohde tai sen välittömässä 
läheisyydessä oleva materiaali. Tässä tutkimuksessa ilmiöön liitetään sekä eksplisiittisten 
evaluaatioiden vaikutus implisiittisen materiaalin tulkintaan että kaiken evaluatiiviseksi 
tulkitun materiaalin vaikutus tuleviin tulkintoihin, ja lisäksi asiaa lähestytään kolmen, 
Martinin ja Whiten (2005) käsittelemän prosodian ilmenemistavan kautta. Prosodia voi 
ilmetä kyllästämisenä (saturation), voimistamisena (intensification) sekä hallintana 
(domination). 
 Tutkimuksessa käsitellään myös evaluaatioiden tunnistamista (identification) eli 
sitä, mikä lasketaan evaluaatioksi. Tästäkin on erilaisia näkemyksiä tutkijoiden 
keskuudessa, mutta tässä tutkimuksessa lähdetään siitä ajatuksesta, että analyysiin 
sisälletään periaatteessa kaikki evaluatiivinen materiaali, mitä aineistossa on. 
Tunnistamista käsitellään kolmesta, Donin (2016) määrittelemästä näkökulmasta. 
Ensimmäinen haaste on suuri, tai oikeastaan ääretön määrä tapoja, joilla evaluaatioita 
voidaan ilmaista. Toinen Donin mainitsema tekijä on kontekstin vaikutus tekstin 
tulkitsemiseen. Kolmantena käsitellään yksittäisten evaluaatioiden rajojen määrittämistä 
eli sitä, mitä lasketaan kuuluvaksi kuhunkin evaluaatioon. Don käsittelee tunnistamisen 
yhteydessä myös eksplisiittisten ja implisiittisten evaluaatioiden kategorisoimista, mutta 
omasta mielestäni se on pikemminkin kategorisointia koskeva kysymys, ei niinkään 
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tunnistamista. Sen sijaan se, miten implisiittiset evaluaatiot ylipäänsä löydetään tekstistä, 
on mielestäni tunnistamiseen liittyvä haaste. 
 Tutkimuksen analyysiosuus alkaa evaluaatioiden kohteiden tunnistamisella ja 
ryhmittelyllä. Varsinaiset kohteet (esim. fysiologi/physiologist, opettaja/teacher ja 
tutkija/researcher) tulee ensin löytää aineistosta, minkä jälkeen niille määritetään 
yleistermi (tässä tapauksessa vivisektion tekijä/vivisector), joka toimii analyysissä 
Kohteena. Lisäksi joistain Kohteista muodostetaan laajempia ryhmiä, jotka 
mahdollistavat hedelmällisemmän analyysin tekemisen. Esimerkiksi erilaisista muussa 
kuin koe-eläintoiminnassa hyödynnettävistä eläimistä (esim. kettujahdissa käytettävät 
ketut tai karjataloudessa käytettävät emakot) muodostetaan yhteinen kategoria muut 
eläimet (other animals).  
 Kohteiden tunnistamisen ja ryhmittelyn jälkeen suoritetaan varsinainen appraisal-
analyysi yllä esitettyjen kategorioiden mukaisesti. Analyysissä käsitellään lisäksi eläinten 
kipuun ja kärsimykseen liittyviä evaluaatioita. Seuraavaksi on vuorossa evaluaation 
kumulatiivisuuteen ja implisiittisiin evaluaatioihin liittyvä osuus. Lopuksi esitellään, 
miten materiaalissa esiintyvien evaluaatioiden rajat määritettiin. 
 Alustava hypoteesini oli, että eläinten suojelemisen ja koe-eläinten käytön 
todellisen rajoittamisen sijaan laki legitimoi koe-eläintoiminnan ja sitä kautta tuki sen 
kehittymistä vakiintuneeksi ja välttämättömäksi osaksi lääketieteellistä ja monenlaista 
muuta tieteellistä tutkimusta. Oletin, että tämä muutos puolestaan näkyisi arvottavassa 
kielessä jollakin tavalla. Pidin mahdollisena, että lain tuoma legitimiteetti tekisi 
eläinkokeiden puolustajista itsevarmempia, mikä saattaisi näkyä kirjeissä esim. 
vivisektion vastustajiin kohdistuvien, (eksplisiittisten) negatiivisten Tuomintojen tai 
vivisektion puolustajiin kohdistuvien, (eksplisiittisten) positiivisten Tuomintojen määrän 
kasvuna. Vaihtoehtoisesti, itsevarmuus saattaisi aiheuttaa sen, että kirjoittajat—jotka ovat 
siis vivisektion vastustajia—tuntisivat vähemmän tarvetta vakuuttaa lukijoitaan ja näin 
ollen käyttäisivät vähemmän vivisektioon kohdistuvia, (eksplisiittisiä) positiivisia 
Arvostuksia tai vivisektion puolustajiin kohdistuvia, (ekplisiittisiä) positiivisia 
Tuomintoja.  
 Analyysin perusteella merkittävimmät evaluoinnin kohteet kirjeissä ovat 
vivisektio (vivisection), vivisektion vastustajat (anti-vivisectionists), vivisektion 
puolustajat (pro-vivisectionists), vivisektion puolustajien lausunnot (anti-vivisectionists’ 
statements), eläimet (animals), muu eläinten käyttö (other animal use) sekä sairaudet 
(disease) ja potilaat (patient). Vivisektion puolustajat evaluoidaan lähes aina positiivisesti 
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ja useimmiten littyen heidän pystyvyyteensä tai soveliaisuuteensa. Vivisektion vastustajat 
sen sijaan evaluoidaan lähes aina negatiivisesti ja useimmiten heidän pystyvyyteensä 
liittyen. Vivisektion puolustajien lausunnot evaluoidaan aina negatiivisesti, lukuun 
ottamatta yhtä positiivista tapausta, jota käytetään sarkastisesti. Eläimet ovat aineistossa 
useimmiten tuntijoina, mutta muutaman kerran myös evaluaation kohteina. Koe-eläinten 
kipu kielletään vivisektiota arvottavissa evaluaatioissa käyttämällä evaluaatioita, joissa 
eläimen negatiivinen tunne kielletään (negated positive evaluation), esim. ”is not 
suffering”. Muita eläimiä koskeva käytön kuvataan sen sijaan aiheuttavan ko. eläimille 
kipua ja kärsimystä käyttämällä negatiivisia evaluaatioita, esim. ”suffers”. Kaikki 
aineistossa esiintyvät sairauksia koskevat evaluaatiot ovat negatiivisia ja ilmaistu sekä 
Tunteen että Arvostuksen avulla. Potilaisiin liittyvät evaluaatiot ovat sekä negatiivisia 
että positiivisia ja potilas esiityy niissä sekä tuntijana että kohteena. Negatiiviset 
evaluaatiot kohdistuvat potilaiden itsensä lisäksi sairauksiin. Positiiviset evaluaatiot joko 
kuvaavat potilaita onnekkaina (lucky) tai hyödyllisinä (useful), tai potilas evaluoi niissä 
eläinkokeita, lääketieteellisiä operaatioita (jotka on kehitetty eläinkokeiden avulla) tai 
lääkäreitä (jotka suorittavat näitä operaatioita). 
 Merkittävimmät muutokset liittyen Cruelty to Animals Act 1876 -lakiin sen sijaan 
liittyvät vivisektioon liitettäviin ominaisuuksiin, eläimiin, sairauksiin ja potilaisiin: lain 
voimaantulon jälkeen eläinkokeet evaluoidaan hyödyllisiksi selkeästi useammin kuin 
ennen lakia. Tämän lisäksi eläimet ovat sekä evaluaation kohteina että erityisesti 
evaluaatioiden tekijöinä tunteidensa kautta—eli tuntijoina—selkeästi useammin ennen 
lakia kuin sen jälkeen, kun taas potilaat ja sairaudet, eli ihmiset ja heidän mahdolliset 
sairautensa, ovat puheenaiheina selkeästi useammin lain voimaantulon jälkeen kuin sitä 
ennen.  
  Nämä tulokset osoittavat mielestäni selvästi, että yleisönosastokirjoitusten 
evaluatiivisessa kielessä on tapahtunut muutos sen jälkeen, kun Cruelty to Animals Act 
1876 tuli voimaan. Tulokset viittaavat myös siihen, että lain voimaantulo muutti ihmisten 
asenteita vivisektiota kohtaan eläinten kannalta epäedulliseen suuntaan. Vaikuttaa siltä, 
että kun ennen lakia eläimet ja eläinten kärsimys olivat vielä suhteellisen usein 
keskustelunaiheena, niin lakimuutokseen jälkeen eläimet saivat väistyä eläinkokeiden 
mahdollisten hyötyjen ja ihmisten hyvinvoinnin tieltä. Tämä puolestaan antaa viitteitä 
siitä, että maailman ensimmäinen koe-eläimiä koskeva laki tosiaan suojelikin koe-
eläintoimintaa itse eläinten sijaan ja samalla tuki eläinkokeiden nousemista erittäin paljon 
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käytetyksi ja vakiintuneeksi tavaksi tehdä sekä lääketieteellistä että monenlaista muuta 
tieteellistä tutkimusta. 
